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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The Mechanistic and Normative Structure of Agency 
 
by 
 
Richard Jason Winning 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy and Cognitive Science 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
Professor William Bechtel, Chair 
 
I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and 
agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of science and that also 
does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents and agency as they are 
understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and economics. The 
framework I develop is internal perspectivalist. That is to say, it counts agents as real in a 
perspective-dependent way, but not in a way that depends on an external perspective. Whether 
or not something counts as an agent depends on whether it is able to have a certain kind of 
perspective. My approach differs from many others by treating possession of a perspective as 
more basic than the possession of agency, representational content/vehicles, cognition, 
intentions, goals, concepts, or mental or psychological states; these latter capabilities require 
xv 
the former, not the other way around. I explain what it means for a system to be able to have a 
perspective at all, beginning with simple cases in biology, and show how self-contained 
normative perspectives about proper function and control can emerge from mechanisms with 
relatively simple dynamics. I then describe how increasingly complex control architectures can 
become organized that allow for more complex perspectives that approach agency. Next, I 
provide my own account of the kind of perspective that is necessary for agency itself, the goal 
being to provide a reference against which other accounts can be compared. Finally, I introduce 
a crucial distinction that is necessary for understanding human agency: that between 
inclinational and committal agency, and venture a hypothesis about how the normative 
perspective underlying committal agency might be mechanistically realized. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a framework for understanding the nature 
of agents and agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of 
science and that also does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents 
and agency as they are understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, 
robotics, and economics. Here, ‘agent’ is understood as referring to an entity that can perform 
actions (as opposed to merely doing things); a human is an agent, whereas a toaster is not. 
Developing a cross-disciplinary framework for understanding agency is a difficult task because 
agency is not a univocal concept. In some contexts (e.g., where it may not even make much 
sense to speak of cognition, mentality, or consciousness), simple robots and organisms are 
counted as agents. In others, like economics and social psychology, agency is associated with 
complex capacities like rational deliberation and long-term planning. Rather than fixing on a 
single definition of agency, then, this dissertation develops a systematic framework of 
interrelated concepts in terms of which more or less demanding notions of agency can be 
defined and distinguished. 
There are two assumptions that I make that crucially shape the way this dissertation 
proceeds. First, I assume that agents are real. Agents are not merely instrumentally useful 
fictions or posits. In fact, it would not make sense for this to be true: in order for there to be a 
posit, something (an agent) must be there to do the positing. So agents cannot themselves 
simply be posits. They must have objective existence that is independent of other minded 
beings. 
The second assumption I make is that agent is not a natural kind. In other words, there 
is no single division between what counts as an agent and what doesn’t that is the ultimately 
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“right” one, in a sense that is perspective-independent. Whether or not something counts as an 
agent is context-dependent. This is even true in a sense that goes beyond the mere 
observation that ‘agent’ is defined in different ways. On many of the ways ‘agency’ is defined in 
different fields, there will not be a perspective-independent way of drawing boundary lines 
around what counts as an agent and what doesn’t. 
The present work differs from other discussions of agency in that it takes both of these 
assumptions seriously and applies them consistently. Other accounts implicitly or explicitly 
relax one or both of these assumptions at various times. It might seem that there is no other 
choice but to do so. How can something be real in a mind-independent way, but also have an 
existence that is ineliminably perspectival? There is only one possibility: an agent must be 
capable of defining its own existence by means of its own perspective. And the possession of a 
perspective must be more basic than the possession of a mind: something can have a 
perspective without having a mind. 
But how can something be real in a way that depends on itself being real? If something 
is grounded in itself, it might be objected, then it is grounded in nothing at all. The solution to 
this requires a key insight made by Daniel Dennett (1991): even when it is in question whether 
something is real as an entity, we can allow that it exists as a real pattern. The key, then, is that 
a perspective can emerge merely by means of the emergence of a certain kind of pattern.1 
Once this happens, the perspective can ground the existence of other things. The reality of an 
agent as an entity depends on its reality as a pattern. Chapters 2 and 3 provide substantiation 
and argumentation for this line of reasoning. 
Among other things, an agent is a kind of mechanism. A person is a mechanism, in the 
sense that a person’s behavior is explainable in terms of the causal organization of his or her 
parts. The geyser Old Faithful is also a mechanism in this sense (though in the case of Old 
                                                            
1 On the difference between the emergence of being (or the emergence of an entity) and the emergence 
of a pattern, see Winning and Bechtel (forthcoming). 
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Faithful we don’t refer to the causal organization of its parts as its “physiology”). It makes sense 
to ask for the reason why Old Faithful erupts on a given occasion, just as it makes sense to ask 
for the reason why a person stands up on a given occasion. But whereas it also makes sense 
to inquire into the person’s reason for standing up, it would not make sense to inquire into Old 
Faithful’s reason for erupting. This is because whereas persons are agents, Old Faithful is not 
an agent. Whereas Old Faithful engages in behaviors (i.e., erupting), Old Faithful does not 
perform actions; only agents do that. What is distinctive about agents is that some of their 
behaviors count as actions, i.e., behaviors that are performed for the agent’s own reason.2 
We often treat many kinds of organisms as agents (i.e., as if they have their own 
reasons for doing what they do). Certain kinds of artificial intelligence systems and robots might 
also be viewed as having reasons for what they do (especially those that are designed to 
engage in means-end reasoning or deliberation). But in general, machines and inanimate 
objects don’t have their own reasons for their behaviors. A toaster doesn’t toast bread for any 
reason at all (though its human user may have a reason in mind); it just does it. 
One might be tempted to say that the toaster can’t have its own reason for doing 
anything because its causal organization fully constrains its behavior. But this is also true of 
persons: human beings are of course fully constrained by their causal organization (i.e., their 
physiology) to behave the way they do as well. In fact, all agents are mechanisms: all 
organisms and artificial systems that count as agents are similarly constrained to act the way 
they do by the causal organization of their parts. What, then, is the special nature of the causal 
organization of certain mechanisms in virtue of which they count as agents, i.e., what kind of 
pattern must emerge for there to exist an agent? That is the question with which much of this 
                                                            
2 When speaking about the agent’s own reasons, the reasons I am referring to are agent-relative (as 
opposed to agent-neutral; Portmore, 2013) and motivating (as opposed to moral, or what Parfit, 1997 
calls “normative”) reasons. 
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dissertation is concerned. In the rest of this introduction, I provide an overview of how the 
chapters unfold. 
Chapter 2 draws from the work of New Mechanist philosophers of science to describe 
reality as composed of an ontologically dense “rainforest” (as Ross, 2000 puts it) of modal real 
patterns that are not, as Craver (2013, p. 140) puts it, “prechunked into mechanisms” (nor, for 
that matter, into objects and properties). What counts as a mechanism often depends on the 
context of explanation and on the explanatory interests of the biologist in question. 
Mechanisms therefore only exist, or are “real,” as mechanisms, only in virtue of having been 
identified as such, usually by biologists (though they are real as patterns in an unqualified 
sense). Chapter 2 explores the metaphysical ramifications of this and presents an ontological 
framework, grounded not in philosophical armchair speculation but in scientific practice, 
centered on the ontological category of constraints, a notion that was foundational to the 
development of later forms of classical mechanics as well as quantum mechanics, but mostly 
neglected by philosophers. The existence of constraints is not dependent on perspectives. But 
when we define boundaries around systems of constraints and consider them at certain levels 
of detail, perspectivally-dependent causal powers, objects, properties, and mechanisms 
emerge. Chapter 2 spells out how the characteristics possessed by mechanisms and their 
parts (including those that allow for mechanistic explanation) can emerge from the ontological 
bedrock of constraints combined with the perspective-taking of external observers. 
As noted earlier, this would seem to present a conundrum: if agents are mechanisms, 
and mechanisms are ontologically dependent on perspectives, but perspectives depend on 
agents (i.e., somebody has to do the perspective-taking), then agents seem locked in an 
ontological chicken-and-egg paradox. If agent A only exists because of agent B’s perspective, 
and agent B only exists because of agent C’s perspective, etc. then how does the entire chain 
of agents exist? Is there a perspective-taker whose existence is not grounded in a perspective? 
I argue that this regress problem can only be solved by dropping a key assumption: that of 
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external perspectivalism. External perspectivalism says that if the existence of X is dependent 
on Y’s having a certain perspective, then Y must be (physically or ontologically) external to X. 
The denial of this thesis yields internal perspectivalism: X can be what has the perspective that 
X’s own existence as an instance of a perspective-dependent ontological category C (e.g., 
mechanism) depends on. In other words, X’s possession of a certain perspective can ground 
X’s own ontological characteristics. Something like this idea is central to the Autopoietic 
approach to theoretical biology (e.g., Varela, 1997).  
But now, internal perspectivalism might seem to be describing things as ontologically 
grounded in nothing: the perspective-haver and the perspective-having are mutually grounding, 
but their mutual grounding flows in an infinite cycle that never seems to be grounded by 
anything else. The key here is to realize that the perspective-haver, like everything, also has a 
non-perspectival existence as a real pattern, i.e., as a particular organization of constraint. 
What is distinctive about those systems of constraint that define their own perspectival 
existence must be that they possess a certain distinctive kind of organization. My approach 
differs from many others by treating possession of a perspective as more basic than the 
possession of agency, representational content/vehicles, cognition, intentions, goals, concepts, 
or mental or psychological states; these latter capabilities require the former, not the other way 
around. But a crucial question emerges: what is the minimal organization that is necessary and 
sufficient for a system to have its own perspective? 
To begin to understand the minimal conditions for a physical system to have a 
perspective, I turn in Chapter 3 to the philosophical debate about the nature of biological proper 
functions. The practice of biologists seems to presuppose objective divisions between what 
counts as proper versus improper function for biological systems. This is in fact key to the 
mechanistic perspectives they take that are discussed in Chapter 2. I examine a number of 
non-perspectival attempts to analyze proper function, finding that they fail because it is 
impossible to analyze a normative standard in a way that does not make reference to a 
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perspective. As I explain in Chapter 3, a perspective is needed to establish the categories of 
entities to which the normative standard applies; a normative standard can only apply to a 
world that has been ontologically “carved” (or in Craver’s language, “chunked”), i.e., it can only 
apply to a scheme that establishes which real patterns will be counted as “the same” and which 
will not. 
But I also argue that the activity of “natural selection” does not imply any fixed 
perspective, and attempts to ground biological proper function in the external perspectives of 
scientists also fail. Proper function within a biological system ultimately must be grounded in 
that system’s own ability to have a perspective on what it is the job of some part(s) or trait(s) to 
perform, and how to intervene when they are not performing their job properly. I then describe 
how this is possible: certain types of biological molecules are capable of sorting other objects in 
their surroundings into discrete types, and enacting categorical responses depending on which 
type the objects they come into contact with fall into. These molecules are organized into larger 
schemes that test for certain conditions and enact differential responses depending on which 
condition is present (i.e., to leave things alone if they are functioning normally, or intervene if 
they are not). I explain the sense in which such organized activities can provide an internal 
perspectivalist, determinate grounding for a normative standard of functioning within biological 
systems. 
In Chapter 4, I attempt to draw a more general lesson from the special case of proper 
function normativity, to argue that any system that grounds a normative standard by means of 
its own internal perspective must possess a certain type of organization: in my terminology, it 
must count as an observer-worker system. I explain the sense in which an observer-worker 
system can ground the most basic kind of normative standard that can exist physically: a 
standard of what counts as thermodynamical work. Such a system also counts as an observer 
in a way that is independent of whether an external observer considers it as such. An observer-
worker system minimally classifies events in its environment according to a discrete 
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categorization scheme, and produces behavioral responses that are only sensitive to such 
events at the level of detail of their category type (i.e., its behavior is not sensitive to difference 
between events past a certain level of detail). As I explain, this way of understanding the 
fundamental requirements for the grounding of a normative system owes a great deal to the 
work of Howard Pattee. 
I then go on in Chapter 4 to define another type of normativity that (like proper function 
normativity) is a special case of observer-worker normativity, but that is distinct from proper 
function normativity. This is the normativity of control. To say that X controls Y means more 
than simply that X causally influences Y: it means that X’s causal influence exceeds a certain 
type of threshold (sufficient to separate it from being “mere influence” rather than control). This 
way of defining control is inspired by the work of Nicholas Rescher. An autonomous controller 
is one that has its own perspective on where this threshold lies. A large part of Chapter 4 is 
then devoted to describing a number of kinds of organization that a system can possess in 
virtue of which it can ground such normative standards. 
Agents are a certain kind of autonomous control system, but they are a very 
sophisticated kind.3 In fact, there are a number of types of autonomous controllers that are 
referred to as ‘agents’ or that are ascribed characteristics that are associated with agency, 
such as goal-directedness. Workers in different disciplines do not universally agree on what 
kinds of control systems should be called ‘agents’, and this fact sometimes makes it difficult for 
ideas to be translated from one discipline to another. In Chapter 4, I focus on the kinds of 
features that control systems can have in virtue of which they can possess control perspectives 
that increasingly approach the kind of sophistication that human agents possess. The goal here 
                                                            
3 It should be noted here that ‘autonomous’ is used with respect to agency in many contexts with a 
different meaning than the one used here. For example, “autonomous” robots are those that can set their 
own top-level goals or that can function independently in a given environment. Sometimes ‘autonomous’ 
refers to a person’s ability to make their own decisions. My usage of ‘autonomous’ is much more basic, 
and simply refers to any control system that has its own internal perspective on what kind of influence 
counts as control. 
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is to create a more neutral vocabulary so that various ways of understanding agential concepts 
from different domains can be compared and translated. As Davidson writes, 
We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it as mindless, 
and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for describing thought and intentional 
action; what we lack is a way of describing what is in between. This is particularly 
evident when we speak of the “intentions” and “desires” of simple animals; we 
have no better way to explain what they do. (1999, p. 11) 
Chapter 4 attempts to fill this lacuna. 
If there is one characteristic that is most common across the diverse ways that agency 
is understood, it is that agents are fundamentally systems capable of making choices. Chapter 
5 is based on the basic presupposition that the ability to make choices requires the ability to 
possess a distinct kind of perspective (beyond those considered in Chapter 4), and therefore a 
distinct kind of organization. All control systems make selections, but this is not the same thing 
as making a choice. In particular, when making a choice, what gets selected is a state of affairs 
against other states of affairs, on the basis that the chosen state of affairs is preferred over the 
others.  
The key to understanding the capacity for choice is then to understand what it means to 
have a perspective that includes states of affairs, and on which some states of affairs are 
preferred over others. What I argue in Chapter 5 is that this involves having a perspective on 
which some things are potentially under my control sometimes and not under my control at 
other times. In this way, a representational content is not merely decoupled from particular 
behaviors; it is semantically decoupled from control as such. This represents the point where a 
system can have a perspective on something that does not essentially connect it to whether or 
how it is under the system’s control. I argue that this is the emergence of objective 
representational contents. By representing this way, a system is able to have not merely its 
own perspective, but its own reasons. It can have a preference of one state of affairs over 
another, where the preference itself does not imply what must be done to obtain that state of 
affairs. Other objective representations of causal relations between states of affairs must be 
 
 
9 
combined with representations of potential actions and their causal consequences to engage in 
practical reasoning to obtain the preferred state of affairs. 
This results in a relatively demanding definition of agency that, when combined with the 
broader taxonomy of agent-like control system architectures of Chapter 4, can provide a rich 
vocabulary for understanding how different approaches to understanding agency are related. 
However, they leave out a crucial phenomenon that is mostly associated with human agency: 
commitment. Humans are capable not merely of objective representations and acting on 
reasons pertaining to the situation at hand, but they can also form and act on commitments 
(e.g., plans or promises) that constrain how they will reason and act in the future. In Chapter 6, 
I argue that this is a fundamentally distinct type of perspective that cannot be explained by 
means of the machinery introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. The difference here is that the agent’s 
own self, as agent, becomes not just the subject but the object of its own agency: it becomes 
one of the things that has been, and will be, either under its control or not under its control in 
various ways at various times. It doesn’t just see its own body or its cognitive capacities as 
tools for its own use: it sees its own agency as a tool for its own use. And it can subject itself to 
its own past commands, as well as subordinate its future self to its current self. In Chapter 6, I 
not only explore what this means conceptually but also forward a hypothesis about the nature 
of how a system could be mechanistically organized to realize such a perspective. 
There are a number of core philosophical debates that, although relevant to the issues 
at hand, I will not have space to directly address in this dissertation. The debate at the center of 
the branch of philosophy known as the philosophy of action is the “problem of deviant causal 
chains,” i.e., the problem of defining when a movement or a behavior counts as an action. The 
debate at the center of the branch of philosophy known as epistemology is the problem of 
defining when a true belief counts as knowledge. The debate at the center of the branch of 
philosophy known as the philosophy of mind is the “mind-body problem,” i.e., the problem of 
defining the nature of minds and how they are related to non-mental entities. Three of the core 
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problems within moral philosophy are the problems of personal identity and of how freedom of 
the will and moral responsibility are compatible with the universe as existing in the causal 
framework depicted by science. However, this dissertation does address the basic puzzle that 
underlies all of these problems and that has made their solution so elusive over the centuries: 
the puzzle of understanding how something can simultaneously be mind-independently real, 
ineliminably dependent on a perspective, and capable of providing a non-normative grounding 
for normative properties. What is needed to solve this puzzle in any given case is an observer-
worker system (introduced in Chapter 4). The present framework, then, not only can facilitate 
interdisciplinary work on agency but can also pave the way for substantial progress to be made 
on these core debates in future work. 
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Chapter 2  
Mechanistic Causation and Constraints: 
Perspectival Parts and Powers, 
Non-Perspectival Modal Patterns 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Mechanistic explanation is ubiquitous in science, and philosophy of science has been 
making great progress in gaining a realistic understanding of the epistemic practices of 
scientists. Less progress has been made in understanding the metaphysical implications of 
these new insights about mechanistic explanation. I argue that this is due to the fact that as a 
result of the insights gained about mechanistic explanation, there are now at least five key 
desiderata that must be satisfied by any account of its metaphysical underpinnings, and no 
extant account has managed to satisfy all five. In this chapter, I lay out these five desiderata 
and explain why existing accounts of the metaphysics of mechanistic causation fail to satisfy 
them. I then present an alternative account which does satisfy the five desiderata. According to 
this alternative account, we must resort to a type of ontological entity that is new to 
metaphysics, but that has been familiar to scientists for two centuries: constraints. In this 
chapter, I explain how a constraints-based metaphysics fits best with the emerging consensus 
on the nature of mechanistic explanation.4 
  
                                                            
4 I do not discuss it in this chapter, but there is arguably a sixth desideratum: the need to account for 
control relationships in biological mechanisms. To see how the present constraint-based framework rises 
to this challenge, see Winning and Bechtel (2018). 
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2.2 Five Desiderata for an Account of Mechanistic Causation 
 
The standard scientific realist ontology has it that objects (here conceived broadly 
enough to include entities such as particles and fields) exist, they have properties, and the 
universe has laws that determine what happens to these objects and properties over time. 
Scientists discover these laws and are able to explain observations of objects and properties 
and how they change (that is, phenomena) by reference to the laws. 
Much has been written recently about the fact that, prima facie at least, this picture 
does not fit the epistemic practices of scientists in a number of domains, for example in biology. 
Biologists do not generally seek out or refer to laws to explain phenomena (Smart, 1963, pp. 
50–61; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 422); instead, biological explanations often appeal to 
mechanisms (Polányi, 1958, p. 357; Wimsatt, 1976, p. 671). What are the implications of this 
fact for the scientific realist ontology? One might respond to this fact by denying scientific 
realism in general, or denying realism about mechanisms in particular.5 Perhaps scientific 
explanations in general, or mechanistic explanations in particular, are not true by virtue of 
referring to real entities in the first place. Maybe biologists’ mechanisms are mere metaphors or 
useful fictions. 
No attempt will be made in this chapter to defend any stance on debates between 
realism and antirealism. Instead, I want to begin by adopting the most straightforward 
metaphysical interpretation of the practice of biologists and granting the New Mechanist view 
that “mechanisms are real systems in nature” (Bechtel, 2006, p. 33), in order to see what type 
of view about causation squares best with treating mechanisms as real in some robust sense. 
                                                            
5 The question of whether or not mechanisms are real is orthogonal to the debate about the metaphysics 
of explanations, i.e., whether explanations themselves consist of causal structures (the “ontic view” of 
explanations) or representations (the “epistemic view”; see Glennan, 2017, Section 8.2 for an excellent 
overview of this debate). 
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What is a scientific realist to conclude from the fact that biology explains in terms of real 
mechanisms rather than laws? When we look at the reasons why New Mechanists have 
rejected conventional accounts of causation,6 the five desiderata will emerge. 
 
2.2.1 The First Two Desiderata: Intrinsicness and Productivity 
 
One of the themes of the New Mechanist literature is that mechanisms and their 
components are productive of changes, and that this productive nature is intrinsic to them. A 
mechanistic explanation does not merely describe occurrent regularities in the way a system 
changes over time and posit some type of external principle of change, such as laws, for the 
purpose of assigning responsibility for the production of these changes. Instead, with 
mechanistic explanation, what is responsible for producing changes lies within the mechanism 
itself, and the buck stops there. Machamer, Darden, and Craver (henceforth MDC) explain that 
in this sense, mechanistic explanation implies the rejection of a certain type of Humeanism 
about causation: 
We should not be tempted to follow Hume and later logical empiricists into 
thinking that the intelligibility of activities (or mechanisms) is reducible to their 
regularity. … Rather, explanation involves revealing the productive relation. 
(2000, pp. 21–22) 
MDC argue that traditional ontological categories such as that of object, property, or process, 
which allow us to talk about the intrinsic nature of mechanisms, are not sufficient for 
characterizing the productive nature of mechanisms, and they argue that we must make room 
for activities as a category in our ontology: 
                                                            
6 New Mechanists like Craver (2007) have sometimes adopted Woodward’s (2003) manipulability account 
of causal explanation, but it is important to keep in mind that Woodward’s account is intended only to be 
an account of “how we think about, learn about, and reason with various causal notions and about their 
role in causal explanation” (2008, p. 194), not an account of the metaphysics of causation. Additionally, 
Glennan has argued that the virtues of Woodward’s account of the epistemology of causal reasoning “[do] 
not legitimate the manipulability theory as a metaphysical account of causation” (2009, p. 318). 
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… it is artificial and impoverished to describe mechanisms solely in terms of 
entities, properties, interactions, inputs-outputs, and state changes over time. 
Mechanisms do things. They are active and so ought to be described in terms of 
the activities of their entities, not merely in terms of changes in their properties. 
(2000, p. 5) 
MDC argue that activities themselves underwrite the modal characteristics (for example, 
counterfactuals) of causal relations, being “the producers of change” (2000, p. 4), and that 
therefore, “[n]o philosophical work is done by positing some further thing, a law, that 
underwrites the productivity of activities” (2000, p. 8). 
But there is a further ontological alternative to activities that MDC must address: causal 
powers (also known as ‘capacities’ or ‘dispositions’). MDC give short shrift to this alternative 
conception in their 2000 paper. Their remarks are confined to the following: 
Substantivalists thus speak of entities with capacities (Cartwright, 1989) or 
dispositions to act. However, in order to identify a capacity of an entity, one must 
first identify the activities in which that entity engages. One does not know that 
aspirin has the capacity to relieve a headache unless one knows that aspirin 
produces headache relief. (2000, pp. 4–5) 
MDC therefore conclude that it is activities that are fundamental, and dispositions or capacities 
are ontologically secondary to them. Here, MDC have made the mistake of conflating epistemic 
priority with metaphysical priority. Cartwright has argued that knowledge of capacities does not 
reduce to knowledge of activities: “The knowledge we have of the capacity of a feature is not 
knowledge of what things with that feature do but rather knowledge of the nature of the feature” 
(1999, p. 78). But even if it were necessary to identify the occurrence of an activity before one 
could identity the capacity to engage in the activity, as MDC argue, it would not follow that the 
capacities are ontologically dependent on activities, and activities are therefore more 
fundamental. 
Machamer makes a slightly different argument in a later paper: 
activities are better off ontologically than some people’s ontic commitments to 
capacities, dispositions, tendencies, propensities, powers, or endeavours. All 
these concepts are derivative from activities. … [T]he active exercise of a 
capacity has to be ontologically prior to any mysterious property called “the ability 
to exercise that capacity.” (2004, p. 30) 
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Instead of arguing from epistemic priority to ontic priority, Machamer is arguing from conceptual 
priority to ontic priority. Machamer explicitly states the underlying premise of this argument on 
the same page: “being able to recognize what a capacity does when actualized or the activity 
that constitutes it presupposes having the concept of the activity” (2004, p. 30). Again, there is 
a conflation at work: conceptual priority is not the same thing as ontological priority. But further, 
it’s not clear that the premise itself is true. As Aristotle argued, it is only the conception of a 
capacity (or “potentiality”) that allows us to make sense of an entity persisting through a change 
in its activity (Gill, 1989, pp. 185ff). Hence, it’s not obvious that activities are conceptually prior 
to capacities. 
The above arguments are not the primary reason why powers and capacities have 
been mostly avoided by philosophers of science. The primary reason was alluded to in the 
quotation from Machamer: causal powers and their ilk are often viewed by philosophers of 
science as something to be avoided, because they are viewed as mysterious as well as alien to 
science. This brings us to the next desideratum. 
 
2.2.2 The Third Desideratum: Scientific Validity/Non-Mysteriousness 
 
While Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) have argued in favor of a robust, Aristotelian 
account of causal powers to ground the inherent activeness of mechanisms, and others7 have 
understood biological causation in terms of causal powers, the New Mechanist philosophers 
have generally been unwilling to fully embrace an Aristotelian picture of causation that imbues 
the entities within mechanisms with causal powers.8 There are a couple of reasons for this. 
                                                            
7 For example, Gillett (2007), Dupré (2007), Deacon (2011, pp. 364–368), Mumford and Anjum (2011, pp. 
218–220), and Moreno and Mossio (2015). 
8 Glennan at times writes of capacities and powers (e.g., 2017, pp. 31–35) but they are not basic 
categories in his ontology and take a backseat to activities (e.g., 2017, pp. 50 & 148). This is apparently 
because Glennan denies that capacities are ‘intrinsic features’ of their bearers (2017, p. 52). But on the 
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First, scientists don’t tend to talk in a way that makes it obvious that they are committed to the 
reality of entities like powers.9 Second, it has sometimes been argued (for example, by 
Machamer, 2004) that causal powers are mysterious. Why believe that causal powers are 
more mysterious than activities (that is, the actual behavior)? Because causal powers are 
dispositional. This fact, by itself, has often led philosophers to claim that causal powers are 
ontologically secondary to occurrent events and properties. 
But what is it about dispositions that makes them mysterious? Consider what Nelson 
Goodman had to say on this subject: 
The peculiarity of dispositional predicates is that they seem to be applied to 
things in virtue of possible rather than actual occurrences—and possible 
occurrences are for us no more admissible as unexplained elements than are 
occult capacities. The problem, then, is to explain how dispositional predicates 
can be assigned to things solely on the basis of actual occurrences and yet in 
due accordance with ordinary or scientific usage. (1954, p. 42) 
On Goodman’s understanding, then, that which is merely dispositional cannot be actual; there 
is no logical space for any alternative. But Heil (2005, 2012) argues that this is not the only way 
to understand the meaning of ‘dispositional’.10 When powers are conceived of as dispositions, 
he argues, they are conceived as something that is actual, part of the intrinsic nature of its 
bearers, even when not manifested. Similarly, for Harré and Madden, having a power versus 
not having power is not merely a difference in what objects can do, or might do, and it might 
not be a difference in what they will do at all. It is rather “a difference in what they themselves 
now are … a difference in intrinsic nature” (1975, p. 86). 
Heil’s way of understanding ‘dispositional’ opens up a way out of Machamer’s 
mysteriousness objection. But what could it mean for something to be part of the actual, 
                                                            
other hand, and interestingly, Glennan does characterize modal “relations of causal determination” as 
“intrinsic actual-world” features (2017, pp. 167–168). 
9 Cartwright has argued that a commitment to capacities or powers is “implicit … in the conventional 
methods for causal inference” (1989, p. 142) used by scientists, but many philosophers of science have 
remained unconvinced. 
10 See also Weissman’s (1965, pp. 84–85) criticism of Goodman’s view, which anticipates Heil’s argument 
in important respects. 
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intrinsic nature of an object, but in a non-manifested state? And can this be understood in a 
way that is grounded in the details of scientific practice? A positive account that answers these 
questions will have to wait until Section 2.4. I turn now to the remaining two desiderata. 
 
2.2.3 The Fourth Desideratum: Directionality 
 
Mechanistic activities are sometimes characterized as being directional. Among the 
New Mechanist philosophers of science, Bechtel has laid the greatest stress on the directional 
aspect of the activeness of mechanisms:  
The term activity … does not readily capture the fact that in most operations 
there is also something acted upon. This is the reason I have preferred the term 
operation. Typical of the operations I have in mind are the reactions of chemistry 
which prototypically involve a catalyst, a reactant, a product, and often a cofactor. 
(2006, p. 30; see also Bechtel, 2008, p. 14) 
In a similar vein, Glennan writes that “with respect to activities that are interactions, we often 
distinguish between the active ‘doer’ of the activity and the passive object of the activity” (2017, 
p. 31).11 In other words, one component might play a passive role in a mechanistic operation, 
while another plays an active role. For example, a chaperone molecule in a cell performs the 
operation of folding a protein. After folding is completed, the bonding structure of the protein 
has changed, but the chaperone returns to its original configuration after the operation is 
complete. The chaperone plays an active role in the process: it changes the structure of the 
folding substrate without itself being substantially altered in the process (any alterations to the 
chaperone are readily reversed so that it can play the same role on subsequent occasions). 
Several accounts of causation provide a natural interpretation for the directionality of 
causation. On the conserved quantity theory (Dowe, 2000), for example, one might explain 
                                                            
11 Glennan further adds the caveat that “this distinction is not a deep one, in the sense that all actors in an 
interaction produce changes in other actors, and often the active/passive distinction is a matter of degree” 
(2017, p. 31). In this respect, the directionality of activities manifests one of the ways that mechanisms 
are perspectival, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. 
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directionality by reference to the fact that one component in an operation gains a quantity of 
energy while another loses a quantity of energy. While this might be useful for identifying the 
components playing an energetically active versus passive role in metabolic processes in 
biology (the molecule supplying the energy for a reaction might be seen as the active 
component), it would fail with respect to many signaling or regulatory types of processes. Any 
account of mechanistic causation should be able to provide a substantive story about the 
directionality of causation that is consistent with scientific practice. 
This could potentially be another respect in which the causal powers approach has a 
leg up. A distinction between active and passive causal powers goes at least back to Locke, 
and has been revived in the form of ‘powers’ versus ‘liabilities’ by Harré and Madden (1975, p. 
89), as well as ‘backward-looking’ versus ‘forward-looking’ powers by Shoemaker (1998).12 
 
2.2.4 The Fifth Desideratum: Perspectival Nature of Mechanisms 
 
Another one of the recurring themes in the New Mechanist literature is that mechanisms 
are perspectival: the boundaries and identity conditions of mechanisms are fixed, in part, by the 
subjective mental states (for example, interests or perspectives) of scientists.13 Specifically, 
what counts as a mechanism is determined not by “what the mechanism invariably does but 
what we think it is supposed to do” (Craver, 2013, p. 140). Craver and Bechtel write that “there 
are no mechanisms simpliciter—only mechanisms for phenomena. A mechanism’s 
phenomenon partially determines the mechanism’s boundaries (i.e., what is ‘in the mechanism 
and what is not)” (2006, p. 469), but as Darden points out, “the choice of phenomenon is 
                                                            
12 It should be noted that a distinct notion of “directionality” or “directedness” pertaining to dispositions 
was discussed by Martin and Pfeifer (1986) and Molnar (2003). ‘Directionality’ in their sense merely refers 
to the relation between a disposition and its manifestations. 
13 This point was made earlier by Polányi (1958, p. 357), Kauffman (1971, pp. 259–260), and Glennan 
(1996, p. 52). 
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relative to the scientist’s interests” (2008, p. 960). Craver emphasizes that “the world does not 
come prechunked into mechanisms”; such chunking ineliminably will be contextually dependent 
on the phenomenon of interest, that is, “some behavior that the scientist is interested, for 
whatever reason, in explaining” (2013, p. 140). As a result, Craver characterizes his view as a 
kind of “perspectivalism about mechanisms”: 
Mechanistic and functional descriptions … presuppose a vantage point on the 
causal structure of the world, a stance taken by intentional creatures when they 
single out certain preferred behaviors as worthy of explanation. (2013, p. 134) 
Kuhlmann and Glennan write that “the New Mechanists agree that there is an inherent 
perspectivalism in the process of identifying and individuating parts” (2014, p. 339), which in 
turn is key to the individuation and identity conditions of the mechanisms themselves. 
This fifth desideratum, which has perhaps been most neglected in extant discussions of 
mechanistic causation, creates special difficulties for any attempt to provide a metaphysical 
account of mechanisms. Mechanistic processes are causal processes, and mechanisms are 
individuated relative to scientists’ explanatory interests. But surely, causation itself is objective 
and mind-independent (otherwise, an enormous amount of ink has been spilled on the mind-
body problem and the causal exclusion problem for nothing!). Further: above, I said that I 
would take for granted the New Mechanist view that “mechanisms are real systems in nature.” 
How do we square this with the “inherent perspectivalism” of the individuation and identity 
conditions of mechanisms? 
In the discussion leading up to Section 2.2.4, I have been drumming up the merits of 
causal powers as an approach to understanding the metaphysical underpinnings of 
mechanisms. But the causal powers approach does not offer much help once we consider the 
perspectival nature of mechanisms, and if anything, the causal powers approach only 
compounds the difficulties. MDC characterize causal powers approaches as fundamentally 
substantivalist; they are correct in the sense that an attribution of causal powers typically 
presupposes some scheme of individuation. On the usual picture of causal powers, they are 
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instantiated by individuals. To the extent that the individuation of mechanistic parts is 
dependent on the perspectives taken by scientists, then, the individuation of causal powers will 
be as well. In other words, powers are relative to a stance that one takes about what counts as 
an individual and what does not.14 
Among the traditional options, causal powers are the best way to conceptualize 
mechanistic causation, but they cannot metaphysically be the end of the story. Instead, a new 
approach is needed that provides the necessary metaphysical foundation for understanding 
both causal powers and mechanistic causation and also satisfies the five desiderata. It is to this 
new approach that I now turn. 
 
2.3 Constraints and Causation 
 
2.3.1 Terminology 
 
2.3.1.1 Definition of ‘pattern’ or ‘structure’ 
For what follows, it is important first to get clear on the notion of a pattern or structure (I 
will treat these two terms as synonymous). A pattern is a repeatable way that things, parts, or 
portions of some kind of stuff (where ‘stuff’ is intended very broadly to include matter, energy, 
space, time, etc.) can be arranged or related in some way (when the underlying stuff is 
discretely divisible it is often referred to as the pattern’s “elements”). Something can exist as a 
pattern even if it does not satisfy the requirements of any other ontological category (examples 
of such ontological categories are object, property, event, etc.). All of the socks that I have ever 
lost, considered collectively, instantiate a pattern. They each exist somewhere (let’s assume 
                                                            
14 Additionally, Heil (2012, pp. 118–119) argues that distinctions that are made between active and 
passive roles for causal powers in causation are ineliminably perspectival even if powers themselves are 
not. 
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they are still intact) and in spatial relations with one another. Another set of socks could, in 
principle, also become spatially arranged in that way. But though there is a pattern in the set of 
socks I have lost—a real pattern—there is no real object whose parts those socks are. 
An important distinction about patterns is that between pattern types and pattern 
tokens. Only pattern types are repeatable; a pattern token is a single instance of the type and 
can only exist once. At any moment, for a pattern token to exist, there must be some kind of 
entities, material, or underlying stuff that the pattern is a pattern “of” at that moment. But at 
least for some kinds of patterns, the underlying stuff that instances a pattern can change over 
time while the same pattern token persists (as in the famous Ship of Theseus example). 
Patterns exist at multiple levels of grain. Suppose an ordinary person draws a circle on 
a sheet of paper. We could build a detection device that detects circles at a very coarse level of 
grain, and another one that makes much finer discriminations. The first device might detect a 
circle on the sheet of paper, whereas the “imperfections” or “noise” in the circle (that are due to 
the imperfections of the medium and of the artist) may prevent the second device from 
counting it as a circle. They are in fact sensitive to two different patterns: the first admits of a 
greater range of variation in its instances than the second. Similarly, the set of socks I have lost 
do not merely instantiate one spatial pattern, they instantiate a range of patterns of different 
levels of coarseness of grain. 
Pattern types may or may not include the nature of their elements or underlying stuff as 
part of their identity conditions. A sock-pattern (such as the one cited above) can only be 
instantiated by another set of socks. If a set of shoes became spatially arranged in the same 
way, they would instance the same spatial pattern but not the same sock-pattern (they cannot 
instance any sock-pattern; they are not socks). Consider two philosophers: A, who believes 
that the only things that are real are atoms and subatomic particles, and B, who believes that 
macro-scale objects are real. B points to a set of rocks arranged into a circle. A agrees that it is 
a circle, and that they are pointing to the same pattern. But A disagrees that it is a pattern of 
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rocks; A believes that it is a pattern of atoms, and not rocks. The pattern is the same, even 
though A and B disagree on how to ontologically categorize the medium that instantiates it. In 
fact, they might even agree that the pattern A sees is at the same level of grain as the one B 
sees. It is this very observation that has given rise to the “structural realist” approach in 
philosophy of science, one version of which says that scientific progress mostly consists in 
progress in terms of learning structural facts, whereas science has a poorer track record when 
it comes to the discovery of facts about fundamental ontological categories. 
 
2.3.1.2 Definition of ‘causal pattern’ or ‘causal structure’ 
Also important for present purposes will be the notion of a causal pattern or causal 
structure (I also treat these as synonymous). In a causal system, some patterns (e.g., spatial 
patterns of a certain type of material) cannot help but give rise to certain other kinds of patterns 
at some time in the future. The result is a causal pattern: a repeatable way that patterns within 
the causal system will (by some sort of necessity or modal force weaker than logical necessity) 
change over time. In a Newtonian causal system containing only two masses at rest, for 
example, the two masses will attract one another. Their spatial arrangement at time t1 is 
constrained to change into a certain different arrangement at time t2: the two masses will 
become closer to one another. This causal pattern will be repeated with any other system of 
two masses at rest. 
Causal patterns, like any pattern, can exist at different levels of grain, and may or may 
not depend on their elements having certain properties. Causal patterns that are relations of 
patterns of a relatively coarse level of grain (like patterns of temperature or pressure) are more 
likely to be described in terms of probabilities instead of strict rules. 
If the causal pattern itself is thought to include a modal aspect (which the “Humean” 
would deny), then the pattern, to be a causal pattern, will be partly constituted by whatever 
gives it that modal force—e.g., powers or laws. If we abstract away from the power or law, it 
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becomes only a pattern of what did happen in the system, not a pattern of what must happen in 
the system. The two masses in the example above would no longer instance a pattern of 
attraction, only of moving closer together. As I discuss in the next few sections, philosophers 
disagree about how to ontologically characterize whatever it is that realizes the modal aspect of 
causal patterns (which they usually refer to as ‘causal structures’ instead; I will follow their 
usage from now on).  
 
2.3.2 Multi-Perspectival Realism and Causal Structure 
 
A new type of “multi-perspectival realism” (to use Wimsatt’s 2007 terminology) has 
been emerging that can offer us guidance to finding the right metaphysical account of 
mechanistic causation given the desiderata of Section 2.2. Sandra Mitchell, for example, 
writes: 
I will argue for a pluralist-realist approach to ontology, which suggests not that 
there are multiple worlds, but that there are multiple correct ways to parse our 
world, individuating a variety of objects and processes that reflect both causal 
structures and our interests. (2009, p. 13; see also Glennan, 2017, p. 93) 
Note that Mitchell takes the value of the approach to lie in the fact that it reflects our interests 
on the one hand, and causal structures on the other. On her view, the causal structures 
themselves exist out in the world, independently of human interests and perspectives, but we 
may adopt more than one perspective or ‘ways of parsing’ to talk about them.  In the words of 
Gordon Globus, “there is a ‘reality’ independent of perspective, and that ‘reality’ is structure” 
(1976, p. 282). So there are really two levels of realism here: a perspectival realism about 
objects and processes, and a non-perspectival realism about causal structures themselves. But 
the success of this approach hinges on the questions: what are “causal structures”? In what 
sense are they “real”? What is their metaphysical nature? Can they really do the work Mitchell 
needs them to do? 
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Wimsatt seems to make a similar kind of move, arguing that while scientists take 
multiple perspectives on how the world is carved up,  
this multiple rootedness need not lead to ‘anything goes’ perspectival relativism, 
or an anti-naturalist worship of common sense, experience, or language. It yields 
a kind of multi-perspectival realism anchored in the heterogeneity of ‘piecewise’ 
complementary approaches common in biology and the study of complex 
systems. (2007, p. 12) 
Like Mitchell, Wimsatt appeals a notion of causal structure that underwrites such perspectives: 
Ontologically, one could take the primary working matter of the world to be 
causal relationships, which are connected to one another in a variety of ways—
and together make up patterns of causal networks. … These networks should be 
viewed as a sort of bulk causal matter—an undifferentiated tissue of causal 
structures … Under some conditions, they are so richly connected that neither 
perspectives nor levels seem to capture their organization, and for this condition, 
I have coined the term “causal thickets.” (1994, p. 220) 
The question, again, is: How are we to characterize this “bulk causal matter” or causal-
structural “tissue”? “Thicket”… of what? 
 
2.3.3 Causal Structure as Laws 
 
The traditional way that philosophers have metaphysically characterized causal 
structures is by positing laws as something ontologically free-standing.15 Historians such as 
John Henry have traced this tradition back to Descartes. According to Henry (2004), it was 
Descartes who was primarily responsible for effecting a shift from the conception of causality 
as resulting from the intrinsic nature of things, as on the Aristotelian view, to a conception of 
causality as resulting from laws that are external to physical objects. Henry argues that before 
Descartes, the notion of a ‘natural law’ was primarily only invoked to refer to regularity in 
nature; such usages of ‘law’ were only descriptive and not explanatory. However, “laws” in 
                                                            
15 Salmon, who played an important role in the development of the New Mechanist philosophy, did not 
see causal structures as identical with laws, but instead as ‘governed’ by them (1984, p. 132). 
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themselves became central to explanation for Descartes because he considered causal 
efficacy itself to be located within laws, rather than merely described by them. 
Funkenstein (1986) argues that Descartes rejected the idea of physical objects having 
causal efficacy as part of their intrinsic nature because this was incompatible with his 
epistemology. Specifically, Descartes’s “skeptical analysis of sense perceptions” led to the 
result that 
“matter” (the object of sense perception) is first and foremost extension, for 
extension is the only determination of matter perceived “clearly and distinctly.” 
Mathematical relations (and geometry, for Descartes, is throughout quantifiable) 
constitute all that is known and all that can be known about matter. (Funkenstein, 
1986, p. 184) 
As a result, matter for Descartes was causally inert in itself. Henry argues that for Descartes, 
the idea of laws themselves being explanatory, which was novel at the time, was likely inspired 
by his background in mathematics. But in order to explain physical events, they also had to be 
causal. At the time of Descartes, the only intuitively plausible alternative to physical matter 
having intrinsic causal powers was to conceive of things as instead being caused by God. 
Henry argues that the idea of inanimate bodies being independently capable of “obeying” laws 
of nature would have been seen as an “awkward inherent implication” of Descartes’s position, 
had he not attributed the role of executing such laws to God. 
Eventually, however, Henry’s argument continues, people’s intuitions shifted so that the 
idea of inert matter operating according to laws became the conventional and default way of 
looking at physics. Boyle and Newton still conceived of natural laws as ultimately dependent on 
God for their execution, but by the nineteenth century, the idea of laws as being ontologically 
fundamental and free-standing, and as being the ultimate source of causal efficacy (or “self-
executing,” as it were), became commonplace. This was reinforced, of course, by the success 
of Newtonian mechanics, in which laws were taken to play a central explanatory role. Newton, 
who shared Descartes’s goal of creating a mathematical system of mechanics, followed 
Descartes in rejecting the idea of causal powers that inhered within physical objects, and 
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adopted a view of matter as causally inert and governed by laws. The Cartesian conception of 
a universe of physical objects causally directed by laws that were extrinsic to those objects 
continued as the dominant metaphysical picture for philosophers well into the twentieth 
century. On this picture, matter has no intrinsic causal structure of its own; causal explanations 
must therefore refer to the laws. 
It is important to note at this point that although Newtonian mechanics speaks of “laws,” 
it is not committed to any particular metaphysical picture. From here on, I will use ‘Cartesian 
laws’ to refer to the metaphysical conception of laws as universal and extrinsic to matter, and 
‘Newtonian laws’ to refer merely to equations of motion as formulated by Newtonian mechanics 
(abstracted from any given metaphysical interpretation). 
 
2.3.4 Causal Structures in Analytical Mechanics: Constraints 
 
The Newtonian formulation of mechanics is the one that philosophers generally 
associate with “classical mechanics.” But later formulations, now referred to as analytical 
mechanics—such as that of Joseph-Louis Lagrange, introduced in the eighteenth century, and 
that of William Rowan Hamilton, introduced in the nineteenth—are different from Newtonian 
mechanics in important ways that yield a different picture of the nature of causal structure. 
Before going into these, it is necessary to introduce some further terminology. 
Constraint. A constraint is a limitation on how a system can change. Constraints 
can be local or non-local. Consider a very simple physical system that consists of 
a particle inside a box, and another particle outside the box. The box instances 
two different constraints: it constrains the first particle from moving out of the 
region occupied by the box, and it constrains the other one from entering that 
region. The box is a local constraint: it only affects particles in the vicinity of the 
box’s region. The system as a whole may also be subject to the constraint that 
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something in motion will stay in motion and something at rest will stay at rest 
(Newton’s “first law of motion”). Such non-local constraints are less likely to be 
referred to as “constraints” (and more likely to be referred to as “laws”) because 
their scope is not spatially limited or context-dependent in the way the box 
constraint is. 
Motion equation. A motion equation is a mathematical description of a non-local 
constraint, or a constraint that is treated as non-local by the coordinate system in 
question. It describes causal relations that will hold throughout the space in 
question, or the entire domain over which the coordinate system in question is 
defined.  
Constraint equation. A constraint equation is a mathematical description of a 
local constraint. For example, it might describe a relation that holds between two 
specific particles that are bonded together, by equating the distance between 
their position variables with a constant. Other particles in the system may not be 
subject to the same constraint. 
Coordinate system. A coordinate system is a set of dimensions along which 
variables in the motion and constraint equations may vary. 
Cartesian coordinate system. A coordinate system in which the values of 
variables each represent points along scalar orthogonal spatial dimensions. 
Motion equations defined in terms of Cartesian coordinates will hold throughout 
the entire space in question. 
Generalized coordinate system. A coordinate system in which the variables 
may represent something other than the scalar orthogonal spatial dimensions of 
the space in question. For example, the motion of a pendulum might be 
expressed by means of a single scalar position variable that represents the 
rotation angle of the pendulum arm, or the position along the circular arc of its 
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path. Generalized coordinate systems are often defined only for specific regions 
of a given space (for example, the pendulum arc position variable is only defined 
within the range of possible motion for the pendulum). 
Generalized coordinate systems may also be used to treat multiple distinct 
objects as defined in one coordinate system as single, whole objects in the 
generalized coordinate system. For example, if points in the Cartesian coordinate 
system represent positions of particles (as they do in Newtonian mechanics), a 
generalized coordinate system might be adopted instead in which points 
represent positions of rigid objects consisting of multiple particles. 
Holonomic constraints. In some situations, a system described by a 
combination of motion and constraint equations that are defined in terms of 
Cartesian coordinates can be redescribed in terms of a set of motion equations 
defined in terms of a different (“generalized”) system of coordinates. This is done 
by means of an analytical method that requires being able to integrate the 
constraint equations. Such “integrable constraint equations” are sometimes 
referred to as “holonomic constraint equations.” Correspondingly, we might call 
the constraints that such equations mathematically describe “holonomic 
constraints.” The importance of holonomic constraints is that they make it 
possible to describe the constrained system in terms of motion equations alone 
in the generalized coordinate system. The simplest example is a system of two 
particles that are bonded together into a larger, rigid whole. The system can be 
redescribed in a new coordinate system where a point represents the location of 
the rigid whole, instead of one of the two particles. This enables a reduction in 
the number of variables needed to describe the system. 
Non-holonomic constraints. Non-holonomic constraint equations are constraint 
equations that cannot be integrated, so that it is not possible to analytically derive 
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a new description of the system in terms of only motion equations in a 
generalized coordinate system. The system consisting of a box and two particles 
was an example of this. Because the box constrains only the position of particles 
while leaving the velocity free to vary independently, no generalized coordinate 
system can be derived that could describe the same behavior in motion 
equations alone. 
With these definitions on the table, the two key differences between Newtonian mechanics and 
analytical mechanics that are important for present purposes can be stated as follows: 
• Whereas the Newtonian formulation relies only on motion equations, 
analytical mechanics introduces constraint equations. 
• Whereas the Newtonian formulation always expresses motion using 
Cartesian coordinates, analytical mechanical methods often involve switching 
to a new coordinate system (referred to as generalized coordinates) that is 
tailored to the problem at hand. 
Though it remains possible (in principle) to describe any classical system using the Newtonian 
formulation, the innovations of analytical mechanics allow many types of problems to be 
expressed in a far more economical and practical manner. This is because there are many 
types of patterns and structure that can be represented and exploited by analytical mechanics 
that cannot be represented and exploited by Newtonian mechanics. Take for example a rigid 
object composed of many particles. In Newtonian mechanics, the system will require six 
variables for each particle (location and velocity in three dimensions), and a separate equation 
for each particle. This becomes quite unwieldy for systems with a large number of particles. 
Instead, analytical methods allow reduction of the entire system to a single equation by 
adopting a “generalized” coordinate system that might consist of only eight variables, 
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representing degrees of freedom (three each for location of the center of mass and velocity, 
and two for angles of rotation about the center of mass) for the rigid object as a whole.16 
The transformation from Cartesian coordinates to generalized coordinates begins with 
the addition of constraint equations. Whereas the motion equations describe how the 
coordinate variables will change over time, constraint equations describe limitations on how 
they can change. In cases where the constraint equations are not too complex (for example, 
when they do not have to be expressed using differential equations, in which cases the 
constraints are referred to as holonomic), analytical methods may be applied to the motion and 
constraint equations to derive a new description of the system in terms of motion equations in a 
generalized coordinate system. It is important to realize, however, that in such cases, the 
constraints have not ceased to exist; they are merely implicit and are now incorporated into the 
new “laws of motion” of the system. The new “laws of motion,” that is, the equations that 
describe the system, are not laws in Descartes’s sense; they are equations that only apply 
locally to the system that has been so redescribed. In many other cases, however, constraint 
equations cannot be eliminated by analytical means. I will refer to the former cases as 
‘holonomic systems’, and the latter as ‘non-holonomic systems’.17 Holonomic systems will 
include cases like rigid objects; non-holonomic cases will include systems with complex, 
machine-like dynamics, notably including protein molecules, which make up the building blocks 
and machinery of all biological systems (Pattee, 1973a).  
The need for formulations other than that of Newton arises because there is a great 
deal of causal structure that Newtonian equations do not describe; not all structure is 
                                                            
16 For recent textbooks that deal with these topics, see Goldstein, Poole, and Safko (2002) and Taylor 
(2005). 
17 Technically this is not quite accurate because analytical methods do exist for producing constraint-free 
formulations of some relatively simple non-holonomic systems (specifically, those that fall under the 
scope of D’Alembert’s principle), but this technicality will be of no consequence in what follows, since 
biological systems are of much greater dynamical complexity (Pattee, 1973a). 
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microstructure (Mitchell, 2012).18 Much of this causal structure is confined locally; this is why it 
is often useful to adopt problem-specific constraint equations or coordinate systems. The 
Newtonian formulation only exploits facts about causal structure that hold true in all parts of 
space and time, for all kinds of (classical) dynamical systems. This is why it expresses all 
problems in the same, Cartesian, coordinate system. Dynamical systems include a great deal 
of structure that is not described by Newtonian mechanics, and non-holonomic systems have 
dynamics that cannot be described without reference to constraints. What are the metaphysical 
implications? 
 
2.3.5 A Metaphysics Inspired by Analytical Mechanics: Constraints as Ontologically 
Primitive Modal Structures 
 
In order to account metaphysically for the fact that Newtonian motion equations capture 
causal structure on the particle level, and generalized motion equations and constraint 
equations capture larger and higher-order causal patterns, there are three options: 
1. Treat both motion equations and constraint equations as true in virtue of 
Cartesian laws, placing causal efficacy within ontologically robust, standalone 
entities that are extrinsic to all objects and dynamical systems. 
2. Treat motion equations as true in virtue of ontologically robust, extrinsic 
entities (Cartesian laws), and constraint equations as true in virtue of the 
intrinsic causal structure of constrained systems (so that causal efficacy is 
partly extrinsic to objects in the world and partly intrinsic). 
                                                            
18 Further, not all causal structure is reducible to microstructure (Wimsatt, 1994; Mitchell, 2012). 
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3. Treat both motion equations and constraint equations as true in virtue of 
causal structure that is intrinsic to the particles, objects, and dynamical 
systems themselves. 
In my view, Occam’s razor and other considerations clearly favor the third option. The first 
option would require non-universal extrinsic principles of motion that undergo continual change 
(as local constraints continually change, and dynamical systems become describable in terms 
of different kinds of constraint equations). Most of the appeal of regarding principles of motion 
as extrinsic to objects is supposed to derive from their being the universal and unchanging 
anchors of physical explanation. Option one would defeat this basic appeal. Option one also 
leaves the dynamics of non-holonomic systems unaccounted for. Option two locates causal 
efficacy partly within extrinsic laws and partly within intrinsic natures. Some advocates of 
‘strong emergence’ have proposed such a metaphysics.19 But given that some systems (for 
example, holonomic systems) could equally be described either in terms of motion equations 
alone or in terms of a combination of motion and constraint equations, it does not make sense 
to argue that there is a single, objective partitioning in nature between extrinsic and intrinsic 
causal principles of motion. 
The preferable option is the third, that is, the metaphysical idea that causal structure in 
general is something local to and inherent within mechanical systems, waiting to be discovered 
and exploited by means of various choices of motion equations, constraint equations, and 
coordinate transformations. Systems can be described by these means because they 
intrinsically possess systematic limitations on how they can change. On option 3, causal 
structure refers precisely to such intrinsic systematic limitations and is ontologically primitive 
(that is, it is not grounded in an extrinsic principle of change like Cartesian laws). Like Ross, 
Ladyman, and Spurrett (2007), and in order to mark the departure from the Cartesian 
                                                            
19 For critical discussion of such views, see Klee (1984). 
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metaphysics of laws, I will refer to such ontologically primitive, intrinsic limitations as 
‘constraints’. On this view, constraints are more than mere regularities; in the words of 
Mumford (2004), constraints are “modally loaded.” They may be thought of as modal patterns. 
Often, patterns are conceived in philosophy as nothing more than non-modal regularities. But 
constraints are more than just occurrent regularities; constraints in a dynamical system pertain 
to what might happen. They are the modal facts about a dynamical system, the truthmakers for 
dynamical equations and modal causal claims.  
This conception of causal structure is cognate with French’s “modal structuralism” 
which “takes the structure to be ‘inherently’ modal” (2014, p. 263) and Esfeld’s (2009) 
conception of “causal structures.” French (2006, p. 183) argues that there is nothing inherent to 
the concept of a structure that makes it any less causal than other ontological categories like 
properties. French also draws inspiration from Maudlin (2007) to make a positive argument for 
his modal structuralism. Maudlin argues that 
nothing in scientific practice suggests that one ought to try to reduce fundamental 
laws to anything else. … The practice of science, I suggest, takes fundamental 
laws of nature as further unanalyzable primitives. As philosophers, I think we can 
do no better than to follow this lead. (2007, p. 105) 
French carries this reasoning further, arguing that the practice of physics shows that physicists 
treat laws as structures that are causal, unanalyzable, and primitively modal (2014, p. 298). As 
I have argued, however, looking at scientific practice leads us not to the Cartesian conception 
of causal structure as extrinsic laws, but instead to a conception of causal structure as intrinsic 
constraint. This argument is only strengthened when we realize that quantum mechanics is 
itself an offshoot of analytical mechanics, not Newtonian mechanics (Dirac, 1958, p. 114). 
The present view is a rejection of the Cartesian metaphysical account of laws. But it is 
not necessarily a rejection of the idea of a “law” tout court. Ashby (1956, p. 130) characterized 
laws as merely a special case of physical constraints that apply universally. Similarly, Glennan 
(2017, pp. 3 & 44–46) characterizes laws as generalizations about local, intrinsic causal 
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structures. But these need not be universal. Cartwright (1999), for example, argues that 
empirical evidence does not support universal generalizations, and that what are called “laws” 
are generally only true within the scope of local “nomological machines.” 
These considerations support the view that mechanical systems inherently contain a 
“thicket” of constraints. It is our choice how to represent these constraints, that is, how to 
“parse our world” (to use Mitchell’s phrase) and individuate individuals and processes—the 
task accomplished in analytical mechanics by choosing which coordinate system and/or 
constraint equations to adopt. A constraints-based metaphysics provides a more 
comprehensive way to understand causal structure that is rooted in scientific practice. 
 
2.4 Constraints and Mechanistic Causal Powers 
 
I now return to two questions raised but not yet answered from Section 2.2: What could 
it mean for something to be part of the actual, intrinsic nature of an object, but in a non-
manifested state? And can this be understood in a way that is grounded in the details of 
scientific practice? 
 
2.4.1 Inter- versus Intra-Perspectival Categories 
 
As physicist and theoretical biologist Howard Pattee explained, constraint is really an 
inter-perspective concept, rather than an intra-perspective one. This is because the concept of 
a constraint is really the concept of a set of possibilities that is reduced to a smaller number of 
possibilities. Describing something as a constraint implies at least two ways of carving the 
world. This can be seen in the example of the rigid object composed by particles, which might 
allow a change in coordinate systems. By referring to the rigid object as constrained, one 
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makes implicit reference to the fact that without the constraint, the system would consist of 
particles with many more degrees of freedom: 
constraints must be defined by different descriptive levels. … Why are these 
necessarily two-level processes? Why are two distinct descriptions necessary? 
Because we cannot speak of an event as being both possible and impossible 
using the same level of description. On the lower, unconstrained level the 
alternatives must be possible; for if they were impossible then deciding for or 
against them would be a vacuous process. But on the upper, constrained or 
controlled level, … some of these alternatives are actually selected, or more 
precisely, made more probable … (Pattee, 1972, p. 84) 
For this reason, writes Pattee, “whenever a physicist adds an equation of constraint to the 
equations of motion, he is really writing in two languages at the same time” (1973a, p. 98). 
Constraints require some kind of stuff in order to be instantiated, but their instantiation does not 
depend on how the underlying stuff is ontologically “carved” into objects, or what Lloyd Morgan 
called the “substantial gotogetherness” (1927, p. 193) of the stuff. This is a key difference 
between constraints and powers. Powers emerge once one adopts a world-carving 
perspective; constraints are the preconditions in the world that underwrite the adoption of such 
perspectives. 
Return to the example of the chaperone and substrate molecules. From one 
perspective, each is a collection of atoms held together in a certain way by bonds. From 
another perspective, each is an object constrained to possess a certain shape. Neither of these 
perspectives is the “right” one; they merely represent distinct “ways of parsing” the world. 
However, in each case the same underlying, invariant causal structures (whether we 
conceptualize them as configurations of bonds between atoms or as shapes of objects)—
constraints—are determining how the system will behave. 
It might be argued that when we abstract away from object-oriented ways of carving up 
the world, and merely refer to the universe as consisting of an uncarved expanse of “stuff” that 
is constrained in various ways in various locations, we are still adopting a “perspective.” Yes, 
but this will by definition not be a world-carving perspective. When I say that constraint is an 
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inter-perspectival ontological category, I mean that it is an ontological category that is 
independent of any perspective on where the boundaries between objects (events, processes, 
and so on) are. It is an ontological category that picks out the full range of real causal patterns 
in the world which are the candidates for populating such world-carving schemes; any world-
carving perspective will selectively isolate a subset of such causal patterns to form the basis of 
its parcellation into objects, events, processes, and so on. 
The key difference between powers and constraints, namely that powers are applicable 
to object-oriented ways of carving up the world, whereas constraints are inter-perspectival, 
demonstrates why it is necessary to have both categories. Here it is helpful to recall MDC’s 
claim that causal powers are “substantivalist.” In the framework of mechanistic explanation, any 
power instance is the power of some object (that is, of a mechanism or part of a mechanism); if 
the object goes out of existence (that is, its identity conditions no longer obtain), its powers do 
as well. Unlike causal powers, constraints don’t go away when you change ontological 
perspectives.20 
 
2.4.2 Mechanistic Causal Powers are Grounded by Constraints 
 
My main suggestion in this chapter is that we adopt a multi-perspectival realist 
approach to understanding mechanistic causation. Again, multi-perspectivalism involves two 
levels of realism: a perspectival realism about objects and processes, and a non-perspectival 
realism about causal structures themselves.21 Correspondingly, a metaphysical account of 
                                                            
20 It should be noted that while most ways of conceiving causal powers tie them to objects or processes, 
this is not true of all ways of conceiving causal powers. For example, Marmodoro (2017) makes a 
distinction between structural powers and substantial powers; her ‘substantial power’ corresponds to my 
use of ‘power’, and her ‘structural power’ is closer to what I am calling ‘constraint’.  
21 Ross, Ladyman, and Collier provide reasons why “our local actual (physical) circumstances [might] be 
such that constructing individuals is necessary for tracking some extra-representational real patterns” 
(2007, p. 245). What they refer to as “locally dynamic real patterns” (e.g., 2007, p. 252) seems to be the 
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mechanistic causation must involve perspectival realism about causal powers, and non-
perspectival realism about constraints. Mechanisms, being physical systems, are constituted 
by physical stuff; as such, constitution is a relation that can transcend world-carving 
perspectives. Then what is the relation between constraints and causal powers? The relation 
cannot be identity, since something that is real relative to a perspective will not have the same 
identity conditions as something that is real independently of perspective. Instead, the relation 
is a certain kind of ontological dependence: the constraints, that is, the perspective-
independent causal structures, are what make it possible to usefully adopt a causal powers 
perspective. When we adopt an object-oriented perspective, the way that the stuff constituting 
an object is dynamically constrained allows us to talk instead of powers that the object has.22 
Constraints are the truthmakers for modal facts about the dynamics of a system; when looked 
at from a perspective that parcels the system into objects and properties, these modal facts 
map onto dispositional facts about such objects and properties. In other words, they serve as 
the intrinsic and actual grounding of perspectival facts about what kinds of behaviors will 
manifest under certain conditions. 
The causal powers approach seemed like a promising way to account for mechanistic 
causation until we saw that it could not meet two of the desiderata in a way that practice-
oriented philosophers of science would consider fully satisfactory: scientific validity/non-
mysteriousness, and the perspectival nature of mechanisms. However, if we can account for 
causal powers ontologically in terms of constraints, we will have an account of causal powers 
that is well-grounded in the details of scientific practice; Paul C. W. Davies writes that “in 
almost every branch of physics, with the possible exception of elementary particle physics, 
                                                            
same as what I am calling “constraints.”  Later in the same book, Ross, Ladyman, and Spurrett (2007, p. 
288) use the word ‘constraint’. 
22 Juarrero (1999, pp. 131–132) and Moreno and Mossio (2015, p. 51) have also proposed that 
constraints can ground causal powers. Cartwright and Pemberton (2013, p. 96) reverse the order of 
priority and hold that “constrainings” result from causal powers.  
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constraints play a crucial role” (1989, p. 104). Further, whereas resorting to causal powers 
alone does not provide a non-perspectival grounding of mechanistic causation, constraints 
offer a way to account for the underlying causal structure that underwrites causal powers 
perspectives. 
The present account of mechanistic causation will not be complete, however, until it is 
explained how constraints can ground the other aspects of causal powers that allow them to 
satisfy the remaining three desiderata: intrinsicness, productivity, and directionality. 
 
2.4.3 Intrinsicness and Constraints 
 
Unlike laws, constraints are local to the system that possesses them. The local, intrinsic 
aspect of constraints has been emphasized by a number of authors who have applied the 
concept of a physical constraint to a wide range of contexts.23 It is important to note here that 
sometimes authors have distinguished between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” constraints, or 
“internal” and “external” constraints. For example, “constraints may be external owing to the 
environment interacting with the system. Or such constraints may arise internally within the 
system owing to the collective effects of its constituents or the evolving dynamics” (Bishop, 
2012, p. 5). Deacon uses the words ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’: “constraints can originate intrinsic 
or extrinsic to the system that is thereby constrained” (2011, p. 549). The distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic constraints is important in thermodynamics, for example (Nicolis & 
Prigogine, 1977). 
However, these are just different ways of talking about metaphysically intrinsic 
constraints. Hooker (2013, p. 760) argues that any system that is described in terms of external 
                                                            
23 For example, situation theory (Barwise & Perry, 1983, p. 98), theoretical biology (Pattee, 1982, p. 176), 
cybernetics (Ashby, 1956, p. 131), information theory (Deacon, 2007, pp. 127ff.), behavioral science 
(Kelso, 1995), ecological psychology (Greeno, 1994), and Gestalt theory (Köhler, 1922/1967, pp. 61–62 & 
68–69). 
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constraints between subsystems can be re-described in terms of the internal constraints of the 
larger containing system. But he argues that this does not in any way diminish the reality of the 
constraints themselves; it is only the characterization of them as internal versus external that is 
perspectival. For example, in the case of Rayleigh–Bénard convection, the Bénard cells that 
form are themselves internal constraints of the boiling water that result from the external 
constraints of the water’s metal container and the heat source. Nothing stops us from 
describing it as a single system that contains the heat source, metal container, and the Bénard 
cells themselves as internal constraints. But this does not show that constraints are not local or 
intrinsic to dynamical systems. It shows, instead, that constraints remain regardless of the 
perspective we take on the portion of physical stuff that is constrained. We can talk about that 
stuff as being a single object, or a set of objects, or a portion of a larger object; in all of these 
cases, we are talking about the same locally constrained stuff in different ways. One is not 
more fundamental than the other. 
 
2.4.4 Constraints and Productiveness 
 
In Section 2.3.5, I defined constraints as ontologically primitive intrinsic limitations on 
how dynamical systems can change. But how is the idea of something limiting the possibilities 
for change of a system compatible with its producing the resulting changes? In one sense, of 
course, constraints are limiting, and reduce the degrees of freedom of a system. But in another 
sense, constraints are enabling, and they shape and define the types of behaviors a system 
will have, as Cliff Hooker explains: 
… constraints can at the same time also be enabling, they can provide access to 
new states unavailable to the unconstrained system: equivalently, by 
coordinatedly decreasing degrees of freedom they provide access to dynamical 
trajectories inaccessible to the unconstrained system. … a skeleton is a disabling 
constraint, for example limiting the movements of limbs (cf. an octopus), but by 
providing a jointed frame of rigid components for muscular attachments it also 
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acts to enable a huge range of articulated motions and leverages (2013, p. 761; 
see also Pattee, 1973a) 
To see how productivity results from constraint, consider what a dynamical system would be 
like if it were absolutely unconstrained. From one moment to the next, all configurations or 
state-transitions would be equally probable. It would not be possible to make any kind of 
predictions about the system (or, for that matter, to take an object-oriented perspective on 
events going on in the system). All predictability requires redundancy, which is nothing more or 
less than a way that a system is constrained. Whenever we can isolate systematic or 
predictable behaviors or forces within a system, that reflects a way in which the system is 
organized. Therefore, writes Ashby, “the presence of ‘organization’ between variables is 
equivalent to the existence of a constraint in the product-space of the possibilities” (1962, p. 
257). When we put this fact together with the recognition that productive relations within 
mechanisms exist in virtue of the causal organization that mechanisms possess (Glennan, 
2017, p. 23)—causal organization which underwrites and makes possible the taking of any 
mechanistic perspective—the sense in which productive relations within biological systems 
derive from how such systems are constrained becomes clear. 
 
2.4.5 Constraints and Directionality 
 
Recall Bechtel’s and Glennan’s point above that in most mechanistic operations, there 
is both something that acts and something that is acted upon. A mechanistic perspective will 
therefore usually be one that posits directional causal powers: the operation will involve an 
active component and a passive component, and the effects will be explained in terms of active 
powers of the active component and passive powers of the passive component. An account of 
how constraints ground causal powers should provide a story about how directional powers are 
grounded. 
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In Section 2.4.3, I considered the fact that a dynamical system may contain 
subsystems, and that we can then distinguish between the subsystem’s internal and external 
constraints. Its internal constraints are instantiated by the stuff that constitutes the subsystem; 
the external constraints are instantiated by stuff that is external to it. Since a passive power is 
the ability of something to be causally affected in a certain way by something external to it, a 
passive power can only be instantiated by an object constituted by stuff that is both internally 
and externally constrained in certain ways. Specifically, I consider passive powers to emerge 
from a kind of second-order constraint: 
A passive causal power exists when a system within a larger system is 
internally constrained in such a way as to be externally constrained under certain 
conditions. 
Similarly, active causal powers (of the kind that result in causal effects within external objects) 
also emerge from a kind of second-order constraint: 
An active causal power exists when a system within a larger system is internally 
constrained in such a way as to externally constrain under certain conditions. 
We can now revisit the example of the chaperone molecule performing the operation of folding 
a substrate protein. The chaperone plays an active role in the process, since it changes the 
structure of the folding substrate without itself being changed in the relevant way by that 
process. The chaperone has the active causal power to fold the substrate: it has an internal 
bond structure that will allow it to externally constrain the structure of the substrate after the 
substrate bonds to the chaperone. After folding is completed, the bonding structure of the 
substrate has changed, but the chaperone returns to its original configuration. The substrate 
had the passive causal power to be folded: it had an internal bond structure that would allow it 
to be recognized by the chaperone and to be folded by it.  
Keep in mind that there is nothing ontologically profligate about countenancing second-
order constraints; constraints are merely a type of structure, and any account of structure will 
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include higher-order structures. There are of course many orders of structure within biological 
systems, and this is key to Wimsatt’s notion of “causal thickets.” Because these higher orders 
of structure are indispensable to biological explanation, as well as to the other “sciences of 
complexity” (Stein, 1989), we should acknowledge that primitive modality may also accompany 
these higher orders. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that extant accounts of the metaphysics of mechanistic 
causation do not succeed because they fail to satisfy five key desiderata that have emerged in 
recent New Mechanist literature. I offered a novel multi-perspectivalist approach to 
understanding mechanistic causation which incorporates two levels of realism: a perspectival 
realism about objects (mechanisms and their parts) and their causal powers, and a non-
perspectival realism about the causal structures that underwrite these perspectives. I further 
showed how the conception of non-perspectivally real causal structures can be cashed out in 
terms of a concept that has long been familiar to science but that has been mostly neglected by 
philosophers: constraints. Finally, I demonstrated how a constraints-based account has the 
resources to satisfy the five desiderata, and to provide a non-perspectival grounding for 
mechanistic causation. 
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Chapter 3  
Internal Perspectivalism: 
The Solution to Generality Problems about 
Proper Function and Natural Norms 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In a wide variety of contexts, scientists and philosophers take for granted that it is 
meaningful to refer to or inquire into the biological function of a given trait, property, or part 
(from now on I will just say ‘trait’ for sake of brevity) of an organism or biological system. The 
idea here is that although a given trait may be capable of performing any number of functions—
in the sense that there are various causal interactions it may enter into, and hence various 
causal roles it can play in those interactions—there might only be one function that it has (its 
proper function).24 The distinction between properly functioning versus malfunctioning traits is 
extremely important to philosophy because it has been thought to provide resources for 
resolving a number of philosophical debates. For example, proper function has figured centrally 
in philosophical accounts of representation (Dretske, 1988), computation (Piccinini, 2015, p. 
11), action and agency (Burge, 2009), mechanisms and mechanistic explanation in biology 
(Garson, 2013), epistemic norms (Sullivan-Bissett, 2017), and even value as such (Foot, 
                                                            
24 This is a broader use of ‘proper function’ than is sometimes used; often, ‘proper function’ is used to 
refer specifically to the etiological conception of function defended by philosophers such as Karen 
Neander (1991). On the present use of ‘proper function’, the etiological conception is only one of many 
conceptions of proper function. Often, ‘teleological function’ is used to mean what I intend by ‘proper 
function’ (e.g., Maley & Piccinini, 2017). Not all accounts of proper function (as I am using the term) 
provide for a notion of malfunction, as I detail below. It should also be noted that, at least on some views, 
traits can have multiple proper functions; for example, it might be said that the hind legs of turtles have 
the proper functions both of locomotion and of excavation (Preston, 1998). 
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2001), among many other projects falling under the heading of “naturalizing normativity.” 
Proper function is an equally important notion for biologists. Their investigations are often 
inquiries into what the function of a given trait is, or into what the function of parts that 
contribute to produce a larger phenomenon or behavior are, or what the function of certain 
activities or developmental processes (I will also include these under the umbrella of ‘trait’) are 
in the life cycle of given organisms. 
In order to provide an account of proper functions, philosophers need to answer two 
questions: 
Demarcation Question: What is the difference between a properly functioning 
trait and a malfunctioning one? 
Grounding Question: What makes it the case that traits have functions rather 
than merely accidental causal dispositions?25 
The first question is about the traits themselves. The second question is about the situatedness 
of traits that makes them have any normative or functional status at all. I will divide the 
approaches philosophers have taken to answering these questions into two broad categories: 
perspectival and non-perspectival. The difference is that on perspectival approaches, proper 
function ascription is irreducibly relative to a perspective.  
In this chapter, I raise a problem for non-perspectival accounts in philosophy of biology 
that is analogous to the generality problem that has been raised against process reliabilism in 
epistemology (Section 3.2). I argue that this should not be surprising: Both types of account 
explain a normative status (epistemic justification of beliefs in one case, proper function of traits 
                                                            
25 It is important to keep in mind that these are metaphysical questions; i.e., they are questions about the 
nature of proper functions themselves, rather than epistemological questions about how humans 
can/should go about studying them. In this chapter, I do not address questions about how humans 
discover, test/confirm hypotheses about, or reason about proper functions. Though I don’t offer an 
account of the role that proper function plays in scientific explanation, I do consider the fact that proper 
functions play an explanatory role for biologists as a desideratum that can rule out certain metaphysical 
accounts of proper function (see Section 3.4). 
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in the other) by reference to the type a certain token (third column of Table 3.1) falls under, but 
such tokens fall under many such types of varying generality, and neither account offers a way 
to tell us which is the relevant type in given cases (Section 3.3). Perspectival accounts of 
proper function26 do not have this problem, since the perspective that a functional attribution is 
relativized to will involve a univocal interpretation of the situation that disambiguates between 
the problematic multitude of types. 
I further divide perspectival accounts into two categories: external perspectivalism and 
internal perspectivalism. Up to now, discussions of perspectivalism have tended only to focus 
on external perspectivalism (e.g., Massimi, 2018b). On an external perspectivalist account, 
proper function within a given system depends on the perspective taken by an observer that is 
external to the system in question (such as a scientist who is investigating the system). Such 
accounts have not been as popular among philosophers because they are sometimes not 
considered to be fully naturalistic and have other well-known problems (Section 3.4). On an 
internal perspectivalist account, by contrast, the proper function of a trait within a given system 
depends on the perspective had by the system itself. Unlike non-perspectival accounts, internal 
perspectivalism does not succumb to generality problems. But unlike external perspectivalism, 
internal perspectivalism can provide a fully naturalistic, mind-independent grounding of proper 
function and natural norms. Accordingly, I will defend a novel internal perspectivalist account in 
this chapter, according to which what counts as the proper function of a trait is a matter of the 
de facto perspective that the biological system, itself, possesses on what counts as proper 
functioning for that trait (Sections 3.5–3.7). 
My attribution of perspectives to biological systems is intended to be neither 
metaphorical nor anthropomorphic: I do not mean to imply that such systems thereby must 
                                                            
26 As far as I know, no perspectival version of process reliabilism has been offered, perhaps because 
process reliabilists tend to be epistemic externalists. 
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possess agency, cognition, intentions, concepts, or mental or psychological states.27 The 
notion of a perspective to be developed here (in Sections 3.5 and 3.6) is much thinner, 
depending only on minimal recognition and response capabilities by means of which even 
“simple” organisms without nervous systems, and subsystems within such organisms, are 
selectively sensitive to details of their outer and inner environment at a fixed level of generality. 
Such systems provide the grounding for norms of performance when they internally enforce 
their own standard of (i.e., their own perspective on) what constitutes proper functioning or 
malfunctioning. Since they operate with a fixed, determinate level of generality, such systems 
provide the basis for an account of proper function that is immune to generality problems. 
Importantly, the sort of generality problem I will raise for theories of proper function is 
not merely one of fuzzy boundaries that result in mildly puzzling cases or sorities paradoxes.28 
An account that suffers from generality problems not only fails to give an exact answer; it fails 
even to give you the means to know when you are anywhere near the right answer, as I 
demonstrate in the next section. 
 
3.2 The Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism 
 
Generality problems have been most thoroughly discussed in debates about the nature 
of epistemic justification. Process reliabilism is a theory of epistemic justification stating that  
The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the process or 
processes that cause it, where (as a first approximation) reliability consists in the 
tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false. 
(Goldman, 1979, p. 10) 
                                                            
27 My internal perspectivalism is therefore very different from that of Sinnott, who argued that “biological 
organization … and psychical activity … are fundamentally the same thing” (1961, p. 48). Pattee, whose 
work partly inspired the present view, might also be read as an internal perspectivalist about biological 
function (e.g., 1970, p. 130; 1982). 
28 See Neander (1995, p. 113) for a useful breakdown of different kinds of function indeterminacy. 
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Process reliabilism attempts to answer epistemic analogs of what I have referred to as the 
Demarcation and Grounding questions: it attempts to say what makes a justified belief different 
from an unjustified belief (a justified belief must have been formed by a reliable type of 
process), and it attempts to tell us what makes it the case that beliefs have any justificational 
status in the first place (the purported fact that any given belief will have been formed by a 
process that has some determinate level of reliability). 
Conee and Feldman (1998) argue that belief-forming process tokens will always fall 
under a number of different types of varying generality and of varying reliability. For example, 
suppose I look out my window and form the belief that my friend Sharon is walking on the 
sidewalk outside. Suppose further that the process by which I formed my belief counts as a i) 
visual process at night, ii) visual process at night in a well-lit area (there is a street light 
nearby), and iii) visual process on a foggy night. We might characterize my belief as having 
been formed by any of these process types, among others, depending on the level of generality 
at which we choose to individuate such processes. But note that some of these belief-forming 
process types (BFPTs) are reliable, and some are not. Process reliabilism will therefore give 
wildly differing answers depending on the level of generality at which we individuate processes. 
Without resources for specifying the relevant level of BFPT generality, such an account fails 
even to give you the means to know when you are anywhere near the right answer. It therefore 
does not provide a satisfactory answer to the grounding question: it does not tell us which non-
normative facts make it the case that beliefs are justified or unjustified. 
As Michael Bishop put it, “Without a principled solution to the generality problem, the 
reliabilist can always start with the intuitively correct judgment about a belief’s justificatory 
status and then cherry pick a BFPT that yields that judgment,” (2010, p. 287). Conee and 
Feldman argue that 
Given the multiplicity of belief-forming process types and their variations in 
reliability, it is easy to make ad hoc case-by-case selections of types that match 
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our intuitions. But case-by-case selections of relevant types does not constitute 
working out a reliabilist theory of justification. (1998, pp. 3–4) 
In the intervening years, solutions have been proposed, but for my purposes what matters is 
that it continues to be recognized as a serious problem. In the next section I argue that a 
parallel and equally serious problem afflicts each of the three major non-perspectivalist theories 
of proper function. 
 
3.3 How Generality Problems Arise for Non-Perspectival Theories 
of Function 
 
Space does not here permit an exhaustive critique of non-perspectivalist theories, but I 
will briefly indicate a few ways that generality problems can arise in three prominent non-
perspectivalist approaches: etiological, systemic causal role, and self-maintenance-based 
accounts. Generality problems arise for these theories because they each analyze the proper 
function of traits in terms of how those traits relate to some related token entity (third column 
 
 
Table 3.1: Analyses that result in generality problems due to the fact that the 
token referred to in the analysans (third column) can be considered as falling 
under multiple types of varying generality. 
 
Name of account Normative analysandum Token(s) invoked in analysans that can be 
typed at multiple levels of generality 
Process Reliabilism Epistemic justification Process by which belief was formed 
Etiological theories Proper function Task that the trait was selected for; selective regime 
Systemic causal role 
theories Proper function 
System that the trait is part of; systemic 
capacity; contribution to system capacity 
Self-maintenance-
based theories Proper function 
Self-maintenance regime for that trait; 
organizational class 
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in Table 3.1) that falls under multiple types. Just as you can reach conflicting judgments about 
justification by characterizing belief-forming processes as instances of types of varying 
generality, you can also reach conflicting judgments about proper function by characterizing 
selection processes, systems, and self-maintenance regimes as instances of types of varying 
generality, as I will presently demonstrate. 
 
3.3.1 Etiological Approach 
 
According to the most prominent etiological approach, “a token trait’s function depends 
on what traits of the relevant type were selected for” (Neander & Rosenberg, 2012, p. 613).29 
Whether or not trait X is functioning properly is a matter of whether or not trait X can perform 
the task that it was selected for performing. It is therefore the fact that the trait was selected for 
a certain task that provides the basis for attributing proper functions rather than mere causal 
ones (an answer to the Grounding question), and a trait functions properly if and only if it 
currently can perform that task and provide the fitness contribution in question (hence 
answering the Demarcation question). 
Whether or not a trait can perform the task it was selected for performing depends on 
what task it was selected for performing. The assumption is that on many occasions in the 
past, the trait helped the organism’s ancestors survive and reproduce to a greater extent than 
conspecifics without the trait in question. In order for these occasions to add up to a definite 
                                                            
29 I count the etiological approach as non-perspectival because, as many authors have pointed out (e.g., 
Polányi, 1958, p. 385; Nagel, 1977, pp. 286–287; Nyberg, 2009, p. 187; Okasha, 2009, p. 720), “natural 
selection” does not involve anything like an intelligent agent in the background applying any particular 
normative standard. Instead, in any given case, organisms succeed or fail at reproducing, not because of 
some universal trait that is consistently selected across eons and ecosystems, but because of whatever 
particular traits happen to be helpful (or “adaptive”) in specific environments on specific occasions 
(Beatty, 1984, pp. 192–193). 
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function attribution, it must have been beneficial in the same way across those occasions, i.e., 
by performing the same task. 
A generality problem arises because the task at issue can be described at different 
levels of generality. For example, suppose the auditory system of a preyed-upon mouse 
population has become especially attuned to a certain frequency band B over a large number 
of generations, because its main predator (a certain hawk population) makes a distinctive 
sound in which frequency band B is dominant.30 Suppose further that over those many 
generations, due to the nature of their habitat, the mice gained almost no survival or 
reproductive benefit from detecting noises otherwise. Now suppose a mutation occurs in the 
hawk population, making it almost silent in frequency band B (producing what we may call 
“stealthy hawks”; call the non-mutated hawks “noisy hawks”). We may ask, is the auditory 
system of one of the mice malfunctioning when it fails to detect the stealthy hawk approaching? 
This depends on how we characterize the task that the auditory system was selected for, i.e., 
the task that conferred a benefit to its possessors. We may describe this as: 
• Detecting predators that are noisy with respect to frequency band B 
• Detecting noisy hawks 
• Detecting hawks 
• Detecting predators 
• Detecting sounds in general 
If “detecting sounds in general” is the task that the auditory system was selected for, then 
arguably, it was not malfunctioning. The mouse was generally able to detect sounds, just not 
those made by the stealthy hawks. Similarly, if “detecting predators that are noisy with respect 
to frequency band B” is the selected-for task, then it is not malfunctioning. But if the task is 
                                                            
30 This example is loosely inspired by one given by Walsh (1996), but it is being used to make a different 
kind of argument. 
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“detecting hawks” or “detecting predators,” then it is indeed malfunctioning. Our intuitions may 
pull us toward one answer or another, but as was the case with process reliabilism, it will be 
our intuitions doing the heavy lifting, not the account itself.31 
The larger fact at issue is that, as Walsh argues, natural selection is “relative to a 
selective regime” (1996, p. 553), defined as “the total set of abiological and biological (including 
social, developmental and physiological) factors in the environment of the trait which potentially 
affect the fitness of individuals with that trait” (1996, p. 564; cf. Bechtel, 1986). Etiological 
theories of function therefore “face indeterminacy problems, for there are more and less 
specific descriptions of selective regimes and functional outcomes” (Sterelny, 1995, p. 255). 
Goode and Griffiths write that “the apparent indeterminacy of etiological functions is a genuine 
indeterminacy, but a harmless one. Selection processes can be described at more or less 
abstract theoretical levels, all of which generate genuine, complementary descriptions of 
etiological function,” (1995, p. 107). But as the example above shows, descriptions at differing 
levels of generality will often generate conflicting, not complementary, function and malfunction 
ascriptions. 
The point here is that the bare historical facts of “selection,” by themselves, are 
insufficient to pick out proper functions and malfunctions in given cases. The facts, by 
themselves, do not specify the relevant level of generality for making function assignments. To 
paraphrase Bishop, it is too easy for the etiological theorist to “start with the intuitively correct 
judgment about a [trait’s proper function] and then cherry pick an account of [the organism’s 
selection history] that yields that judgment.”32 
                                                            
31 Neander addresses this type of problem by arguing that when there are multiple ways to characterize 
functions, “we should give priority to that description of a trait's function that is the lowest level in the 
analysis (most mechanistic),” where mechanistic levels are connected by “asymmetrical by-relations” 
(1995, p. 137). But in the above case, unlike the cases Neander considers, the varying characterizations 
do not correspond to different mechanistic levels connected by asymmetrical “by-relations.” 
32 Enç (2002) enumerates a series of arguments against etiological theories of proper function along 
similar lines as well. 
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3.3.2 Systemic Causal Role Approach 
 
Systemic causal role theories of function attribute functions to traits on the basis of the 
causal contribution that such traits make to the activities of the larger system that they are part 
of. Some authors (e.g., Craver 2001, 2013) explicitly relativize such accounts to an external 
perspective; here, I will consider non-perspectival versions of such accounts (external 
perspectival accounts will be considered in Section 3.4). As well, many authors who advocate 
for systemic causal role theories explicitly deny that their theory is intended to support a 
distinction between function and malfunction. On this approach, it is the fact that the trait in 
question has a causal role to play in the organization of the larger system that answers the 
Grounding question. For versions of the theory that allow for malfunction, the trait is functioning 
properly if and only if it is can actually play that causal role (hence answering the Demarcation 
question). 
Davies’s (2001) account is the most fully worked out version of the systemic causal role 
theory, which was earlier put forward in different forms by Nagel (1961) and Cummins (1975). 
Davies’s account is not intended to support a distinction between function and malfunction, but 
unlike Craver’s account, Davies’s account is intended to be non-perspectival, i.e., it is not 
grounded in “our explanatory interests or, better, our explanatory whims” (2001, p. 77). Any 
systemic causal role account not grounded in an external perspective, however, must confront 
the most common objection leveled against such accounts, which Davies calls the “promiscuity 
objection.” If there are insufficient restrictions on what counts as a “system”, and what counts 
as a “contribution to” the activities of a system, then almost anything can have almost any 
function (Millikan, 1989, p. 294; Illari & Williamson, 2011, p. 826). 
Davies attempts to meet these challenges by offering the following constraint: 
The sorts of phenomena to which the theory of systemic functions properly 
applies are those that are hierarchically organized. A system is hierarchical if it 
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exercises a capacity at one level by virtue of the organized capacities operating 
at some lower level of organization. (2001, p. 82) 
Davies argues that “restricting the theory to hierarchically organized systems provides 
resources with which to distinguish the functional from the merely causal” (2001, p. 86). But 
even with this restriction, contributions, systems, and system capacities can be described at 
multiple levels of generality, leading to multiple conflicting conclusions about whether a function 
attribution should be made and what it should be. 
Consider the function attribution being made in the following passage: 
Human fingers are capable of gripping a cigarette. The fingers, combined with 
the mouth and respiratory tract, constitute a larger system that has the capacity 
of smoking a cigarette (call this the “cigarette-smoking system”). Since the 
fingers' ability to grip the cigarette contributes to the larger system's capacity to 
smoke the cigarette, gripping cigarettes is a biological function (not a mere 
accidental capacity) of fingers. 
The systemic causal role theorist could simply agree with the conclusion, but the theory now 
seems dangerously close to counting almost any capacity as a biological function. Here is the 
beginning of a list of other ways the systemic causal role theorist might respond to the 
passage: 
• Cigarette-smoking is a capacity realized at the same level as the fingers, 
since there is no such higher-level system as the “cigarette-smoking system”. 
Since the hierarchy constraint is not being fulfilled, the fingers should not be 
said to be exercising a biological function in this case (no function is being 
exercised). 
• The larger system capacity has been identified incorrectly. It is more accurate 
to say that the fingers are contributing to the musculoskeletal system’s 
capacity to position an object (the function is therefore “to hold an object 
being positioned”). 
• The larger system capacity has been identified incorrectly. It is more accurate 
to say that the fingers are contributing to the whole-organism capacity to 
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consume an object (the function is therefore “to grip an object being 
consumed”).   
• The task performed by the fingers has been identified incorrectly. The 
contribution that the fingers are making is to apply forces to a cigarette at 
different points and in opposing directions. The larger systemic capacity is the 
hand’s ability to hold a cigarette steadily in place (the function is therefore “to 
apply forces to a cigarette at different points and in opposing directions”). 
… and so on. 
These statements are not equivalent; some of the functions could be lost without losing 
others.33 The systemic causal theorist will probably have the intuition that some of these 
statements should be preferred over the others, and perhaps even that one of them is the sole 
correct one. But we are now at the same point we were at with process reliabilism in Section 
3.2. All you have to do is find the right level of generality at which to describe the system, 
system capacity, and contribution, and the systemic causal role theory will give you whatever 
answer your intuitions favored from the start. The systemic causal role theory itself does not 
have the resources to tell us whether any of these statements should be preferred and why. 
One way to restrict the possible interpretations is to require that system capacities must 
themselves be functional (this could eliminate frivolous system capacities like “the capacity to 
smoke cigarettes”). But this would make the account viciously circular. 
To avoid the problems traditionally associated with systemic causal role theories, there 
are two main directions systemic causal role theorists have gone. One is to index function 
attributions to external perspectives; external perspectivalist theories are considered in Section 
3.4. The other is to add the further constraint that the systemic capacity being contributed to 
must be a form of self-maintenance. This type of account is considered next. 
                                                            
33 And again, Neander’s (1995) solution to indeterminacy problems, described in an earlier footnote, will 
not suffice because the function attributions are not all connected by interlevel mechanistic “by-relations.” 
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3.3.3 Self-Maintenance-Based Approach 
 
Moreno et al. offer specific criteria for what types of systems are self-maintaining, and 
what counts as a contribution to self-maintenance, which are based on their notion of 
thermodynamic constraint closure (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, Chapter 1). To yield an account of 
proper function, and a distinction between function and malfunction, Moreno et al. must also 
answer the question, in virtue of what can a part of such a system continue to qualify as 
belonging to a functional type if that part is no longer contributing to the system’s self-
maintenance? Mossio et al. claim that “To have functions, self-maintaining systems must 
belong to a specific class” (2009, p. 825), depending on “the kind of organization they possess” 
(2009, p. 829). Such organization can persist even when some parts are no longer contributing 
to the system’s self-maintenance; such parts are then said to malfunction. The answer to the 
Grounding question is then: traits have functions in virtue of the fact that they are part of 
organized systems that require self-maintenance. The answer to the Demarcation question is: 
traits are functioning properly when they are actually contributing to the self-maintenance of the 
larger organized system. 
But if the actual presence of self-maintenance is not necessary for individuating such 
classes of organization, then how are they to be individuated? Almost any type of organized 
system will be subject to entropic forces and will therefore require maintenance, so there are 
few constraints on what counts as an organized system. Certainly kinds of organization can be 
distinguished at varying levels of grain, and since function is relative to organizational class, a 
generality problem will appear here as well. 
Christensen and Bickhard note that “the conditions of self-maintenance vary over an 
organism’s lifetime and across generations (due to environmental variability amongst other 
things)” (2002, p. 10). Moreno et al.’s way of putting this point is that any given class of 
organization will be capable of adopting multiple “regimes of self-maintenance”; a regime of 
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self-maintenance is a “possible specific organization that an individual member of a class can 
adopt without ceasing to exist or losing its membership of that class” (Mossio et al., 2009, p. 
849). But since a regime of self-maintenance essentially amounts to a different way of 
conducting self-maintenance, “functional ascription could vary according to the specific 
instance of [self-maintenance] that the system is realising at a given moment (what we called a 
‘regime of self-maintenance’)” (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 74). This means that functional 
ascriptions depend not only on the level of generality at which organizational classes are typed, 
but also the level of generality at which regimes of self-maintenance are typed: 
Each specific regime, orders and levels of closure generate … a distinct set of 
norms and functions. … [A] given function … could be at work only within a 
specific regime of maintenance of the considered system, realised, for instance, 
only in some particular conditions or at a given moment. As a consequence, 
adequate functional ascriptions should make explicit, in each specific case, which 
are the regime, order, and level of the closure involved… (Moreno & Mossio, 
2015, p. 74) 
Further, since the requirements for self-maintenance can change when the environment 
changes, whether a part is contributing (or can contribute) to self-maintenance may change 
depending on the organism’s context (Mossio et al., 2009, p. 832). But whether or not the 
environmental context should be considered to have changed is dependent on the level of 
generality at which the environment and its features are typed, so a generality problem will also 
exist at the level of context-dependence of biological function ascriptions. 
 
3.3.4 Lesson: Generality Problems Afflict Non-Perspectival Theories in General 
 
It is not hard to see how other non-perspectival theories of proper function can easily 
run into such problems as well. For instance, the modal theory of function (Nanay, 2010; cf. 
Bickhard, 2000, pp. 116–117) defines function and malfunction counterfactually in terms of the 
closeness of possible worlds. Of course, possible worlds can be typed at varying levels of 
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grain, and this will drastically impact which ones are counted as being “close” to each other 
(Enç, 2002, p. 303). 
The general lesson of Section 3.3 has been that theories of proper function that assign 
proper functions to trait tokens, on the basis of how some related non-perspectival token 
(selection history, system the trait plays a causal role in, self-maintenance regime, etc.) is to be 
typed, will give rise to generality problems. Without supplying a general principle for choosing 
the relevant type in given cases, such a theory cannot provide a function assignment with 
definite content because such assignments will tend to vary widely depending on the generality 
at which the relevant token is typed. These problems may or may not be insurmountable; but if 
I am right that such problems do not arise for perspectivalist accounts, they offer an important 
motivation to give perspectivalism a closer look. 
 
3.4 External Perspectivalism 
 
Though external perspectivalism has not had as much uptake as the non-perspectivalist 
approaches, defenses of it have begun to appear recently (e.g., Craver, 2001, 2013).34 
According to a simple version of external perspectivalism, the proper function of a trait token 
consists in whatever an external observer considers it to be. In this bald form, it is obvious how 
such a view runs into problems: different observers might disagree on what the proper function 
is, or the same observer might hold differing views on different occasions (Maley & Piccinini, 
2017, p. 240). One way around these problems is to relativize proper function to specific 
observers and specific occasions: the proper function of A for observer B on occasion C is D. 
But since we do not relativize biological explanations to specific observers and specific 
                                                            
34 An earlier account that is unambiguously perspectivalist was developed by Wimsatt (1972). Because 
systemic causal role theorists often find it necessary to appeal to things like the interests of scientists to 
avoid promiscuity objections, they are sometimes read as what I am calling external perspectivalists.  
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occasions, it is hard to see how this would provide answers to the Demarcation and Grounding 
questions in a way that accounts for the explanatory role of proper functions.35 
The usual way of dealing with these problems is to relativize function, not to observers 
and occasions, but instead to interests of external observers (usually scientists). The rationale 
is that biological explanations are themselves relative to explanatory interests (Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver, 2000, p. 13), so it should not be problematic if function attributions are 
relative in this way as well. However, it is hard to see how proper functions can be explanatory 
if explanatory interests are appealed to in order to give definite content to such functions in the 
first place; the mere fact that a scientist has taken an interest in something does not impart 
explanatory power to it.36 To avoid this problem, the external perspectivalist may respond that 
explanatory interests themselves are suitably constrained by non-perspectival empirical facts; 
but in this case, it would seem that such facts are what are actually answering the Demarcation 
and Grounding questions. Therefore, the external perspectivalist about proper function is 
trapped in a dilemma: the account either fails to satisfy a key desideratum for an account of 
function, or it reduces to a non-perspectival theory, in which case generality problems are likely 
to emerge (Section 3.3). 
But there are additional problems for external perspectivalism. Bigelow and Pargetter 
argue that there is often a mismatch between functions and what we take an interest in: 
it is assumed that biological structures would have had the functions they do 
have even if we had not been here to take an interest in them at all. And some of 
the effects of structures that we take an interest in have nothing to do with their 
function. And some functions are of no interest to us at all. (1987, pp. 183–184)37 
                                                            
35 See Massimi (2018a, p. 347) for additional problems for making such a move. 
36 Woodger went further, arguing that attempts to “explain internal teleology by means of external 
teleology” are no better than vitalism or Cartesian dualism if they leave the external teleology 
unaccounted for (1929, p. 441; cf. Pattee, 1977, pp. 260–261). 
37 Mark Bedau (1992, p. 37) makes similar arguments against what I am calling external perspectivalism 
about goal-directedness. 
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External perspectivalists may yet be able to devise effective responses to such criticisms. My 
intention in considering the above theories and their weaknesses has not been to make an 
argument by elimination, but instead to motivate exploration for an alternative theory that does 
not face generality problems and that does not make proper functions relative to the subjective 
mental states of external observers. It is to this exploration that I now turn. 
 
3.5 Avoiding Generality Problems: Non-Minded Systems That Have 
Perspectives 
 
3.5.1 Pattee, Dretske, and Selective Loss of Detail 
 
Generality problems, in general, make it difficult to provide a sufficient answer to what I 
have called the Grounding question, which, applied to the proper function debate, is: What 
makes it the case that any such mode of functioning should count as a proper function? In 
order to solve generality problems, any theory that analyzes proper function in terms of some 
other factors must tell us what it is about any given case that fixes the appropriate level of 
generality at which such factors should be considered. 
What kind of thing can “fix” or “pick out” a level of generality in the first place? Clearly, 
human beings can pick out a level of generality; this is just what Conee and Feldman and 
Bishop argue is happening when philosophers “apply” process reliabilism to given problems. 
Arguably, this is because human beings are capable of abstraction; they are capable of taking 
different perspectives on a situation, and characterizing it at varying levels of description, some 
of which are more fine-grained than others. But most theories of proper function attempt to 
answer the Grounding question in a way that does not make essential reference to the 
subjective mental states or cognitive capacities of humans, because otherwise they cannot do 
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the work referred to in the introduction (naturalizing representation, value, etc.), and they 
cannot account for the explanatory utility of notions of proper function. 
The question then is: what sort of thing is it to have a perspective at all, i.e., the sort of 
perspective that allows us to “fix” some level of generality at all? What is special about the 
human capacity for abstraction that is relevant to generality problems? Pattee’s answer to this 
is that selective loss of detail is the key: 
All forms of discrimination, measurement, classification, selection, pattern 
recognition, etc., are accomplished by selective loss of details. Quite generally, it 
is this selective loss of details from the immense array of sensory inputs and 
memory stores that makes symbol systems of all types, including all languages, 
functionally useful. Such discriminations are certainly one of the most primitive 
and fundamental functions of the brain. (1992, p. 190) 
For instance, the ability to discriminate houses from other types of buildings requires a 
selective loss of detail: it requires sensitivity (or attention) to the details that distinguish houses 
from non-houses, but insensitivity (or lack of attention) to details that are irrelevant to making 
such discriminations (e.g., whether the building has four windows or five). By switching to a 
different perspective, different details are lost or treated as insignificant. The generality at which 
discriminations are made is given by the level of detail that is treated as significant, and the 
level of detail that is ignored, i.e., selectively lost. 
But Pattee does not believe that a mind (or even a nervous system) is necessary for 
this. Relatively simple dynamical systems and devices can exhibit a selective loss of detail in 
the way that they are sensitive in their interactions with other objects. Similarly, Dretske argues 
that simple analog/digital devices, by systematically ignoring information at a certain level of 
detail, are capable of processes that involve assigning tokens to types, such as classification, 
categorization, or recognition: 
Until information has been lost, or discarded, an information-processing system 
has failed to treat different things as essentially the same. It has failed to classify 
or categorize, failed to generalize, failed to “recognize” the input as being an 
instance (token) of a more general type. (1981, p. 141) 
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Dretske argues that it makes sense to speak of such a device as having its own “point of view,” 
according to which multiple tokens are considered to be of “the same” type. Similarly, Popper 
argued that since no two physical events are ever exactly the same, “for logical reasons, there 
must always be a point of view … before there can be any repetition; which point of view, 
consequently, cannot be merely the result of repetition” (2002, p. 59). Dennett (1991) and 
Ross, Ladyman, and Collier (2007, pp. 220–227) use the word ‘perspective’ in the same sense 
as Dretske’s ‘point of view’. Devices that perform pattern recognition operate with a 
determinate scheme of sorting tokens into types—a de facto perspective on which tokens 
should get assigned to which types. In fact, in his book-length treatment of the notion of a 
“point of view,” Hautamäki argued that while this notion gets used in many different ways, the 
commonality is that when a given thing is being considered from a point of view, “certain 
aspects of [that thing] are considered while others are ignored” (1986, p. 7), i.e., a selective 
loss of details. On Hautamäki’s account of points of view, out of all of the possible 
“determinables” (i.e., types) that a determinate (token) object or situation may fall under, a point 
of view represents a selection of certain of these determinables as relevant and others as 
irrelevant (ibid., p. 65).38  
Pattee argues that selective loss of details is ubiquitous within biological systems, as it 
is essential to the working of enzymes; in fact, Pattee argues that ultimately, all  
pattern recognition and selective action [in biological systems] is mediated by 
enzymes or enzyme-like molecules. This is the case for the cell’s sensing of the 
external environment, for sensing between the cells, and for intracellular 
recognition of patterns. (1982, p. 172) 
                                                            
38 My main reason for adopting Dennett’s and Ladyman, Ross, and Collier’s use of ‘perspective’ rather 
than Dretske’s, Popper’s, and Hautamäki’s term ‘point of view’ here is to highlight that the key advantage 
that external perspectivalism has over forms of non-perspectivalism can be retained while dropping the 
dependence on mentality or cognition. Generally, the two terms are treated as synonymous. I would 
define ‘perspective’ as an isolated set of pattern-types which the system uses to implicitly carve its own 
world of interaction (cf. Varela, 1997). My use of ‘perspective’ is also similar to Devlin’s (1991, p. 151) 
notion of a ‘scheme of individuation’. Dennett’s (and my) use of ‘perspective’ should not be confused with 
his use of ‘stance’; a perspective counts as a “stance” for Dennett when it is adopted by minded beings as 
a “predictive strategy” (1981, p. 15). 
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Enzymes act as detection devices because of the selectivity with which they bind to other 
molecules. They have binding sites at which they form electrochemical bonds to specific types 
of molecules (often other proteins or carbohydrates). The formation of an electrochemical bond 
is much more like a discrete process than a continuous one; normally a protein either binds to 
a molecule or it doesn’t. Further, enzymes are insensitive to differences between molecules of 
a given chemical species; either the catalytic reaction is carried out or it is not. Subtle 
differences in conformation between substrate molecules that bond to the enzyme do not 
translate to qualitative differences in catalytic reaction; such differences are effectively 
“ignored” by the enzyme: 
out of all the microscopic collisions with … an enzyme, only very special ones are 
capable of triggering their catalytic function, and furthermore when this function is 
triggered only a very limited or simple result takes place. This is in contrast to 
ordinary dynamical systems where almost any collision results in a complex 
perturbation spreading through the entire system with no coherent result 
whatsoever. (Pattee, 1973c, p. 43) 
In this sense, protein binding, which is the basis for enzymatic reactions and intracellular 
signaling, counts as a fixed practice of recognition and response that consistently sorts 
substrate molecules, as well as operates on them, at a fixed level of generality. For these 
reasons, Pattee (e.g., 1982, p. 172) argues that enzymes can be said to recognize or classify 
molecules; enzymes have their own perspectives on which differences between molecules are 
significant and which are not (which determinables are relevant and which irrelevant, in 
Hautamäki’s terminology)—perspectives on how to sort molecule tokens into types (viz., 
substrate and nonsubstrate). 
An external perspective can be a way of sorting tokens into types, and so indexing the 
sorting of tokens into types to such an external perspective screens off alternative 
interpretations. But if Dretske and Pattee are right, then a theory of proper function need not 
make essential reference to human minds or sophisticated cognitive systems; it could instead 
ground the normativity of function in the classificatory or recognitional capacities of certain 
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kinds of much simpler systems. But even given Pattee’s claim that biological systems contain 
vast numbers of classification and recognition devices, it remains to be seen how these 
resources can provide a basis for norms of biological performance, i.e., proper function. In the 
next section, I discuss work by Haugeland that attempts to demonstrate how basic 
classification and recognition capacities can provide the basis for norms of performance.  
 
3.5.2 Selective Loss of Performance Detail: Haugeland and Censoriousness 
 
In his 1990 paper “The Intentionality All-Stars,” Haugeland’s goal is to provide an 
account of the normativity of intentionality. Though he is not providing an account of biological 
proper function per se, his theory is worth examining in this context because of the more 
general insights it can offer about what is needed to avoid generality problems about norms of 
performance.39 
According to Haugeland, normative standards of performance can spontaneously 
emerge within a community of “versatile and interactive creatures, not otherwise specified 
except that they are conformists” (1990, p. 147). Haugeland discusses two forms such 
conformism might take, i.e., two mechanisms of interaction by which such creatures might 
participate in and sustain a community of shared performance norms. The first of these is 
imitativeness, i.e., the tendency to imitate the behavior of the other “creatures.” Turner (1994) 
argues that imitativeness alone cannot provide a ground for the sharing of norms. This is 
because imitating is subject to interpretation: there are many ways to interpret another’s 
behavior, and therefore many different ways to imitate it. Again, a generality problem arises: 
whether or not A’s behavior is an imitation of B’s behavior depends on the level of generality or 
                                                            
39 Haugeland (1990, p. 147) credits Heidegger, Sellars, and Brandom as forerunners of the position he is 
advancing. 
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grain at which the behaviors are typed, i.e., at which behaviors are considered as being the 
same for purposes of imitation:  
What is needed to preserve the concept of sameness in the case of open-
textured rules is … some way of distinguishing variation of habits, or the 
acquisition of a variant rule, from the acquisition of the same open-textured rule. 
(Turner, 1994, p. 76) 
In other words, what is needed is a shared scheme for sorting and discriminating the 
performances of others. Turner and Haugeland both argue that what is needed to fix a norm is 
not merely a tendency of imitativeness, but a form of what Haugeland refers to as 
censoriousness that fixes and categorizes the relevant behavior types. Turner notes that, for 
this reason, norms “are identifiable only by observing what happens if they are breached” 
(1994, p. 28). Haugeland says that by censoriousness, he means “a positive tendency to see 
that one’s neighbors do likewise, and to suppress variation” (1990, p. 147). He does not only 
have negative kinds of censoriousness in mind: 
What in general counts as censorious acceptance and rejection? Whatever 
community members do that promotes conformism: if they smile at conforming 
performances, and smiles promote repetition, if they fire electric shocks at those 
who err, and these shocks discourage aberration, then smiles and shocks are 
devices of censorship. And who are the members of this community? The 
members are basically whoever is brought into conformity with the rest of the 
group, and thereupon participates in the censoring of others. (1990, p. 148) 
Haugeland explains that such censoriousness can form the grounding of a socially-based norm 
if it is based on a fixed practice of recognition and sorting of behavior. 
Imagine, for instance, that the rules of chess were not explicitly codified, but 
observed only as a body of conformist norms—“how one acts” when one plays 
chess. So, it is proper (socially acceptable) to move the king in any direction, but 
only one square at a time. For this to be a norm, players and teacher/censors 
must be able to “tell” (that is, respond differentially to) which piece is the king, 
what are the squares, what counts as a move, and so on; thus, the presupposed 
sorting of circumstances is effectively a sorting of items, features, and events 
within those circumstances. Meanwhile, according to other norms, the king must 
be protected when threatened, cannot be exposed to capture, can castle under 
certain conditions, and so on; and, crucially, for all of these norms, it’s the same 
instituted sort (“king”) that’s involved. Hence, the norms themselves are 
interdependent via depending on the same sorting of circumstances (items, 
features, …). (1990, pp. 151–152) 
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As long as the sorting and categorizing is done in the same way by participants, there is no 
generality problem; which piece is counted as a “king” is not left open to interpretation based 
on differing levels of grain. In order to be playing chess at all, in this community, one must first 
of all attend to the same level of specification or detail as all the other participants when 
counting something as a “king” or not. But Haugeland stresses that the categorization must not 
only happen at the level of recognizing and categorizing items, features, and events; it must 
also happen at the behavioral level, so that input stimuli are recognized and categorized and 
then mapped to a categorical response: “norms have a kind of ‘if-then’ character, connecting 
sorts of circumstance to sorts of behavior,” (1990, p. 151).40 Haugeland argues that because 
conformism (in his sense) is the type of thing that serves not only to determine the behavior of 
individuals in the community but also that sets the framework for typing circumstances, 
behaviors, and conditions that hold between them, as well as for discriminating deviations, 
conformism can provide the necessary grounding for performance norms: 
When behavioral dispositions aggregate under the force of conformism, it isn’t 
herds that coalesce, but norms … distinct, enduring clusters of dispositions in 
behavioral feasibility space, separated in that space by clear gaps where there 
are no dispositions … . The community-wide classes of similar dispositions that 
coalesce under the force of conformism can be called “norms”—and not just 
collections or kinds—precisely because they themselves set the standard for that 
very censoriousness by which they are generated and maintained. The censure 
attendant on deviation automatically gives these standards (the extant classes 
themselves) a de facto normative force. (1990, p. 149) 
Haugeland stresses that conformism, on his view, does not require the capacity for following 
explicit rules, but neither does it consist in mere causal regularity. Here, Haugeland trades on a 
                                                            
40 Schroeder has argued that  
 
Regulating involves creating a rule of some sort, as the word ‘regulate’ suggests. This is 
the sort of activity that can be expected to create norms, for a rule is just one sort of 
norm. Hence it should be no surprise that a regulated object is subject to a norm of 
performance: that it has a function. (2004a, p. 118) 
 
However, as will be discussed in Section 4.4.1, not all forms of regulation rely on fixed typing schemes 
that define sorts in Haugeland’s sense. Simple forms of negative feedback, for example, are insufficient 
for normativity because it is a matter of interpretation how far the variable being controlled has to be from 
the set point until malfunction should be ascribed. 
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distinction that was earlier mapped out by Sellars, who distinguished between “merely 
conforming to rules,” “obeying rules,” and a third category situated in between the first two that 
Sellars refers to as “pattern-governed behavior” (1954, pp. 326–327). Haugeland also argues 
that conformist norms should not be confused with conventional norms; on his view, the latter 
require mental states: 
The difference between norms and conventions lies in this explanatory appeal: 
conformism does not presuppose any prior beliefs or preferences on the part of 
individual conformists, and hence the persistence of norms cannot be explained 
in terms of agents’ interest maximization or rational choice. Indeed, norms need 
not be, or even seem to be, in any way beneficial either to the individuals or to 
the group; the mechanism of conformism is completely blind to the character or 
merits of the norms engendered.41 (1990, p. 150) 
For these reasons, the information processing capacity of “creatures” constituting the 
conformist community can be extremely thin. They do not have to be human beings: they could 
be very simple organisms or machines—anything that has the capability to perform recognition 
and enact a rule-like (pattern-governed) mapping between recognized circumstances and 
behavioral response categories. 
 
3.5.3 Division of Labor 
 
Whereas Haugeland’s account depended on a community of homogenous “creatures” 
that are all monitoring and censuring each others’ behavior, the entities doing the censuring 
(call these the “alpha creatures”) might be distinct from those which are censured (“beta 
creatures”). Consider an example in which all of the creatures are robots in a fully automated 
factory (perhaps they were all designed by intelligent beings, or suppose that their existence 
and placement within the factory is a chance occurrence, like the parts of Dretske’s “Twin 
Tercel,” 1995, pp. 141ff). The beta robots are the workers. They perform the work in the 
                                                            
41 Stated another way: Conformist norms need not be categorically binding (in the sense of Copp, 2015), 
and need not be constrained by categorically binding norms. 
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factory, assembling and transporting components, and they each have a task that they usually 
perform successfully. But they sometimes develop problems causing them to fail at their tasks. 
For example, their internal components may become corroded or damaged, there may be 
lurking bugs in their software, or their parts may need recalibrating. Fortunately, the alpha 
robots are there to roam the factory and monitor the performance of the beta robots. When the 
beta robots are doing their jobs properly, the alphas simply continue vigilantly roaming through 
the factory. When they detect that a beta robot is not performing its job properly, the beta robot 
is censured. This may take many forms: perhaps taking it offline and sending it to a repair bay, 
or taking it offline and sending it to a scrapping or recycling area, or even sending a signal to 
the beta robot that stimulates a self-repair activity. Regardless, even in this simple situation, the 
automated factory may be said to realize a communal regime of “conformist norms” in 
Haugeland’s sense, even if the information processing capabilities of the robots are very 
simple. Again, Haugeland stresses that in the minimal case, 
conformism does not presuppose thought, reasoning, language, or any other 
cognitive faculty; the creatures do not in the first instance conform or censure 
wittingly or because they want to (except “tacitly”)—they are simply built that way. 
(1990, p. 148) 
Nonetheless, by enacting a specific framework for typing circumstances, behaviors, and 
conditions, as well as what count as deviations, and censuring these deviations, the censuring 
patterns of the alphas set a normative standard for the factory as a whole. Given the 
background of such norms of performance that are put into practice by the alphas, the beta 
robots in the factory may be said to have proper functions; the standard for whether a given 
beta robot is functioning properly is set by the censuring patterns of the alphas.  
Note that by putting a certain set of standards into practice in the factory, the alphas 
may be said to collectively have a perspective: their pattern of censuring constitutes a tacit 
perspective on which differences in performance are significant and which ones insignificant. 
An external observer may take a different perspective and decide that the way the alphas work 
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is not objectively best for the factory. The perspective possessed by the alphas may not be 
“objective” in this sense42 (as we saw, due to generality problems, there probably cannot be a 
theory of what counts as proper function in this non-perspectival sense), but it is objective in 
the sense that it is independent of any external observer. The system in question, by itself, 
realizes a normative standard. The collective activity of alpha robots also provides an objective 
criterion for delineating what is part of the system and what is not. 
Such norms of proper function are not etiological or history-dependent, and they are not 
dependent on the perspective(s) taken by external observers. They depend on the level of 
generality at which certain circumstances, behaviors, and conditions are typed, but instead of 
“starting with the intuitively correct judgment about a [trait’s proper function] and then cherry 
picking an account of [the organism’s selective regime, selection history, possible worlds, 
regime of self-maintenance, the functional characteristics of the larger system, hierarchical 
levels, etc.] that yields that judgment” (again paraphrasing Bishop), it is the alpha robots 
themselves that fix the relevant level of generality. For this reason, by grounding proper 
function in the censuring activities of alpha robots, the generality problems can be avoided. In 
the next section, I discuss how the theory applies to real biological systems. 
 
3.6 Performance-Monitoring and Censuring Mechanisms in 
Subcellular Biology 
 
The cells of biological organisms, including even single-celled organisms like bacteria, 
contain highly sophisticated molecular machinery. The everyday functioning of any given cell 
involves many different kinds of chemical reactions that are tightly orchestrated and 
coordinated in ways that biologists are only beginning to understand. There are many ways 
                                                            
42 Or, again in Copp’s (2015) terminology, the performance norms grounded by the censuring patterns of 
the alphas are not categorically binding. 
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that such orchestration and coordination can (and does) fail, and like an automated factory, 
cells are highly dependent on certain components (proteins) that are capable of sensing 
whether certain other components are doing their job properly. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, 
the enzymatic binding and catalysis by which proteins perform their work also counts as a fixed 
practice of recognition and categorical response. Just as chess players consistently categorize 
chess pieces at a fixed level of generality, enzymes sort substrate molecules at a similarly fixed 
level of generality.  These quality control proteins can trigger various types of responses, 
ranging from throttling down upstream processes to reduce the malfunctioning component’s 
workload, to triggering a process called programmed cell death, in which the cell itself commits 
suicide in an orderly fashion to prevent the malfunctioning cell from causing further problems 
for the larger organism. 
One example of this is the unfolded protein response that is triggered by several 
different types of “performance monitoring” proteins in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER). An 
important task that many cells perform is to synthesize proteins that will be excreted from the 
cell to perform functions elsewhere. These proteins (among others) are synthesized in 
ribosomes that are embedded within the ER. Protein synthesis involves stringing together 
component amino acid molecules, and requires the string of amino acids to be folded into the 
right shape (important because the capacity of proteins to do work is largely a matter of how 
they are shaped). The folding process can occur spontaneously during synthesis, but is 
sometimes also assisted by helper proteins called chaperones. Problems may occur during the 
folding process, whereby a non-folded or misfolded protein results, or a properly folded protein 
can also become unfolded or misfolded as a result of various conditions in the cell, like 
excessive heat or pH levels (the unfolding of a protein is sometimes called denaturing). There 
are several types of proteins in the ER that are able to sense unfolded or misfolded proteins, 
including Ire1, ATF6, and PERK (Galluzzi, Bravo-San Pedro, & Kroemer, 2014). 
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When too many unfolded proteins are detected by such “sensor” proteins, several types 
of responses may be triggered. A signal may be sent to the nucleus of the cell causing it to 
produce more of the chaperone molecules or to enlarge the ER to increase its processing 
capacity. A signal may also be sent that causes the upstream processes of protein synthesis to 
be slowed down (to give the ER a chance to play catch-up, and hopefully reduce the number of 
unfolded or misfolded proteins). These signals may also halt the progression of the cell cycle, 
preventing the cell from making further progress towards mitosis, or cell division (since if this 
cell is malfunctioning, then the resulting cells may not be properly formed). When conditions 
are bad enough, these sensors can even send a signal that triggers mitochondrial membrane 
permeabilization (MMP), in which “executioner” enzymes are released from the outer 
membrane of the mitochondria. These executioner enzymes, called caspases, are like a 
controlled demolition team that systematically degrades the components of the cell, causing it 
to self-terminate without provoking an immune response or causing problems in the 
surrounding tissues (Hotchkiss, Strasser, McDunn, & Swanson, 2009). 
Other examples of malfunction detection and response have been found in other 
organelles, including the mitochondria, nucleus, Golgi apparatus, and lysosomes (Galluzzi, 
Bravo-San Pedro, & Kroemer, 2014). For example, the SOK1 sensor protein in the Golgi 
apparatus detects malfunction by responding to elevated levels of reactive oxygen species 
(ROS), which are a potentially dangerous byproduct of certain intracellular reactions (Nogueira 
et al., 2008). Instead of triggering programmed cell death, another way that cells respond to 
malfunction is by causing the orderly disposal of malfunctioning organelles in a process called 
autophagy (Okamoto, Kondo-Okamoto, & Ohsumi, 2009; Youle & Narendra, 2011). 
Even when the damage repair mechanism is not known, its existence can be 
ascertained. For several decades, biologists have known that when filaments are sheared off of 
flagella, bacteria are able to replace them. Kelly T. Hughes and colleagues found that flagella 
can regenerate from the same hook/basal body of a flagellum that was sheared off. Through 
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clever experiments they determined that a separate mechanism for repairing malfunctioning 
flagella must exist, rather than simply retriggering the same mechanism that initially builds the 
flagellum, although this separate mechanism is not yet known (Rosu & Hughes, 2006). 
These examples have several features in common. In each case, there is some 
situation indicative of performance which is either registered as present or not present (e.g., 
malfunctioning flagellum, too many unfolded/misfolded proteins, too many ROS molecules 
being produced/too much oxidative damage, malfunctioning or superfluous mitochondria), 
triggering an unequivocal all-or-nothing type of response (e.g., flagellar filament replacement, 
autophagy, halting the cell cycle, apoptosis). In other words, the recognition and typing of a 
performance token, an implicit if-then mapping from this recognized performance type to a 
categorical censuring response, and the context-dependent execution of that response, all the 
ingredients needed for a community of “creatures” to realize norms of performance based on 
censorious acceptance and rejection. Since what is being categorized is the performance of 
some subsystem or component, each of these processes can ground a distinction between 
functioning and malfunctioning for that subsystem/component. 
 
3.7 Macro-Level Functions: Composite Recognition and Response 
 
In the previous section, the focus was on individual protein molecules that act as “alpha 
creatures” at the subcellular level. But it might seem that there is no equivalent at the 
macroscopic level that can ground macro-level proper functions, such as the mammalian 
heart’s function of pumping blood. After all, there is no individual system in mammals we can 
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point to that that acts as an alpha creature, measuring overall performance of the heart and 
“censuring” the heart when it malfunctions.43 
Recall from Section 3.5.1 that what is special about enzymes that allows them to act as 
alpha creatures is their selective sensitivity to types (chemical species) at a specific level of 
detail: differences in conformation between substrates of the right chemical species for that 
enzyme are ignored, so that enzymatic reactions implement the kind of fixed practice of 
recognition (in the Dretskean sense) and categorical response that can ground a normative 
perspective. While such enzymatic activity is ubiquitous in biological systems (Section 3.6), 
similar detection and censuring systems above the cellular level may not be nearly as common. 
However, I do not believe that this shows that most of the macro-level functions we attribute to 
biological traits do not exist. In this section I argue that instead of arising from the activity of 
individual, macro-scale alpha creatures, most macro-level proper functions emerge from the 
collective activity of micro-level alpha creatures. 
To understand how macro-level proper functions (e.g., of an organ like the heart) can 
arise from the activity of the kinds of micro-level alpha creatures described in the previous 
section, begin again with a simple example. Suppose that there is a device that detects 
whether there is a ‘1’ in a certain position, and another device that detects whether there is a ‘5’ 
in the position next to it. Each device responds categorically in one of two ways depending on 
whether the condition in question is met. But when you consider both devices together, there 
are four conditions that the devices are collectively—not singly—responsive to: present 1 and 
absent 5, present 1 and present 5, absent 1 and present 5, and absent 1 and absent 5. There 
are similarly four collective response behaviors, one for each of these conditions. In this way, 
                                                            
43 The hypothalamus plays a key role in regulating heart rate, but this is not quite the same thing: the 
hypothalamus only makes adjustments to normal heart functioning. It has no way to detect and “censure” 
the heart based on macro-level conditions of heart malfunction, like congestive heart failure or cardiac 
arrest. 
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we can instead look at the two detection devices as comprising a single, more complex 
detection device.44 
Now suppose that the absence of a 1, in the case of the first detector, or the absence of 
a 5, in the case of the second detector, results in negative censuring behaviors (perhaps they 
are monitoring and censuring the mechanisms responsible for producing the 1s and 5s). The 
detectors are then each a type of alpha creature. If so, then it equally makes sense to consider 
the combination of the two detectors as a single, more complex alpha creature that monitors 
whether the sequence (1, 5) is present. It is monitoring the larger system that includes the 
subsystems that produce the 1s and 5s, and enforcing a standard in which the production of (1, 
5) sequences constitutes proper functioning, and other conditions constitute varying degrees of 
malfunction. 
The larger point here is that the activity of many alpha creatures can collectively realize 
a higher-level, and more complex, standard of functioning—not due to the fact that the higher-
level censuring is causally dependent on the low-level censuring, but because it is constituted 
by it. The higher-level response is categorical and involves a selective loss of detail precisely 
because the lower-level responses are categorical and involve selective losses of detail. In 
fact, the detail that is lost at the higher level just is the sum of the detail that is lost at the lower 
level. As long as the lower-level alpha creatures operate with a fixed level of generality, any 
normative censuring standard that is additively built up from them will also operate with a fixed 
level of generality. Ultimately, activity that passes muster for many different types of alpha 
creatures at the cellular level just is activity at the macro scale when you add it all together. The 
alpha creatures collectively define a standard of what passes muster at the macro-level, and 
therefore define what proper functioning consists in (when no censuring activity is triggered) or 
what varying degrees of malfunction consist in (when varying amounts of negative censuring 
                                                            
44 In fact, this is the basis of parallel distributed (Selfridge & Neisser, 1960) and agent-based (Rosin & 
Rana, 2004) pattern detection techniques. 
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activity is triggered). Just as in the simple initial example, the function of the combined 
subsystems was to produce sequences of (1, 5), the function of the heart is to pump blood 
because that is the collective activity that the detectors are collectively responsive to. The 
detectors, considered collectively, realize a perspective on what counts as proper functioning 
for the heart as a whole. In fact, this is the reason why we don’t find a single, non-composite 
macro-level alpha creature that monitors the heart as a whole: such a macro-level alpha 
creature is not necessary and would be redundant, because that role is already fulfilled by the 
collective, finely orchestrated and emergent self-organizing activity of lower-level alpha 
creatures. 
Go back to the automated factory example, and suppose it is a car factory. It might be 
the case that there isn’t any particular alpha robot whose job it is to monitor the factory as a 
whole and detect whether it is producing entire cars properly or not. This might be because the 
operations of the individual alpha robots are so well orchestrated (without there needing to be a 
non-composite “orchestrator”) that their activity collectively adds up to the implementation of a 
standard-verifying mechanism for the whole factory that works as well as a single, holistically 
functioning alpha robot would. In this way, an organ like the heart is like the car factory.45 
Space does not here allow a detailed critical analysis of this way of grounding macro-
level proper functions. However, since on this account, proper function is always derived from 
the detection of individual enzymatic detectors (and other Dretske-style recognition devices 
that might exist in biological systems), an objection might run as follows: Even at the level of 
                                                            
45 Unfortunately it isn’t possible to go into empirically detailed concrete biological examples of this, simply 
because we don't know in detail about how the activities of thousands of “alpha creature” individual 
proteins collectively sustain the organization of a system like the heart. It would require reverse-
engineering the heart in total molecular detail, all the different genes that get expressed under what 
circumstances (and exactly what molecular pathways they are triggered by) in all the different types of 
cells of the heart and what their intercellular and intracellular effects are, and all of the non-linear 
interactions of those effects, etc., something we cannot yet approach. I don’t, however, believe that such 
an exhaustive level of knowledge is necessary for scientists to competently discover and investigate 
macro-level proper functions, just as knowledge of molecular structure is not necessary for competently 
discovering and classifying crystals (Polányi, 1958, pp. 43–48). 
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subcellular detection enzymes, it is a matter of interpretation whether (in the case of the 
enzyme that detects mitochondrial damage) increased ROS is being detected, or whether 
incomplete oxidative phosphorylation is being detected. This is similar to the argument that 
there is no determinate representational content in frog vision when a frog is detecting a fly, 
because there are equally good reasons to think that what is being registered by the frog’s 
visual system is the presence of ‘food’ or the presence of ‘small dark moving things’ (Goode & 
Griffiths, 1995, p. 100). 
However, this objection conflates two different types of problems. One pertains to the 
question of whether there exists a determinate category for the frog (i.e., by the frog’s “lights,” 
or according to its own perspective) of what is being detected. The other pertains to the 
question of how to translate such a category into the ordinary language of humans.46 The latter 
problem is an important one to solve if one wishes to ground the full richness of 
representational content of human cognition in basic perceptual detection capabilities, which is 
certainly not being attempted in this chapter. There may very well be no fact of the matter 
whether we should characterize what the frog is detecting as ‘food’, ‘flies’, or ‘small dark 
moving things’. But it may be true at the same time that since the frog has no cognitive means 
of distinguishing between these situations, and only has a single category corresponding to its 
more basic recognition capacity, no corresponding ambiguity exists from the point of view of its 
own content-assignation scheme (cf. Dennett, 1996, pp. 42–43). The categorical discrimination 
necessary for such ambiguity to arise outstrips the frog’s own classificatory repertoire. 
Similarly, even if we can conceptualize the performance-monitoring enzyme’s simple 
classificatory repertoire in different ways, this does not mean there will be a corresponding 
indeterminacy in the proper function grounded by the enzyme’s censuring activity. The level of 
                                                            
46 For a thorough discussion of this type of conflation, see Evans (1975). 
 
 
77 
generality that the enzyme works with is fixed, and is simply more coarse-grained than the 
conceptual discriminations that we ordinary language users have at our disposal. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Because performance-monitoring subsystems that recognize and respond to 
malfunctions are widespread in biological systems, all biological systems operate with their 
own implicit perspectives on what constitutes proper functioning. These implicit, operational 
perspectives can provide definite content to a theory of proper function because they amount to 
a fixed scheme for sorting performance tokens into types. The proper function of a given 
biological subsystem consists in the activities undertaken by that subsystem that are enforced 
by performance monitoring detection and response systems. This is an internal perspectivalist 
account of proper function: what counts as the proper function of a biological subsystem or trait 
is a matter of the perspective that the biological system, itself, has on what counts as proper 
functioning for that subsystem. 
One key problem faced by each of the major non-perspectivalist positions in the 
biological function debate is that they assign functions to traits based on the type that some 
related token (system, selection history, self-maintenance regime, etc.) falls under, but the 
token in question falls under many such types and this gives rise to conflicting function 
assignments. As we saw, this is very similar to a problem that has been faced by process 
reliabilism. What was needed was a theory of proper functions that includes sufficient 
resources to say what determines the relevant level of type generality in given cases. Internal 
perspectivalism is the theory of biological function that can meet this key desideratum. The 
question of when a mechanism is functioning or malfunctioning (the Demarcation question) is 
one that can be answered by looking at that mechanism in the larger context of the organism 
and its own quality control “alpha creatures,” which are ubiquitous in biological systems. The 
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larger system that includes the mechanism in question and the quality control “alpha creatures” 
can ground this type of normativity (the Grounding question) since their recognition and 
response patterns will operate with a specific, implicit categorization scheme that isolates a 
specific level of generality. The present account therefore provides the way to naturalize proper 
function without reference to natural selection, natural design, or fitness, and without resorting 
to external perspectivalism. 
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Chapter 4  
What is Control? 
An Internal Perspectivalist Account 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
An enormous mismatch exists between the quantity and variety of ways that the notion 
of control is appealed to in philosophy and other fields, on the one hand, and the quantity of 
attempts to analyze the notion of control, itself, on the other. Consider a few examples of the 
former: 
• Rescher (1970, p. 248) among others has argued that control is what makes 
the difference between action and mere behavior. 
• Frankfurt (1978) argued that online control of behavior is what determines 
whether an action is performed freely. 
• Fischer (1994) argued that control is central to the distinction between 
persons and non-persons. 
• Fischer (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998) has made guidance control the 
centerpiece of his influential compatibilist account of moral responsibility. 
• Bishop (1989) and Schlosser (2007) attribute the main problem for causal 
theories of action, namely the problem of deviant causal chains, to the fact 
that such theories do not properly account for an essential ingredient that any 
theory of action must possess: agential control. 
• Cybernetics and control theory continue to provide insight and theoretical 
tools for understanding  
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o perception (Powers, 1973),  
o attention (Carver & Scheier, 1981), 
o motivation (Toates, 1975), 
o representation (Sloman, 1996), 
o cognition (Dretske, 1986; Hooker, Penfold, & Evans, 1992),  
o mental content (Grush, 2004),  
o the neuroscience of perception and action (Arbib, 1981),  
o intelligence and thought (in the context of robotics; Brooks, 1991), and 
even 
o consciousness (Sayre, 1976). 
• Sterelny (2001) flatly asserts that “Minds are control systems” (cf. Sloman, 
1993). 
• The notion of control lies at the center of Morris’s (1946) influential theory of 
signs and symbols. 
• Robertson and Powers (1990) argue that control theory can serve as the 
basis for an overarching psychological theory. 
• In a widely used AI textbook, Russell and Norvig go as far as to say that “the 
concept of a controller in control theory is identical to that of an agent in AI” 
(2010, p. 59).  
• Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney boldly claim that “animals can be viewed as 
control systems” (1999, p. 1011). 
• Even more broadly, Pattee has argued in many of his works (e.g., 1973b) that 
control is what differentiates living from non-living systems. 
Stear writes: 
That control paradigms are useful in describing and characterizing a great many 
of the processes and functions occurring in living systems in qualitative terms is 
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now well established. … This widespread qualitative use of control concepts to 
characterize the behavior of living systems illustrates the general pervasiveness 
and universality of control concepts—whether they are applied to living systems; 
to the control of nonliving systems such as chemical plants, machines, robots, 
and so on; or to mixed systems, such as man-machine systems in which humans 
control the machines. (1987, p. 352) 
Despite the obvious importance of control for such a diverse range of topics, there have been 
very few attempts to understand control itself. There are many discussions that try to analyze 
what kind or amount of control is necessary to solve specific kinds of problems, or how to 
implement such solutions. These fall into three broad categories: 
• Control in artificial systems (this includes most of what is known as “control 
theory”); e.g., Mackenroth (2004); Franklin, Powell, and Emami-Naeini (2018) 
• Control in biological systems in general; e.g., Milsum (1966), Purich (2010), 
Khoo (2018) 
• Cognitive, agential, and/or intentional control; e.g., Mars, Sallet, Rushworth, 
and Yeung (2011); Fridland (forthcoming) 
But there have been few attempts to understand what all of these domains have in common, or 
what it is about control that makes it such a widely applicable concept. As a result, there is little 
crosstalk between the domains, and discussions that attempt to bridge between the domains 
are often unsuccessful due to the lack of a consistent and rigorous conceptual scaffolding. 
What this chapter offers is an analysis of the concept of control that aims at being truly 
domain-general. On the present account: 
A controller puts into practice a determinate perspective on what kind of 
influence (what changes should be made to which control parameters) is 
appropriate under what conditions. Control is influencing (or being disposed to 
influence) the right aspects of something (i.e., that which is “being controlled”) in 
the right ways to the right extent by the right means at the right times, where 
what is ‘right’ in a given context may be determined either by an external 
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perspective or by the system’s own perspective (here using ‘perspective’ in the 
sense explained in the previous chapter). 
“Influence” will be understood as the exercise of directional causal powers as defined in 
Chapter 2. I begin in Section 4.2 with an introduction to the notion of an observer-worker 
system, which is a generalization of the notion of an “alpha creature” introduced in the previous 
chapter. I then, in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, introduce a distinction between autonomous and non-
autonomous controllers. Whereas the status of non-autonomous controllers as being capable 
of control is dependent on an external perspective, autonomous controllers are not dependent 
on external perspectives in this way. The set of systems that are autonomous controllers is a 
subset of those systems that are observer-worker systems. To be as general as possible, 
control is then defined only in terms of basic concepts introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 as well 
as terminology from control theory. In particular, it is the presence of a control parameter, that 
is, some common dimension of variability that the output behaviors influence in different ways, 
that separates controllers from other types of observer-worker systems that are not controllers. 
After that, in Section 4.5 I discuss several characteristics associated with controllers: 
degrees of effectiveness, degrees of control, and degrees of malfunction. It is important to gain 
a clear understanding of these notions because confusions between them often create 
difficulties for discussing control across disciplines or domains. In Section 4.6, I present a 
partial taxonomy of kinds of control systems and discuss how they are related. Importantly, in 
that section I introduce a distinction between variable, metamorphic, and composite controllers. 
These are three very different kinds of complexity that control systems can have; this 
distinction will be important for understanding how agential controllers (i.e., agents) are 
different from other types of complex controllers, as well as understanding the differences 
between kinds of agents (this will be the topic of the remaining chapters of the dissertation). 
Finally, in Section 4.7, I briefly discuss several other attempts to define the notion of 
control and how they compare from the present account. 
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4.2 Observer-Worker Systems 
 
In this chapter I will argue that the alpha creatures of Chapter 3 and control systems are 
both special cases of something more general: a worker. Physicists have two distinct notions of 
work: the kinematic notion and the thermodynamical notion. On the kinematic understanding, 
work occurs anytime there is a force acting through a distance; the “work” involved is simply 
the quantity of energy transferred. Anything that can generate force (e.g., by possessing mass) 
counts as a “worker” in this sense. I am instead interested in the thermodynamical notion. 
Thermodynamics deals with concepts like heat, coherent motion, and entropy. Heat is 
disorderly or “incoherent” particle motion; the mere dissipation of heat, by itself, is not 
considered to be work in the thermodynamical sense (Atkins, 1984, p. 198). The clearest 
examples of work in the thermodynamical sense are ones in which energy is constrained to 
flow in a way that is orderly and useful (Salthe, 2007). 
How orderly does a release of energy have to be in order to count as work? For what 
purpose, or for whom, does it need to be useful? There is no universally applicable standard. 
Sometimes thermodynamical work is defined in terms of a distinction between 
microscopic and macroscopic forces. One recent thermodynamics textbook defines ‘work’ as 
follows: 
Work is a process of transferring energy to or from a system in ways that can be 
described by macroscopic mechanical forces exerted by factors in the 
surroundings, outside the system. Examples are an externally driven shaft 
agitating a stirrer within the system, or an externally imposed electric field that 
polarizes the material of the system, or a piston that compresses it. (Shah, 2018, 
p. 18) 
But again, where to draw the line between “micro” and “macro” will depend on the context. 
There is no universally applicable standard for how this should be done; nature has no such 
joint at which to carve. Further, in biological systems, work is often done by individual protein 
molecules, which are microscopic. 
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Normally, assumptions about which energy flows will count as “work” are built into the 
way a thermodynamical problem is defined; the person defining the problem will have purposes 
or standards in mind. These facts might lead one to adopt an external perspectivalist position 
about thermodynamical work: something’s counting as a worker depends on whether an 
external observer takes a certain perspective. 
This leads to familiar difficulties raised in Section 3.4. What about systems that no one 
takes an interest in? What if the universe did not contain any cognitive agents capable of 
forming the thermodynamical concept of work, and therefore did not contain anyone that could 
provide the needed external perspective for something in that universe to count as work? 
Would thermodynamics simply not exist in such a universe? This seems tantamount to saying 
that order would not exist in such a universe; but this seems false. Perhaps it’s not that order 
wouldn’t exist, but instead that there would not be anything that could define a line between 
what should count as “ordered” and what should count as “disordered.” 
In fact, thermodynamics defines a notion of entropy that does not rely on any such 
dividing line. Boltzmann defined entropy by the following equation: 
S = k ln W 
where S is the entropy, k is a constant (known as Boltzmann’s constant), and W is the number 
of equiprobable configurations that the system can take on (Atkins, 1984, Chapter 4). This 
equation can tell us the degree of order (or of entropy) that a system possesses, but it does not 
provide a standard for distinguishing instances of heat transfer from instances of work.47 
                                                            
47 In any case of heat dissipation within a closed system, there is an overall increase of entropy, but there 
can also be local decreases of entropy within (thermodynamically open) regions of the system. However, 
not every local decrease of entropy counts as work. As a large system of particles (for example, water in 
a kettle cooling down after it has been removed from a heat source) goes to equilibrium, it will not do so in 
a perfectly uniform way. There will be many local chaotic up and down fluctuations in temperature (Atkins, 
1984, p. 82), but these minor fluctuations away from local equilibrium are generally not counted as cases 
of temporary, local work. This is why thermodynamics texts usually characterize work as “coherent” 
motion (e.g., Atkins, 1984, p. 48). 
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What is needed for an account of work is a solution that is analogous to the one offered 
in Sections 3.5–3.6. A system can ground its own simple standard of proper function by means 
of its own capacity to recognize and differentially respond to the performance tokens of the 
beta creatures. But in the present case, we need to ground an even more generic standard: a 
differentiation between work, on the one hand, and all non-work releases of energy, on the 
other. Consider again the alpha creatures of Section 3.5. What amounts to thermodynamical 
work, according to its perspective? Arguably, its organization and operation implicitly define at 
least three categories of work: 
• Properly functioning performances of beta creatures 
• Malfunctioning performances of beta creatures48 
• Censoring behaviors 
The performances of beta creatures count as work because they are orderly, constrained 
releases of energy, arranged into patterns that the alpha creature can recognize. The 
recognitional capacity grounds a perspective on which such patterns count as coherent for the 
alpha creature. Such patterns are treated not as random noise in the environment but as 
significant patterns that merit a response. But by being constrained in such a way as to 
implement such behavioral responses, the alpha creature also itself generates 
thermodynamical work. Such releases of energy also have significance grounded in the 
organization of the alpha creature itself by being (from the alpha creature’s perspective) the 
appropriate response to the detected condition. 
                                                            
48 It might be thought that a malfunction need not be a case of thermodynamical work; a malfunction 
could take the form of an undesired dissipation of heat or perhaps the absence of activity. But at 
minimum, in order for the condition to be recognized as a malfunction, it has to be recognized as a result 
of the activity of the beta creature in question. The beta creature must be recognized as being present, 
and as being in some behavioral state. Whatever form this takes, it will necessarily need to consist of 
something other than random particle motion, i.e., a coherent configuration of matter and energy that 
persists (so as to be detectable) over some period of time. 
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Note that even though the beta creature’s performances count as work, they do not 
(necessarily) count as work solely in virtue of the beta creature itself; it is the perspective of the 
alpha creature that grounds the operative distinction of work/non-work that applies to the beta 
creature.49 The important lesson here is that in order for a system to be capable of grounding a 
distinction between work/non-work, it has to be capable of (a) recognizing instances of work, 
and (b) producing instances of work. In other words, it has to be an observer (in the 
thermodynamical sense) and it also has to be a worker (in the thermodynamical sense).50 I will 
refer to such systems as observer-worker systems. 
But the class of observer-worker systems includes more than just alpha creatures. It 
includes any system that is capable of recognizing (in Dretske’s and Pattee’s sense, involving 
selective loss of detail) patterns as falling under a certain type, and producing a categorical 
behavioral response when and only when that pattern type is recognized. As was the case with 
alpha creatures, such a system will have a repertoire of patterns it can recognize (a repertoire 
containing only a single pattern in the simplest case) and a repertoire of response behaviors 
(again, that might consist of only one behavior in the simplest case).51  It will be selectively 
insensitive to those details that do not pertain to whether the pattern type in question is present 
or not. The details of motion that it is insensitive to will count as incoherent motion for the 
observer-worker. 
By virtue of the fact that something is an observer-worker system, then, there will be a 
corresponding perspective, an ontological carving-up of the universe, had by that system. This 
ontology will include a range of potential environmental states that can be sensed (situations). 
                                                            
49 Exceptions to this will occur when the beta creature is itself an observer-worker system, a concept to be 
defined shortly. 
50 A standard of what counts as an observer therefore requires or implies a standard of what counts as 
work, and vice versa. This fact was realized by Popper: “Observation is always selective. It needs a 
chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem” (2002, p. 61). 
51 It might be said that any observer-worker system has its own determinate umwelt (in von Uexküll’s 
terminology) or “functional ontology” (in the terminology of Gallese & Metzinger, 2003). 
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By doing work (i.e., imposing an orderly pattern onto a flow of energy), they must work with an 
output categorization scheme. Finally, they must incorporate an internal mapping from input 
category to output category.52 
The fact that some amount of detail must be lost for such recognition to occur means 
that no observer can observe its subject in unlimited detail. This fact is well-known in physics. 
Since measurement involves making discriminations according to a set standard, 
measurement counts as a form of observation in this sense.53 Without a discrete, determinate 
scheme for sorting quantities into categories (e.g., scale quantities), there is no determinate 
fact of the matter in any given instance what measurement is being made. Pattee explains the 
sense in which measurement, like recognition, involves a selective loss of detail: 
Measurement is a very restricted form of perception. To measure something 
means that you are not measuring everything. More formally, a measurement is 
a mapping from a physical system to a symbol: but the essence of this mapping 
is the high selectivity or simplification of the system to only the attribute we have 
chosen to observe. The problem is this: Can we understand the measurement by 
decomposing the process in detail? To understand in detail would put back into 
the measuring device all the complexity of interaction that the function of 
measurement requires that the device ignores. In other words, a detailed 
physical description of a measurement process will look just like any physical 
interaction of two systems. (1982, p. 174) 
In Section 3.5.2, I explained the sense in which an alpha creature works with at least 
two different categorization schemes: it categorizes the performances of beta creatures into 
types, and then maps this to a response category (either leave the beta creature alone, or 
censure it in some way). Haugeland notes that this is true of norms in general: “norms have a 
                                                            
52 Perhaps the simplest form that such a mapping might take is something like an implicit production rule 
(see Haugeland, 1985, p. 261, note 15) directly mapping conditions to basic behaviors. Drescher (1991, 
p. 179) refers to two different basic types of production rule that might be implemented in a simple action 
selection system: situation-action rules, and situation-result rules. What I have in mind as the simplest 
type of action selection function would be something like an implicit situation-action rule. See also 
Minsky’s (2006, p. 20) notion of a “Rule-Based Reaction-Machine.” 
53 Measurement is a concept that has been defined in various ways by different authors (Kuhn, 2009; Tal, 
2015; Bradburn, Cartwright, & Fuller, 2017). In this discussion I am following Pattee’s usage, but some 
authors might argue that a measurement device requires not just any observer-worker system, but one 
that implements autonomous coordination between a dimension of variation and values on a scale; see 
Section 4.6.2. 
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kind of ‘if-then’ character, connecting sorts of circumstance to sorts of behavior,” (1990, p. 
151). By connecting sorts of circumstance (i.e., potential measurements) to sorts of behavior 
(potential orderly patterns that can be imposed on the environment in response to the 
measurements, i.e., work), the observer-worker system is not only the minimal physical system 
capable of grounding the notions of observation, measurement, and work, it is also the minimal 
system that is intrinsically normative, i.e., that grounds its own normative standard. The alpha 
creature of Chapter 3 is a particular type of observer-worker system: one in which what is being 
measured are performances (acceptableness of performance is treated as a binary variable), 
and in which such measurements are mapped to two behavioral categories: censure or don’t 
censure. The alpha creature grounds a particular type of normative standard: proper function. 
Not all observer-workers ground a standard of proper function, but by mapping discrete input 
categories to discrete response categories, they all ground some normative standard. 
A minimal observer inside a universe, then, which I have called an “observer-worker 
system,” minimally requires attunement to and discrete sorting of local environmental variations 
that is internally and systematically linked to the system’s behavioral capacities, which perform 
work on local environmental conditions. This is very close to what Pattee (1991) calls a 
measurement-control system, with two caveats.54 First, Pattee believed that a system had to 
be living in order to be a measurement-control system, and second, he considered such 
systems to be capable of control (i.e., to count as control systems). In contrast, I consider 
neither of these to be necessary conditions for an observer-worker system. Although in this 
chapter I will argue that controllers (at least, those which I will refer to as “autonomous” 
controllers) are, like alpha creatures, a special type of observer-worker system, not all cases of 
                                                            
54 The notion of an “observer-worker system” being developed here is also in many ways similar to 
Holland’s (2012) notion of a situated signal-processing agent, where his notion of an agent is (in his 
terminology) a classifier system enclosed within a boundary. For Holland, a classifier system is basically a 
system that transforms detected signals into effector outputs. Holland’s account is less general than the 
one being developed here, however, since he is only concerned with systems (which he calls complex 
adaptive systems) composed of multiple agents that produce adaptive behavior in the system as a whole. 
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measurement and work count as control, because control is a specific type of normative 
standard that is not grounded by all observer-worker systems. In the next section, I discuss a 
key account of the nature of control, that of Nicholas Rescher, that will be very helpful for 
explaining what must be added to the minimal observer-worker system to make it an 
autonomous controller, and what makes control a special type of normative standard. 
 
4.3 The Normativity of Control: Rescher on Control versus 
Influence 
 
In his important but underappreciated 1969 article on the nature of control in general, 
Rescher distinguishes between full control, partial control, and influence. He first divides full 
control into positive control and negative control: “positive control involves the power to assure 
a desired result, negative control the power to prevent an undesired result” (1969, p. 331). In 
other words, if something is not in a position to be able to assure a desired result, or prevent an 
undesired result, then it is not in full control with respect to that desired/undesired result. 
Partial control is a case in which full control is shared between two or more controllers. 
Consider the apparatus depicted in Figure 4.1. Person A, situated at position 1, and person B, 
situated at position 2, each have full negative control over the presence of outflow through the 
pipe: person A and person B can each, individually, prevent fluid from flowing through the pipe 
and out of the reservoir. But each person only has partial positive control over the flow. No one 
person can assure the flow of fluid out of the reservoir and through the pipe, but they can do 
this jointly, so they jointly have full positive control over the outflow. 
 
 
 
90 
 
Figure 4.1: Reservoir and outlet pipe with shut-off valves at positions 1 and 2. 
Reproduced from Rescher (1969, p. 330). 
 
With his distinction between full and partial control on the table, Rescher then 
distinguishes between full/partial control and influence: 
It is important to draw a distinction between partial control on the one hand, and 
what I propose—somewhat arbitrarily—to term influence upon the other. 
Essential in the idea of control is a condition of definiteness: the controller(s) can 
definitely make something happen or definitely preclude its happening. But there 
is also the prospect of what—by way of contrast with control—we shall call 
influence, viz., the capacity to make something's happening more likely or less 
likely. For example, the taking of vitamin pills may render it less probable that I 
shall contract a common cold. The pills do not give me control—not even 
incomplete control—over my catching colds: the connection is merely one of 
influence in the specified sense (i.e., taking the pill “influences” whether or not I 
shall catch cold). (1969, pp. 336–337) 
Note that the capacity to make something’s happening more or less likely corresponds to the 
idea of a dynamical constraint that was introduced in Chapter 2. In mechanistic contexts, 
influence corresponds to the presence of an active causal power possessed by that which does 
the influencing, and a passive causal power possessed by what is influenced. 
Rescher uses various terminology to distinguish control from mere influence: words like 
assure and definiteness, the phrase “affect decisively” (1969, p. 345), and even the phrase 
desired result. These suggest that control is a kind of influence that rises above a certain 
threshold: a capacity for (or the exercise of) influence sufficient to warrant a certain level of 
confidence on the part of an agent who is interested in the outcome. Putting it this way 
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suggests that control may, like proper function, be relative to a normative perspective; but in 
particular, Rescher’s terminology makes it sound like control is always relative to the (potential 
or actual) desires or goals of agents. This may make sense in the context of artificial control 
systems and when agents are themselves considered as controllers. But as noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, control is important in other contexts where it is not obvious that 
there is a particular agent that attributions of control should be indexed to. For example, control 
is exercised by parts of the nervous system of humans and other animals, at a level that is 
certainly below that of conscious goals or desires (Khoo, 2018). Increasingly, biologists explain 
cellular, subcellular, and even molecular phenomena in terms of control (Purich, 2010). One 
way to explain the normativity of control in such contexts is to say that it is nothing more than 
the normativity of proper function: i.e., that control merely refers to the kind and amount of 
influence that one thing has over another so long as it is functioning properly. In Section 4.5 I 
will argue that the normativity of control cannot be reduced to the normativity of proper function: 
many cases in which proper function implies a certain kind and amount of influence do not 
count as control, and many cases of control in biology are outside the scope of proper function. 
In short, the normativity of proper function and the normativity of control often come apart. A 
separate account of how the normativity of control is grounded is therefore needed to 
understand control in biology and how it is related to control in other contexts. In the next 
section I explain how control is implemented mechanistically as a type of observer-worker 
system that is distinct from the kind of observer-worker system needed to ground a standard of 
function/malfunction. 
 
4.4 Autonomous Controllers as a Type of Observer-Worker System 
 
Pattee argues that control only makes sense from a perspective on which there are 
multiple possible behaviors: 
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in essence control implies that a system possesses alternative behaviors, and 
that owing to the particular nature of the constraint it is possible to correlate a 
controlling input variable or signal with a particular alternative output dynamics 
according to a rule. (1972, p. 83) 
MacKay argued that we can only understand control, and the idea of there being multiple 
possibilities for a system, from a perspective that “under-specifies” the system, i.e., one that 
selectively discards a certain level of details: 
Only if we under-specify the situation, by using generic terms that allow more 
than one microstate to be compatible with our description, can we give meaning 
here to the word ‘possible’. ‘A 2-way switch is a device with two possible states...’ 
Yes. But this ‘2-way switch’ is a physical array of molecules in the only state 
compatible with its past history. ‘Is no other state possible?’—Not in these terms. 
‘In future’, of course, it is ‘possible’ that it may be found in either of the two 
states-but only if we have not specified the time, nor the intervening history of 
forces acting on it. Given these, the concept of a ‘range of possibilities’ 
evaporates. (1962, p. 93) 
The fact that a controller must possess alternative behaviors (in other words, a discrete division 
of possible ways to respond to inputs) follows from the nature of controllers as “decisively” 
affecting an outcome or “assuring” a result. If one possibility is being assured, this means 
nothing more or less than that conflicting alternatives are assured not to happen. The point 
here is that control involves selection (Tolman, 1936, p. 253), and not merely influencing: 
A paradigm example of the contrast can be given in terms of a “fixed” roulette 
wheel in a gambling house. We should speak of “control” if the house can select 
the specific outcome of the wheel, but if the house can merely affect the 
probability-distribution of the outcome, without being able to determine any 
specific outcome, we should—in our terminology—have to speak of “influence” 
(rather than control). (Rescher, 1969, p. 337) 
Selection involves an unequivocal and unambiguous affirmation, but also an unequivocal and 
unambiguous negation (Pitkin, 1912, p. 393). Since one discrete behavior is selected from a 
classification scheme, the other possibilities in that scheme are thereby unequivocally rejected 
(MacKay, 1969, p. 24). MacKay describes selection devices as working as if they were “key-
operated” (ibid, p. 25), by which he means that a selection is meaningful only if there is a 
clearly defined range of possibilities the selection is being made against. In Section 4.2, I 
discussed the fact that all observer-worker systems have a discrete output (behavioral) 
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repertoire whose selections are executed in a context-dependent way,55 and the fact that this is 
a necessary condition for anything that can ground a norm (recall Haugeland’s statement that 
“norms have a kind of ‘if-then’ character, connecting sorts of circumstance to sorts of behavior,” 
1990, p. 151). 
But do controllers fully count as autonomous normative systems? Do they count as 
observer-workers? For this to be the case, controllers need not only a discrete output repertoire 
but also a discrete input repertoire; they must be observers or measurement devices. In fact, 
the notion of selection itself implies that the system must be working with some sort of discrete 
input variable: there has to be a basis on which selections are made. But a system that simply 
generates random output behaviors is not, by itself, capable of making selections. A quarter 
can be flipped and will land one of two ways, and it can be used by an agent to make 
selections (in such cases the quarter would serve as the input to the selection process), but 
this does not mean that the quarter, by itself, can select anything. 
Controllers also require inputs to meet the requirement of being able to assure an 
outcome. Assurance implies predictability, which implies regularity. The behavioral outputs of 
the controller at any given time must correlate, in some way, with some variable that could in 
principle be tracked separately from the outputs, from which the outputs could be predicted 
(and therefore, be seen as “assured” given the inputs). In order for a discrete output selection 
to be seen as “selected” with respect to an input, or as being “assured” with respect to the 
input, the input must itself be a discrete value with discrete alternatives. For these reasons, any 
system that is a controller will be an observer-worker system; controllers are a species under 
the larger genus of observer-worker systems. 
                                                            
55 Rather than exhibiting Newtonian, or fully determinate dynamics, the linkage from inputs to outputs 
incorporates a selective loss of detail and therefore exhibits what Kelso refers to as a “pattern dynamics” 
(1995, p. 145). 
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But not all observer-worker systems are controllers. To see this it is important to 
consider another aspect that is analytically true of all instances of control: there must always be 
something doing the controlling, and something being controlled. As Rescher points out, 
Control over an object is never exercised over the object as such but over some 
aspect (feature, characteristic) of the object. Control is never unqualifiedly 
absolute. Control of something is always control over it in respect to such-and-
such (its motions, movements, functioning, etc.). Nothing can ever be under 
one's control in every respect. Even when it is under his “full control” a driver 
cannot make a motor vehicle go sideways, upwards, etc. (1969, p. 348) 
Rescher follows the general usage of engineers in referring to this aspect as the “control 
parameter.” It is, then, the presence of a control parameter that separates controllers from 
other types of observer-worker systems that are not controllers. Like observer-worker systems, 
controllers have a discrete output repertoire, but further, the potential outputs will be value 
assignments made to the same control parameter. 
In the previous section, I remarked that the terminology Rescher uses to distinguish 
control from mere influence might seem to suggest that control is a kind of influence that is 
sufficient to warrant a certain level of confidence on the part of an agent who is interested in 
the outcome. I now claim that no such relativity to agent interests or mental states of agents 
such as confidence is essential to the existence of control. What is essential is that different 
conditions will result in discrete effects being produced by the controller on a control parameter. 
Such discrete operation may be such as to warrant a certain degree of confidence in an 
interested external observer, but this is incidental to the fact that control is taking place. 
 
4.4.1 Autonomous versus Non-Autonomous (Mere Regulators) 
 
It is important to clarify at this point that my use of the term ‘controller’ is not intended to 
map onto ordinary usage. Up to this point, I have been interested solely with autonomous 
controllers, that is, systems that count as a controller solely due to their own intrinsic 
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characteristics (independently of external perspectives). There are many other devices that, 
although not counting as autonomous controllers, can be used as controllers by agents, or that 
may be interpreted as such by agents. I will refer to these as non-autonomous controllers. In 
such cases, it is more correct to say that the agent is doing the controlling, and using the non-
autonomous “controllers” for the purpose of control. From now on I will reserve the term 
‘controller’ to refer to autonomous controllers, and I will use the term ‘regulator’ to refer to non-
autonomous controllers.56 
As an example, an analog thermostat that works by simple negative feedback may 
count as a regulator, but not a controller, in the present terminology. This may be true even if it 
functions automatically, i.e., without the supervision and intervention of an agent (“automatic” is 
importantly different from “autonomous” in this context). While it may be true that there is a 
regular causal relationship between the ambient temperature in the room where the thermostat 
is located and the effect that the thermostat has on the heating device for that room, if the 
thermostat does not have its own categorization scheme both for input temperatures and 
output settings applied to the heating device, the thermostat cannot be said to have its own 
fixed perspective (which would require selective loss of detail at a fixed level of abstraction; see 
Section 3.5.1) on what the temperature is or what the heating device should be set to. It will 
therefore not count as an observer-worker system, and therefore not as a controller. The 
person who designed, built, and/or deployed the thermostat for use as a controller is actually 
the one doing the controlling, not the thermostat itself. 
Without such a distinction, there would be almost no limit on the range of systems that 
would count as controllers. By exerting a gravitational effect on the planets that results in 
regular orbits, the sun might be said to “control” the planets of the solar system. Instead, on my 
terminology, it is correct to say that the sun regulates the planets, but not that the sun controls 
                                                            
56 Collier and Hooker (1999, fn. 2) distinguish between “control” and “regulation” in a roughly similar way. 
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them. Further, due to the normative aspects of control, as with proper function, an attempt to 
reduce control to regulation (a non-normative notion) will fall prey to generality objections 
similar to those discussed in Section 3.3. In the following section, I will elaborate on the 
normative nature of control and how it compares to the normative nature of function. 
 
4.5 Degrees of Effectiveness, Degrees of Control, and Malfunction 
 
There are several non-equivalent, orthogonal dimensions along which control systems 
are evaluated, but these are often not explicitly treated as separate. This does not usually 
cause problems when discussion is confined to specific philosophical or engineering problems 
pertaining to control (i.e., confined to trees rather than the forest). However, this fact is 
probably partly responsible for the lack of discussions that attempt to understand the forest of 
control as a whole. 
For example, two evaluative dimensions of control that can come apart are the 
effectiveness of control and the degree of control. The degree of control has less to do with the 
controller itself, and more to do with how it is situated (think back to the example of the 
reservoir and outlet pipe with shut-off valves at two positions). Now consider a person who 
drives to a pub, has several alcoholic drinks, and then drives home. The degree of control that 
the person has over the car will not change (if it is granted that the car itself remains in the 
same condition, e.g., the steering system does not cease to function properly on the way 
home, and there is not a second person attempting to control the car). However, what is likely 
to change is the effectiveness of the control that the person has over the car. Effectiveness has 
to do with things like the fineness of discriminations that can be made in input measurements 
and output selections, as well as the speed and accuracy with which adjustments are made to 
the control parameter. 
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As another example to illustrate the difference between degree of control and degree of 
effectiveness, consider the following example from Rescher: 
Think of a wartime aircraft navigator who, as sole survivor, is frantically working 
the controls to get the hang of what they do so as to be able to bring the aircraft 
under control. There is no question that he “is in control of” the aircraft, since 
whatever the aircraft does is being done in response to his settings and 
resettings of the control apparatus. But until he masters the workings of the 
situation so as to be able to coordinate this control at his disposal with his 
purposes we would not say that he “has control over” the aircraft (1969, p. 335) 
Degree of effectiveness can also come apart from the degree of malfunction. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, malfunction requires a point of view as to what counts as proper functioning and 
what does not. Depending on how a controller is being used, a certain degree of 
ineffectiveness may not count as malfunctioning at all. In other contexts, there may not be a 
standard of function/malfunction that is applicable to the controller. 
Whether or not it even makes sense to talk about malfunction with respect to a 
controller depends on whether the controller is being given a “job” in a larger system. There 
would have to be something like an “alpha creature” (described in Section 3.5.3) that has a 
perspective on whether the controller is functioning properly in a given situation, and enacts a 
censuring response. It is conceivable that the controller could be its own “alpha creature”; the 
controller itself might have the ability to monitor its own activities and enact a kind of 
“censuring” response. Complex, adaptive controllers (e.g., that use reinforcement learning or 
Kalman filters) like this will be discussed in the next chapter (Section 5.6). What is important to 
see for now, however, is that an autonomous controller can exist even when there is no “alpha 
creature”. A system can ground a standard of control even when it does not ground a standard 
of malfunction. 
If autonomous controllers, like all observer-worker systems, ground a type of 
normativity, then what kind of normativity are they capable of grounding? Only that type of 
normativity that directly is generated by the type of “if-then” rule (as Haugeland put it), fixed in 
its level of generality, that is tacitly put into practice by that system by itself. This would be 
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nothing more than a normative standard linking discrete input values with discrete control 
parameter values. In other words, certain control parameters are implicitly considered as “going 
with” or being “appropriate to” certain input values by the controller. This is the bare normativity 
of control; a minimal autonomous controller does not actually have its own perspective on 
degrees of control, degrees of effectiveness, or malfunction. Each of these requires a more 
complex perspective. 
We can now revisit the definition I stated in the Introduction to this chapter:  
Control is influencing (or being disposed to influence) the right aspects of 
something (i.e., that which is “being controlled”) in the right ways to the right 
extent by the right means at the right times, where what is ‘right’ in a given 
context may be determined either by an external perspective or by the system’s 
own perspective. 
By taking a perspective on which control parameter value should be selected under what 
conditions, the system realizes a normative standard on which aspects (the control 
parameter(s)) of the controlled system should be influenced to what extent by what means (this 
will be determined by the behavioral repertoire) at what times (this will depend on the 
input/output mapping). However, the controller does not thereby necessarily have a second-
order perspective on whether this first-order perspective and its implementation yields control 
that is effective, whether it amounts to a lot of control or a little, and whether it is functioning 
“properly” or not. Each of these would require either additional recognition and response 
capacities that go beyond mere autonomous control, or an external observer. 
Control is a complex topic because it is easy to lose sight of what kind of normativity is 
minimally associated with control versus what kinds of normativity are usually associated with 
controllers by external agents. But it is also a complex topic because there are many different 
kinds of controllers. For example, we have been discussing controllers so far that only have a 
single input and output parameter, but of course controllers can have many input variables and 
many output parameters. They can vary in degree of effectiveness, degree of control, and 
degree of malfunction along any of these dimensions. Controllers also vary according to the 
 
 
99 
complexity of how they are structured and of how they can change over time. Eventually our 
goal is to understand how control relates to agential concepts like goals, intentions, motivation, 
and cognition. This will require a look at a number of different types of controllers and how they 
are distinct. 
 
4.6 Types of Controllers 
 
4.6.1 Negative Feedback and Homeostats 
 
Negative feedback devices (sometimes called “homeostatic mechanisms”) are one of 
the most common devices used in control systems. A negative feedback controller is a special 
case of control in which the measured quantity is compared to a reference value, also referred 
to as a “setpoint.” The difference between these is then used to determine what the control 
parameter output value should be. The word ‘negative’ in negative feedback refers to the fact 
that the control system responses attempt to negate the perturbations away from the reference 
value. 
Two commonly cited examples are a thermostat used to control a furnace, and the Watt 
governor that is used to control the speed of a steam engine. The input to the thermostat is 
usually the ambient temperature of a room determined by a thermometer. This value is 
compared to a reference value (the temperature setting for the thermostat). If the ambient 
temperature is lower than the reference value by a certain amount, the furnace is turned on. 
Otherwise, it is turned off.  
As described in Section 4.4.1, not all negative feedback controllers are autonomous 
controllers. Some are automatic but non-autonomous controllers (i.e., they either don’t actually 
take measurements, they don’t have a discrete repertoire of control parameter outputs, or both) 
that have continuous inputs or outputs and that approximate what an autonomous controller 
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would do. Even though such controllers are not “autonomous” in the sense defined here, they 
may yet be highly effective regulators. This is true of the Watt governor. In the case of the 
latter, the flow of steam from the engine turns the main shaft, which has swivel arms hinged to 
it that can swing up and down freely. The faster the shaft spins, the further upward the arms 
move due to centrifugal force. The arms are then dynamically linked to a valve on the steam 
outlet of the engine so that when the shaft spins faster, the steam flow is reduced to 
compensate for the increase in shaft speed and the shaft speed is brought more or less back to 
normal.57 In other types of engines the arms may instead be dynamically linked to a fuel intake 
valve or throttle. 
Since the operation is fully continuous, there are no points where the system selectively 
discards detail at a fixed level of generality, i.e., the system does not work with its own 
categorization scheme at the input (the point where shaft speed is converted to a “signal”, i.e., 
the swivel arm height) or at the output (the point where the changes in the arm height and 
connected linkage mechanism directly operate the valve setting). Further, there is no literal 
reference signal that the shaft speed or swivel arm height is actually compared to. An external 
observer (perhaps the designer or a technician whose job it is to calibrate the device) may 
decide that there is, in effect, an engine speed that the system is currently calibrated to 
maintain. But this will only be an idealization subject to varying interpretations. There is no 
objective basis for discriminating between when the system is operating within reference range 
versus when it is compensating for perturbations; these are categories that can only be 
imposed arbitrarily by an external agent. It is for this reason that the Watt governor is not an 
autonomous controller. 
It should be noted that control does not necessarily involve negative feedback or 
homeostasis. Negative feedback is a specific type of mapping between input values and output 
                                                            
57 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASIl3HWTT4U for an illustration. 
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values, where the output values are usually intended (by the designer of the system) to have a 
compensatory effect on the input variable being measured. In other control systems, the control 
parameter may not be causally linked back to the input variable (this is sometimes called 
“open-loop control”). Consider a light switch that turns a light on or off. The light switch itself 
involves measurement; the physical switch position is measured and converted to an 
effectively binary signal. This signal then operates the on/off setting of the light itself (the 
control parameter). The switch itself is not responsive to whether the light is off or on; causation 
only flows in the other direction (of course a light sensor can be added to the system to turn it 
into a negative feedback controller, as is often used for street lighting or smartphone screen 
brightness levels). 
 
4.6.2 Servomechanisms and Coordination 
 
Up to now, the only constraints on the inputs and outputs of the (autonomous) controller 
we have been considering are that the inputs consist of measurements, and the various 
possible output values correspond to different values of a single control parameter. The 
distinguishing characteristic of controllers as compared to other observer-worker systems is the 
second requirement. A controller, then, maps input measurements onto a discrete, ordered set 
of values falling within a range along a continuously variable dimension—that is, onto discrete 
values of what Grush (2007) refers to as a quasi-spatial manifold.58 By contrast, the range of 
                                                            
58 Grush distinguishes between spatial and quasi-spatial manifolds as follows: 
 
… spatial information is straightforward; I can see that one point of light is between two 
others, that it is closer to one than the other; I can get similar information via touch. The 
primary contrast here is with quasi-spatial information. Many of the channels of 
information we receive through sensation are such that the ideas they occasion have 
features that can vary along one or more dimensions, but these dimensions are not 
genuinely spatial dimensions. Sounds can vary along the continuous dimension of pitch, 
and also along the continuous dimension of volume; colors can vary along three 
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outputs of other observer-worker systems may instead by values of what Grush refers to as a 
punctate manifold, a set of values “not naturally orderable along a dimension of variation” 
(2007, p. 416).  
Coordination is a special type of control in which a) the input repertoire also consists of 
a quantization of a quasi-spatial manifold, and b) the controller implements a systematic, 
monotonic transformation from input values to output values.59 In plain English, these are 
controllers where the output may be said to “track” or to be “guided by” the input.60 
Coordination is extremely important for any system that needs to control the movement of 
something so that it is responsive to the movement of something else. As we will see later in 
this dissertation, coordination is the basic organizational motif on which agency is built; it is the 
reason why agency is important for animals and robots. 
Again, a light switch may be considered an extremely simple example of coordination, 
but a better example might be a digital volume knob. A sensor measures the rotational position 
of the knob and sends a digital signal to an amplifier driver board, which decodes the volume 
control signal and amplifies an audio signal to an extent proportional to the knob rotation 
amount. Again, non-autonomous versions of such a controller are also common, for example 
by means of a potentiometer (or rheostat), which transduces rotational movement into an 
analog control signal that is routed to the amplifier. 
                                                            
continuous dimensions of saturation, hue, and brightness; a felt surface can feel more or 
less solid as it offers more or less resistance to pressure. I will call these qualitative 
continua “quasi-spatial manifolds.” (2007, p. 416) 
 
Here, I will simply consider quasi-spatial manifolds to be a larger class that encompasses what he calls 
spatial manifolds. 
59 This definition combines features of, but also diverges from, both that of Kugler, Kelso, and Turvey 
(1980) and that of Grush (2000). As Grush notes, coordination may apply to higher-order manifolds 
(called “order parameters” by Kelso, 1995) that result from the stabilization of features of other manifolds. 
A monotonic transformation between higher-order manifolds may correspond to a much more complex, 
non-monotonic transformation between degrees of freedom of a single behavioral unit (see Kelso, 1995 
for examples). Coordination may involve the use of what are sometimes called “cognitive maps” 
(Golledge, 2010) or “orienting schemata” (Neisser, 1976, Chapter 6). 
60 Sometimes the words ‘coupling’, ‘entrainment’, or ‘synchronization’ are used instead. 
 
 
103 
A slightly more complex form of coordination that is common in robotics is that of a 
servomechanism. This type of controller combines two of the types we have discussed: 
coordination and negative feedback (Milsum, 1966). Instead of having a fixed reference value, 
as in the simplest forms of negative feedback, coordination is used to make changes to a 
variable reference value of a feedback controller. For example, one controller may coordinate 
the reference value of a second controller to the movements of a joystick, causing the second 
controller to seek different reference values depending on the position of the joystick. Milsum 
writes: 
the power steering of a ship operates mostly as a [fixed-setpoint controller] in 
transoceanic passage, but then as a servomechanism during rapid in-port 
maneuvering. (1966, p. 33) 
 
4.6.3 The Many Ways Controllers Can Be Complex 
 
Servomechanisms illustrate one of the many ways that sophistication can be introduced 
into a control system. Not only can controllers be combined into a larger controller (composite 
controllers, considered in the next subsection), but controllers can also have multiple inputs 
and outputs (I will call these multivariate controllers). Further, their input and output values do 
not have to be scalar but can also be multidimensional (I will call these multidimensional 
controllers). 
 
4.6.3.1 Composite controllers: Serial control, shared parallel control, hierarchies, and 
heterarchies 
Controllers have their effects on control parameters, where a control parameter is a 
quasi-spatial dimension of variation within the system being controlled. An example of shared 
parallel control was already discussed in Section 4.3. This occurs when two controllers are 
operating on two different control parameters of the same system simultaneously. Serial 
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control, by contrast, occurs when measurements are made of some aspect of the dynamics of 
one system that has been shaped by a controller, and these measurements are then input to a 
second controller. Closed-loop control (of which negative feedback is a special case) occurs 
when one or more controllers are arranged into a cyclical control series. 
In some cases, multiple controllers arranged into a series are discussed in terms of 
“levels” of control, or even a “hierarchy” of control, where an earlier (or “upstream”) controller 
may be viewed as “higher-level” (or perhaps even “lower-level”, as with sensory information 
processing). Such metaphors will not be used in this discussion. Instead, two different kinds of 
hierarchy will be discussed: nested controllers, and hierarchies of control. 
Nested control occurs when one controller contains another controller as a component. 
This is one way to implement a servomechanism: a feedback controller might be equipped with 
a component that uses an input sensor to calibrate the setpoint value. Nested control is 
extremely common in industrial engineering applications, especially digital electronic or 
software control systems in which it is feasible to have an indefinite number of nested 
controllers. 
For our purposes, the more interesting types of complexity (partly because they are 
more widespread in biological systems) are hierarchies of control.61 This occurs when one 
controller operates on a control parameter which is part of another controller, so that one 
controller directly modulates the functioning of another controller. There are a number of ways 
that a controller may be modulated: 
• The output from one controller may itself be routed as input to another controller. 
                                                            
61 Note that all of the uses of ‘hierarchy’ (and its cognates) in this section are narrower than the way 
Pattee (e.g., 1970) uses ‘hierarchy’ when discussing control. Pattee’s term ‘hierarchical control’ often 
corresponds to ‘autonomous control’ in the terminology of this chapter (but not always; see Section 4.7.2). 
However, at one point, Pattee (1973a, p. 102) uses the phrase “autonomous hierarchical control” to 
express what he (later in that paper) refers to as statistical closure (and in later papers as semantic 
closure or semiotic closure), a concept not discussed in this chapter. 
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• The output from one controller may affect the shape of the function another 
controller implements from its inputs to its outputs. 
• The output from one controller may change the nature of the input or output 
repertoire of a second controller. 
In the first case, there are two important variations. First, the second controller may treat the 
output from the first controller as a continuously variable signal that needs to be measured. 
This is a true instance of hierarchical control. The second possibility is that the second 
controller uses the output from the first controller as an encoded signal. The first controller then 
might more appropriately be referred to as a sensor, and the second controller an effector. A 
third controller might also be inserted between the first two that accepts both an encoded input 
and an encoded output. It might appropriately be called an information processor. The encoded 
signals may then be viewed as representations with semantic contents, since they are part of a 
larger autonomous control system that gives such encoded contents meaning.62 
The second and third cases are treated in the following two subsections. 
 
4.6.3.2 Variable controllers: Non-static output repertoires and input/output mappings 
Above, I mentioned that controllers can also have multiple inputs and outputs (these are 
multivariate controllers), and that input and output values of controllers do not have to be scalar 
but can also be multidimensional (multidimensional controllers). These should not be confused 
with a much more radical form of complexity, that exhibited by what I will call variable 
controllers. A variable controller is a controller in which either the input/output mapping or the 
output repertoire (or both) can change over time. 
                                                            
62 A general account of the nature of representation, semantic information, and content is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. For such an account that seems to fit well with the present account of control, 
see MacKay (1969). In my view, MacKay’s account of how to naturalize contents remains unsurpassed 
and vastly underappreciated—a “wheel” that many others have failed to successfully reinvent. For an 
argument that the conditions I have stated in this paragraph are necessary and sufficient for 
representation, see Pattee (1970). 
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One simple example of the output repertoire being variable in a controller is a music 
synthesizer keyboard with a pitch bender wheel. The pitch bender is a wheel on some 
synthesizers that can be rotated to different positions; changing the position of the wheel 
changes the pitch of all the keys of the keyboard. The input/output mapping remains the same, 
but the behavior produced by output repertoire selections is changed. 
A simple example of the input/output mapping being variable in a controller is a 
computer keyboard with a switch allowing it to be set to QWERTY or Dvorak mode. The output 
repertoire remains the same (either mode leads to the same set of possible character 
sequences), but the input/output mapping is changed; elements of the input repertoire become 
mapped to different elements of the output repertoire. 
Variable controllers often have certain inputs that can act as a “mode switch”, as with 
the computer keyboard. In animal species, this can take the form of instincts and emotions. An 
animal may recognize a certain stimulus pattern, corresponding to the presence of a certain 
kind of situation, that then stimulates readiness for certain types of action, or leads to a change 
in the animal’s dispositions for certain kinds of behavioral responses (Frijda, 2007). 
 
4.6.3.3 Goal-Directed systems 
McFarland (1989) usefully distinguishes between goal-achieving systems, goal-seeking 
systems, and goal-directed systems. A goal-achieving system is “one which can recognize the 
goal once it is arrived at (or at least change its behaviour when it reaches the goal), but the 
process of arriving at the goal is largely determined by the environmental circumstances” 
(1989, p. 108). This would seem to include any controller that can change its behavior (for 
example, change its output repertoire) once a certain condition is detected. A goal-seeking 
system is merely any system that progresses towards a goal as a result of its own organization 
or design. Neither of these notions is particularly useful for characterizing types of autonomous 
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controllers, since they are both characterizations that may potentially depend on the 
perspective of an external observer.63 
Goal-directedness will instead be the focus of this subsection. I will divide goal-
directedness into weak goal-directedness and strong goal-directedness.64 Weak goal-
directedness involves targeting, but not necessarily model-based control. Targeting is a special 
type of coordination, in which two controllers are connected such that the first modulates the 
second, such that the modulation counts as coordination. Such modulation is then called 
aiming. When aiming is performed continuously overtime, and combined with negative 
feedback, the resulting type of control may be called guided targeting (Klinger, 1977, p. 84). 
Usually guided targeting has the effect of reliably causing the controller to ultimately have some 
effect on a specific object or location in the environment, and the presence of this object is 
what produces the measurements that the coordinator is “tracking”. In this case, the object or 
location may be referred to as the “target”, and the targeting system is “locked onto” it. The 
object may also be referred to as the “goal” of the controller, depending on what type of effect 
the controller will ultimately have on the object. 
I refer to this as “weak” goal-directedness because although guided targeting and 
tracking are objective phenomena when performed by an autonomous controller (for example, 
a guided missile), there is often no literal goal representation in the system (except in the sense 
that measurements are being taken that effectively track the location of the goal). The ultimate 
action that will be taken with respect to the goal (if any) is also not explicitly represented within 
the system itself; nor are the consequences of such actions nor any kind of explicit valuation of 
                                                            
63 Unfortunately, many authors in many different fields often use the term “goal-directed” to mean either 
what McFarland means by “goal-seeking” or “goal-achieving,” or teleological in some other sense (for 
example, Murphy and Brown, 2007, p. 106 write that “all activity [of organisms], even of the most 
rudimentary sort, is goal-directed”). Below, when I use the term “weak goal-directedness”, I will still mean 
a stronger sense of “goal-directedness” than these notions. “Weak” and “strong” goal-directedness is 
defined in the next paragraph. 
64 McFarland’s understanding of goal-directedness corresponds to what I call strong goal-directedness, 
defined below. 
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such consequences. All of these features would require model-based control (to be explained 
shortly). However, I do not consider all of these features to be necessary for strong goal-
directedness. 
Although weak goal-directedness is not sufficient for getting a grip on model-based 
control or the use of explicitly represented goals, it is a very important form of goal-
directedness because it is the simplest way that a system can have a perspective on which its 
behavior is directed at a robust object (not merely a control parameter). Weak goal-
directedness will therefore serve as a crucial foundation for understanding desire-based 
motivation in the next chapter (Section 5.3.3). 
 
4.6.3.4 Model-based controllers and goal-directedness 
There are many ways that models can be incorporated into control systems; here, I will 
only be able to focus on a few of these. First, there is a sense in which any autonomous 
controller may be said to involve a model. Pattee writes: 
There are many relatively simple biological recognition-action structures that 
might suggest a primitive kind of model. For example, seedlings detect gravity 
and light, and by converting these input observables to specific rates of growth 
they control their morphology. A physiologist might prefer to call such tropisms a 
stimulus-response action and reserve the concept of model for a more complex 
relation between recognition and action. A cybernetician, on the other hand, 
would claim that the seedling has a model of its world, however primitive (Ashby 
1956). In higher organisms we can recognize the nervous system as the 
physiological structure with the primary function of mapping sensory inputs from 
various receptor organs to output actions of muscles, and we often restrict the 
idea of model to mappings or representations in the brain. However, in the 
context of the more or less gradual process of evolution we do not learn much 
about primitive necessities for function by looking only at highly evolved 
organisms. There is generally more explanatory power in studying the origin of 
functions. What are the minimum requirements for this modeling relation in 
organisms? 
An engineering description of a modeling relation would include at least 
three functions: 
1. Detection, recognition, or measurement that transforms a physical pattern 
into model inputs. In organisms these are usually called receptors or 
sensory organs; 
2. the model itself that establishes the particular input/output relation; and 
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3. the effectors that are controlled by the output of the model, and that 
interact again with the physical environment. (1996, p. 255) 
 
Pattee’s application of the notion of a model shown in this quotation explains why he often 
claims that control systems in biology “contain their own descriptions” (e.g., 1971, p. 265). The 
constraints that enable the autonomous controller to act the way it does essentially conform it 
to an implicit model of its own behavior: “The enzyme molecule is a set of co-ordinated 
constraints which classifies its collisions with other molecules—the only sensitive collisions 
being with the substrate” (Pattee, 1971, p. 272). 
Similarly, Pepper argued that the simple “chain reflex” control system of the digger 
wasp (wasps of the genus Sphex) constituted a kind of model: 
The world is categorized for the wasp as a sequence of causally connected 
events from the appearance of a grasshopper to a well-stored hole in the ground. 
The wasp does not wonder at the miracle of how nature should conform to these 
special categories. … The wasp just acts and on the whole perpetuates her 
species. The wasp’s chain reflex categories, of course, were generated by an 
environment which had the regularities to support them. (1958, pp. 107–108) 
Pepper argues further that in general, the motivational systems of animals may usefully be 
looked at as involving models of the environment that he refers to as “anticipatory sets”. 
Motivational systems, like hunger or thirst, are activated by what Pepper refers to as “impulse 
patterns”; for example, thirst may be activated by the organism’s detection of a condition of 
dehydration. The organism will become more sensitive to cues in the environment related to 
opportunities to drink water, and will experience a heightened readiness to respond to such 
cues in certain ways. For simpler organisms like the digger wasp, a sequence of highly specific 
anticipatory sets will be triggered, each prescribing specific responses to environmental cues—
as if from a script—that triggers the next anticipatory set in the sequence, producing what 
Dennett (1984, p. 11) refers to as “sphexish” behavior, or what Sterelny (2003, p. 18) refers to 
as “detection cascades.”65 
                                                            
65 Keijzer (2013) argues that the digger wasp’s behavioral capacities turn out not to be quite as “sphexish” 
as Dennett makes them out to be. 
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More sophisticated animals are not limited in these ways, but psychologists and 
neuroscientists generally rely on the notion of motivational systems to explain behavior 
(Toates, 1986; McFarland & Kalivas, 2003). Herbert Simon (1979, pp. 4–5) argued that 
motivational systems are necessary for the cognitive system of any “creature of bounded 
rationality”—including humans—to impose constraints on relevant sensory information, 
possibilities for action, and problem solving strategies that will be tailored to the specific 
features of the situation. According to Kenrick et al.,  
any motivational system includes (a) a template for recognizing a particular class 
of relevant environmental threats or opportunities, (b) inner 
motivational/physiological states designed to mobilize relevant resources, (c) 
cognitive decision rules designed to analyze trade-offs inherent in various 
prepotent responses, and (d) a set of responses designed to respond to threats 
or opportunities represented by the environmental inputs (i.e., to achieve 
adaptive goals). (2010, p. 306) 
Similarly, Neisser defined motives in terms of schemata: 
The activities of schemata are not contingent on any external sources of energy. 
If the right sort of information is available, the schema will accept it and may 
direct movements to search for more. But organisms have many schemata, 
related to each other in complex ways. Extensive schemata typically have less 
wide ones embedded in them…. When they do, the larger schema often 
determines, or "motivates," the activity of those embedded within it. Motives are 
not alien forces that bring otherwise passive systems to life; they are just more 
general schemata, that accept information and direct action on a larger scale. 
(1976, p. 56) 
Motivational systems are generally activated by the recognition of a certain type of 
situation (for example, thirst may be activated by the sensation of dehydration); they then 
sensitize the organism to certain affordances in the environment. The thirsty animal will see the 
environment as parceled into things based on their relevance to opportunities for drinking, and 
its action selection system will be primed for relevant behaviors. Once that need is satiated, the 
animal will become less sensitized to drinking opportunities, and other motivational systems 
may become more dominant based on their triggering conditions. Humans have motivational 
systems not only for basic physiological needs like hunger and thirst but also higher-level 
“needs” such as achievement and affiliation (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010, p. xix). 
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Motivational systems are often discussed as being systems that “control” certain kinds 
of behaviors. On this way of speaking, motivational systems could themselves be considered 
as separate control systems, with their own input repertoires (set of affordances), input/output 
mappings (behavioral response strategies), and action repertoires (Frijda, 2007). But we can 
also look at them as being part of a larger, complex variable motivational system that includes 
in its input repertoire the set of triggering situations that will activate particular motivational 
subsystems. In this way, the entire motivational system, including its subsystems, constitutes a 
model that any given organism will use in its species-typical interactions with the environment. 
There is another important sense in which control systems can involve models. So far, 
nothing has yet been said about learning and behavioral plasticity, which is a crucially 
important aspect of animal behavior. In fact, in control theory, as well as in discussions of 
animal behavior, the phrase “model-based control” generally refers not to implicit assumptions 
that are hard-wired into an animal’s nervous system or an artificial controller’s circuitry, but 
instead to the use of models of the environment that can be updated based on experience. 
It has often been pointed out that these latter types of models, which are often referred 
to as “representational,” are not necessary for certain kinds of learning and adaptive behavior 
(Arkin, 1998; Krichmar, 2012). Pavlovian conditioned response is a type of learning mechanism 
in which input/output mappings between sensory inputs and behavioral responses are modified 
based on detected correlations between input values. Highly sophisticated non-
representational adaptive control systems have been developed for robots that use neural 
network-based learning algorithms. In some cases, the latter make use of something like 
reward or reinforcement, in which a utility value is assigned to certain detected events. 
Arguably, a system that makes use of a reward or utility function to modify its behavior is now 
in the territory of what we might call “strong” goal-directedness. The presence of reward, utility, 
or error-detection indicates the presence of a standard of success and failure that is implicitly in 
use by a particular motivational system for the purpose of generating behaviors.  
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An even “stronger” form of goal-directedness combines what I have called “weak” and 
“strong” goal-directedness into a system that is capable of tracking and seeking an object or 
condition in the environment and using trial-and-error strategies to acquire or consume the 
object, and to remember those strategies that “work” and those that do not. Again, systems like 
this do not necessarily require the use of an anticipatory model for the purpose of generating 
strategies (Dayan, 2012; Coutlee & Huettel, 2014), but some have argued that animals such as 
rats do use such models and select strategies based on an evaluation of the predicted 
outcome (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017). 
To summarize, I have considered three main ways that control systems may be said to 
involve models (again, this is not an exhaustive list): 
• Any autonomous control system that maps sensory inputs to behavioral 
outputs constitutes an implicit model prescribing how the overall system will 
behave (the Pattee sense). 
• The use of a model to maintain information about the environment, including 
features of the environment that are not currently being detected or perceived 
(forward models are commonly used in this way). 
• The use of a model to predict the outcome of hypothetical events, behaviors, 
or strategies. 
I have also at this point considered several forms that goal-directedness can take: 
• Tracking a detected object in the environment, by means of coordination 
between multiple control systems (one that detects changes in the object’s 
position, and one that is coordinated with the first that repositions the sensory 
or motor system to “follow” the object). This is “weak” goal-directedness. 
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• Internal assignment of a utility, reward, or error value to detected outcomes of 
behaviors that is used to make changes to the input/output mapping. This is 
“strong” goal-directedness.66 
• Combination of weak and strong goal-directedness to guide and refine 
strategies for acquiring or consuming (or avoiding or destroying, etc.) an 
object or type of object. This is “stronger” goal-directedness. 
There is a form of goal-directedness that is even stronger than the ones listed above, in which 
a standard of utility/reward is adopted as a form of “common currency” across multiple 
motivational systems to resolve behavioral conflicts (McFarland & Sibley, 1975). This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.6.4 Metamorphic Controllers: Non-Static Input Repertoires 
 
A controller is metamorphic when its input repertoire can change over time. A simple 
example of this is a digital camera that can be set to different resolutions. I refer to these as 
metamorphic because it is really with the ability to change input repertoires that a controller 
gains the ability to radically change in nature. Neural networks are sometimes used to 
implement unsupervised learning algorithms for radically metamorphic controllers that can 
discover new kinds of patterns or affordances that they were not previously sensitive to; they 
thus increase the variety of patterns the system can respond to (i.e., its input repertoire). Some 
metamorphic controllers can dynamically alter the processing resources, input resolution, and 
localization of input sensitivity, simulating or recreating biological perceptual phenomena such 
as focus, attention, and concentration.  
                                                            
66 Note that this goes beyond mere negative feedback control, since feedback is here being used to make 
changes to the input/output mapping itself. 
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Motivational systems and their internal states can alter the kinds of input patterns an 
organism or agent is sensitive to, as well as the way attentional resources and concentration 
are allocated. Automatization and the development of motor skills and sensorimotor 
coordination can also serve to alter one’s input repertoire to become much simpler and 
optimized for task performance. The human mind is also a metamorphic controller in that it can 
undergo different mindsets. According to Reeve, 
A mindset is a cognitive framework to guide one's attention, information 
processing, decision making, and thinking about the meaning of effort, success, 
failure, and one's own personal qualities. Once adopted, a mindset functions as a 
cognitive motivational system that produces many important downstream 
consequences in one's thinking, feeling, and acting. That is, the person with one 
mindset looks at a motivational episode in a fundamentally different way than 
does the person with a different mindset, and these different ways of thinking 
yield differences in lifestyle and ways of coping. (2015, p. 240) 
Mindsets can be consciously adopted or triggered automatically, which especially happens 
when one begins striving for a particular goal (Braver et al., 2014). Conceptualization and 
cognitive priming are additional important factors that affect the input repertoire of cognitive and 
motivational systems. 
 
4.7 Summary and Comparison to Other Accounts of Control 
 
In this chapter I have offered an account of control on which a controller puts into 
practice a perspective on what kind of influence (what changes should be made to which 
control parameters) is appropriate under what conditions. Control is influencing (or being 
disposed to influence) the right aspects of something (i.e., that which is “being controlled”) in 
the right ways to the right extent by the right means at the right times, where what is ‘right’ in a 
given context may be determined either by an external perspective or by the system’s own 
perspective (here using ‘perspective’ in the sense explained in the previous chapter). Control 
perspectives can be extremely simple (as in the case of a light switch) but can also be as 
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complex as the human mind itself. I have offered a taxonomy of control systems to provide a 
basic framework for understanding how notions like goal-directedness, coordination, attention, 
and motivation relate back to control. 
The most fundamental distinction to make about controllers is that between 
autonomous and non-autonomous controllers. An autonomous controller works with its own 
categorization scheme for input and control parameters and maps input categories to control 
parameter values. A non-autonomous controller (or “mere regulator”) does not have its own 
perspective in this sense, but may be counted as a controller by an external observer who 
defines its input and control parameters. Variable and metamorphic autonomous controllers 
also work with a perspective, but it is a perspective on which the standard for what kind of 
influence is appropriate under what conditions can change in highly complex ways. 
In the following subsections I discuss how the present account compares to other 
attempts at understanding the nature of control. 
 
4.7.1 Rescher 
 
As discussed in Section 4.3, Rescher’s position is that “Positive [full] control involves 
the power to assure a desired result, negative [full] control the power to prevent an undesired 
result” (1969, p. 331). We can interpret his use of the word ‘assure’ within the framework 
adopted in this chapter. When an input parameter (or parameters) of an autonomous controller 
takes on a certain setting, an output parameter setting (or settings) will be selected as a result. 
The fact that autonomous control works by selection, rather than mere influence, means that 
within the controller’s own implicit framework, one output parameter configuration will be 
selected and all others rejected. The controller will have its own implicit categorization 
framework, or perspective, if it discriminates differences in parameter values at a fixed level of 
generality, which will involve a selective loss of detail (Section 3.5.1). The fact that autonomous 
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controllers can “assure” a certain result in given cases is exactly what makes them useful for so 
many applications. 
I have already discussed reasons why Rescher’s invocation of the notion of ‘desire’ is 
too anthropomorphic; many biological control systems work at a scale where it would not make 
sense to talk about desires, and they exist in organisms that are arguably too simple to have 
desires (at least, not in a sense that is uncontroversially non-metaphoric). But why does 
Rescher appeal to the notion of ‘desire’ in his account of control?67 Though it may not be true 
that a simple autonomous controller (e.g., a light switch) literally desires a certain output 
parameter setting, it may make sense to say that the controller grounds a standard of what 
response is appropriate given a certain input. Of course, this is an extremely limited standard of 
appropriateness; its scope applies only to the controller itself, and my have no relevance or 
significance whatsoever beyond it. For a light switch, i.e., from its (almost trivially simple) 
perspective, when the switch is in the on position, that is the time when it is appropriate for the 
light to come on. This is a standard of control, but not a standard of function/malfunction. If the 
light switch ceases to function properly, it ceases to ground the standard on which the light’s 
coming on is appropriate to the switch being in the on position. Only from the perspective of an 
external observer would that standard still be applicable to the system in any way (such as in 
the judgment that “That is a malfunctioning controller”). 
The invocation of a notion like ‘desire’ may have plausibility because we tend only to 
identify normative control standards in contexts where they may fulfill the desire of some 
external agent—where they may potentially provide opportunities for purposeful agential 
control; in other cases, the operative standard simply isn’t salient. At one point, MacKay argues 
that this type of consideration underlies the very concept of control itself: “the subtle and 
arbitrary human element that underlies many cybernetic notions [is that] basically, by saying 
                                                            
67 Similarly, Dennett argues that “for something to be a controller its states must include desires—or 
something ‘like’ desires—about the states of something (else)” (1984, p. 52). 
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that A controls B we mean that if we could control A then we could control B” (1964, p. 311). 
While potential desirability correlates well with control standards that interest humans, and may 
even enter into the way people think about or conceive the notion of control, this does not 
mean that potential desirability is a necessary condition for the existence of control. 
 
4.7.2 Pattee 
 
Pattee attempted to define a notion of control that is highly general, applying it even to 
individual enzyme molecules. In general, Pattee was only interested in what I have called 
autonomous control, for example writing that “control can only arise through some selective 
loss of detail” (1973a, p. 95). He often writes about “hierarchical control” but it’s not clear that 
he intended this as a particular class of control, to be contrasted with “non-hierarchical” types 
of control. It appears more likely that he took there to be a control “hierarchy” involved in any 
case of control. However, there seem to be two distinct senses of “hierarchical” when Pattee 
discusses control (though he does not seem to have made this distinction explicit). Anytime 
Pattee writes about control, he discusses it in terms of a hierarchy of levels of description, due 
to the fact that control involves a selective loss of detail, in which the dynamics of a system are 
constrained so that only a limited set of possibilities are open to it. The controller makes a 
selection from among this limited set of possibilities based on the input parameter: 
it is important to realize that controls must operate between different descriptive 
levels, just as constraints must be defined by different descriptive levels. This is 
necessarily the case for all measurement, recording, classification, decision-
making, and informational processes in which a number of alternatives on one 
level of description is reduced by some evaluative procedure at a higher level of 
description. Why are these necessarily two-level processes? Why are two distinct 
descriptions necessary? Because we cannot speak of an event as being both 
possible and impossible using the same level of description. On the lower, 
unconstrained level the alternatives must be possible; for if they were impossible 
then deciding for or against them would be a vacuous process. But on the upper, 
constrained or controlled level, in so far as the rules are reliable or effective, 
some of these alternatives are actually selected (Pattee, 1972, p. 84) 
 
 
118 
On the other hand, Pattee sometimes describes “control hierarchies” as systems that 
not only have a constrained set of behaviors, but also in which both hierarchical levels act to 
constrain each other: 
In a control hierarchy the upper level exerts a specific, dynamic constraint on the 
details of the motion at lower level, so that the fast dynamics of the lower level 
cannot simply be averaged out. The collection of subunits that forms the upper 
level in a structural hierarchy now also acts as a constraint on the motions of 
selected individual subunits. This amounts to a feedback path between levels. 
(1973a, p. 93) 
In cases such as Pattee is describing here, the “control hierarchy” involves a cycle of 
control: one process constrains the behavior of the system by means of selective loss of detail, 
as described in the 1972 quotation. But the resulting constrained behavior then leads to effects 
that are sensitive to the finer level of detail selectively ignored at the earlier step. Pattee argues 
that such inter-level processes (occurring between descriptive levels) that feedback onto each 
other are crucial for the functioning of biological systems, and are also the most mysterious 
aspect of them. As noted above, Pattee often refers to this latter situation as “statistical 
closure”, “semantic closure”, or “semiotic closure”. Pattee's stronger notion of a "control 
hierarchy" is concerned with the origin and distinctiveness of living systems, a topic beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Pattee’s weaker notion of a “control hierarchy” (described in the 1972 
quotation) is more relevant here: it is slightly more general than my notion of an autonomous 
controller, and is equivalent to what I have called an observer-worker system. 
Again, the difference between an observer-worker system and an autonomous 
controller is that autonomous controllers are a species of the wider genus of observer-worker 
systems. I argued above that not all observer-worker systems are controllers. Recall Rescher’s 
point that “Control of something is always control over it in respect to such-and-such (its 
motions, movements, functioning, etc.)” (1969, p. 348). It is the presence of a control 
parameter, that is, some common dimension of variability that the output behaviors influence in 
different ways, that separates controllers from other types of observer-worker systems that are 
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not controllers. Like observer-worker systems, controllers have a discrete output repertoire, but 
further, the potential outputs will be value assignments made to the same control parameter. 
 
4.7.3 MacKay 
 
MacKay offered a criterion of control that is endorsed by various authors from time to 
time, arguing that 
“Control” not only implies corrective reaction, but the conceptual possibility of its 
absence owing to lack of information. Unless there is a separate information-path 
which could conceivably be interrupted, the concept of control is inapplicable and 
the reaction could perhaps best be described as “Newtonian”. (1952, pp. 55–56; 
cf. Kelso, 1995, pp. 144–145) 
In a later article, MacKay elaborated on what he means by an “information-path”: 
The only objective physical distinction we can firmly draw is between (a) devices, 
such as watercocks, steam-valves, transistors and rudders, where the input, A, 
determines the form of the output, B, without supplying all the energy of B; and 
(b) devices such as transmission lines, levers, springs and gear trains, where the 
energy of B is totally provided from the energy of A. In the first case, the energy 
of A is at least partly devoted to altering the structure through which the energy 
for B is channeled—altering the coupling between the output, B, and its internal 
energy supply. In the second, no analogous process occurs. In the first case a 
cybernetician would say that A exerts ‘active control’ over B. In the second (if we 
wish) we may speak of ‘passive control’; though to some of us it would here 
seem clearer to speak simply of action and reaction. The important point is that in 
cybernetics we are concerned with the action of form upon form rather than of 
force upon force. (1964, pp. 311–312) 
Because I have argued that control requires an observer-worker system, this implies that there 
will always be an instance of recognition (in the Dretske sense; Section 3.5.1) at the point of 
input and behavioral selection at the point of output. For Dretske (and Pattee, and others) what 
is important for recognition is selective loss of details. Dretske argued that selective loss of 
details makes it possible for a system to be sensitive to whether or not multiple tokens count as 
instances of the same general type. Another way of putting this might be that selective loss of 
details makes a system sensitive to whether a certain pattern or form is present. 
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However, this does not mean that the full energy for the control process cannot be 
supplied by the input. Consider, for example, a bicycle gear shifter with discrete input settings. 
To switch to the next gear, a certain amount of force must be applied that reaches a certain 
threshold. Before the threshold is met, the derailleur does not change position. Once enough 
force has been applied, the derailleur switches position, moving the chain to the next gear. But 
it is the energy applied to the shifter that actually moves the derailleur, and that therefore 
moves the chain to the next gear. On the account of control offered here, this example would 
count as an autonomous controller even though the controller’s input supplies all of the energy 
for the output. Contrary to MacKay, even in autonomous controllers there need not be a 
separation between the energy path and the information path. 
 
4.7.4 Shepherd 
 
Shepherd (2014) claims to offer a “general account” of the “nature of control itself.” 
While Shepherd’s goal is to offer a broad account of control, his main motivation is to offer an 
account of control that explains what is lacking in cases of deviant causal chains, the most 
common type of counterexample that has been raised against Davidson’s causal theory of 
action.68 Philosophers of action who wish to defend the causal theory of action and solve the 
problem of deviant causal chains are generally not only interested in the question of when does 
control exist, but also the question of under what conditions control is effective, under what 
conditions a sufficient degree of control exists to say that the causal chain is not deviant, and 
under what conditions an instance of control has or has not malfunctioned. When one looks at 
the range of thought experiments that are treated in the debate, it becomes clear that an 
insufficient degree of control, an insufficient degree of effectiveness, and malfunction are all 
                                                            
68 The causal theory of action and problem of deviant causal chains are discussed in Davidson (1973). 
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ways that a causal chain can be “deviant.” The deviant causal chain debate is complex mostly 
because these three dimensions of normativity that can be associated with control—explained 
above in Section 4.5—are often conflated in that debate. 
In this dissertation, I am not offering a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains, 
and offering an account of how to determine or quantify the effectiveness of control or the 
degree of control in particular cases, or what constitutes malfunction with respect to agential 
control, would all be outside the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I want to look at Shepherd’s 
account merely in terms of how it characterizes the basic nature of control and how it compares 
to the present account in that respect. Shepherd’s account is as follows: 
An agent J exercises control in service of an intention I to degree D in some 
token circumstance T if and only if (a) J’s behavior in T approximates the 
representational content of I to (at least) degree D, (b) J’s behavior in T is within 
a normal range for J, where the normal range is defined by J’s behavior across a 
sufficiently large and well-selected set of counterfactual circumstances C of 
which T is a member, (c) the causal pathway producing J’s behavior in T is 
among those normally responsible for producing J’s successes at reaching the 
level of content-approximation represented by D across C. (2014, p. 410) 
We can set aside condition (a) since it is specific to intentional control. Intentions will not be 
discussed until the next chapter, but essentially an intention is a specific type of goal (in the 
sense of strong goal-directedness). I have argued above that the input/output mappings of 
controllers need not involve goal-directedness in either the weak or the strong sense. Condition 
(b) is somewhat similar to the condition on my account that control involves the selection of a 
behavior from the controller’s behavioral repertoire.69 Condition (c) is the operative condition 
that is designed to meet causal deviance challenges. Translated into the more general 
concepts of the present account, it might read as follows: “the causal pathway producing the 
controller’s behavior is among those normally responsible for producing the output behavior 
                                                            
69 The appeal to counterfactuals is of course a departure from the present account; see Section 3.3 to see 
why I have rejected counterfactual accounts of the normativity of proper function. Similar considerations 
apply to the normativity of control. 
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corresponding to the input according to the input/output mapping of the controller.” Shepherd 
clarifies that “the notion of normal here is statistical” (2014, p. 407). 
The main weakness that I see with condition (c) is its reliance on statistical normalcy. 
The account implies problematically that the first time that a controller that has just been built is 
put to use cannot count as control because since there have been no previous cases of 
control, no causal pathways are yet “normally responsible” for producing the behavior. Instead 
of understanding the causal pathways within a controller in terms of statistical normalcy, I 
propose instead that we understand them in terms of the notion of a causal pathway explicated 
by Ross (forthcoming-b). According to Ross, scientists such as biologists often treat causal 
pathways not as statistically normal processes, and not as mechanisms, but instead by means 
of a concept that 
captures a (i) sequence of steps, where these steps (ii) track the flow of some 
entity [such as matter or energy] through a system, (iii) abstract from significant 
causal detail, and (iv) emphasize the “connection” aspect of causal relationships. 
(forthcoming-b, p. 6) 
Ross points out that pathways often do not reduce to mechanisms, because they can be 
realized by multiple mechanisms, i.e., matter and energy may flow through the same pathway 
by means of different kinds of mechanisms at different times. This is especially common in 
sophisticated control systems such as in the brain. However, as with mechanisms, any given 
causal process running through a pathway will consist of an unbroken chain of causal influence 
from one component to another; ultimately this causal influence will be conducted by means of 
directional causal powers that emerge from second-order constraints (Section 2.4.5).70 
Input/output mappings in controllers should therefore be seen as implemented and individuated 
by causal pathways in Ross’s sense. For purposes of addressing deviant causal chains, Ross’s 
pathway concept can provide the flexibility needed to account for multiple means of causal 
                                                            
70 Winning and Bechtel (2018) discuss the fact that the causal powers involved in control will often be 
implemented by means of non-holonomic constraints. The terminology of holonomic versus non-
holonomic constraints was defined in Section 2.3.4. 
 
 
123 
influence within the same controller but is an account of causal pathways that is grounded in 
the present, actual nature of the control system, rather than counterfactuals or its statistical 
track record. 
 
4.7.5 Ross 
 
In another paper, Ross provides an account of the nature of control that is intended to 
account for causal selection, the “distinction we make between background conditions and ‘the’ 
true cause or causes of some outcome of interest” (forthcoming-a, p. 1). She argues that 
causal selection is important “in the context of biomedicine, where scientists commonly identify 
‘the’ cause or causes of specific diseases” (ibid.), and that in those contexts, such 
identifications are made on the basis of the “causal control” that candidate causes exert over 
the disease in question. Much of her paper is then devoted to explaining the nature of causal 
control as it applies in such contexts. 
Two important reasons why determining the causes of diseases involves identifying 
controlling factors are that “diseases are (1) type level phenomena, which (2) are often 
represented as taking on the values of ‘present’ or ‘absent’” (ibid, p. 4). First, by “type level 
phenomena”, Ross means that we often count multiple cases that differ to some extent in their 
details to be instances of the same disease type. The attribution of sameness is on the basis of 
specific causal etiology, i.e., there is a set of common “cause and effect variables that 
participate in a type-level causal relationship” that “produce all or most instances of disease D” 
(ibid, p. 8). Second, Ross argues that in given cases, diseases are generally considered to be 
either present or absent; the presence of a disease is treated as a discrete, binary variable. 
Ross argues that these two aspects of diseases explain why control is relevant for the 
discovery of causes. The type-level and discrete, binary aspects of diseases lead to a 
contrastive, counterfactual understanding of disease causes: 
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(i.c.) interventionist cause: a factor C has causal control over disease D if and 
only if there are circumstances S such that if some (single) intervention that 
changes the value of C (and no other variable) were to occur in S, then the value 
of D or the probability distribution of D would change, for the contrastive focus in 
question. (ibid, p. 5) 
Ross notes that i.c. “involves a counterfactual claim: it maintains that C has causal control over 
D in the sense that if there was a change in C, this would produce a change in D” (ibid.). 
We can make sense of why i.c. involves control by recalling Rescher’s distinction 
between influencing and selection: C does not merely influence D but instead selects D. In this 
sense, an organism’s responsiveness to the factors that control whether or not it acquires the 
disease amount to an observer-worker system, an autonomous controller, with its own discrete 
input repertoire (presence or absence of the intervention) and output repertoire (presence or 
absence of the disease). Ross’s account of control is therefore largely compatible with the one 
developed here. 
However, to truly be a case of control, more than just a counterfactual dependence 
should exist between input and control parameters: I argued in the previous subsection that the 
dynamical linkage between input and output should be considered as implemented by means 
of a pathway of dynamical constraint. In Section 2.3.5, I argued that constraints are not mere 
occurrent regularities, but that they are the modal facts about a dynamical system. Constraints 
in a dynamical system pertain not only to what does happen but to what might happen; they 
are the truthmakers for dynamical equations and modal causal claims. The account developed 
here, of autonomous controllers that are constituted by constraints capable of a selective loss 
of details, can therefore support a non-external-perspectivalist account of causal relations that 
admit of discovery by means of contrastive causal selection.71 
 
                                                            
71 In another paper under development, I argue that in general, causal connections that operate within the 
scope of nomological machines are amenable to interventionist types of causal explanation and causal 
control precisely because of the fact that a nomological machine just is a type of observer-worker system. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter has been to offer a framework for understanding control that 
sheds light on what it is about control that makes it useful in so many contexts. This consists in 
the fact that control involves selection rather than influence, and controllers can autonomously 
(i.e., independently of external perspectives) realize a normative standard of which control 
parameter value selections should be made in which situations. While all autonomous 
controllers share these traits in common, they can differ massively from one another in terms of 
complexity. 
Part of what makes it difficult to understand how discussions about control in disparate 
contexts and subjects relate to one another is that multiple normative dimensions apply to 
control. Autonomous controllers have a normative perspective on which parameter values to 
select in which situations. But external observers also evaluate controllers in terms of the 
degree of control that a given controller may offer over some other variable, in terms of the 
effectiveness of a controller with respect to some control variable, or the degree of malfunction 
that might apply to a controller. It is important to keep clear that autonomous controllers do not, 
in general, have a built-in implicit normative standard that applies to these other dimensions, 
but this does not diminish their autonomy, i.e., their nature as being a controller (and not just a 
mere regulator). 
The key to understanding how concepts usually associated with agency such as goal-
directedness, motivation, attention, etc. are related to simpler control systems lies in 
understanding the different ways that control systems can be complex. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, an agent is a special type of autonomous controller that is, among other 
characteristics, 
• multidimensional, 
• multivariate, 
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• composite, 
• variable, and 
• metamorphic. 
Animals often manifest some if not all of these characteristics. They also manifest coordination 
at many different levels of their organization, and generally manifest both weak and strong 
goal-directedness. In the following chapter, I will utilize the concepts and terminology 
introduced here to develop an account of the basic nature of agency and discuss the ways in 
which agential concepts non-metaphorically apply to robotic and organic control systems. 
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Chapter 5  
Agents as Control Systems: 
An Interdisciplinary Synthesis 
 
[W]e must be careful that the ways in which we construe agency and define its 
nature do not conceal a parochial bias, which causes us to neglect the extent to 
which the concept of human action is no more than a special case of another 
concept whose range is much wider. 
—Harry Frankfurt (1978, p. 162) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will offer an account on which an agent is a special kind of control 
system: one that can change its perspective on whether or not something is under its control. 
This is the basic requirement for a system to have preferences; the possession of preferences 
is necessary and sufficient for something’s being an agent. In Section 5.2, I will argue that 
agency is control by means of preferences, and explain what this implies. In Section 5.3, I 
explain how beliefs, desires, and intentions can be understood given the account laid out in 
Section 5.2. In Section 5.4, I briefly summarize my characterization of what an agent is, 
borrowing concepts from Grush and Springle’s (forthcoming) discussion of the relation between 
agency and skills. Section 5.5 then situates the present discussion in the larger topic of “agent 
architecture” and addresses several terminological issues. Finally, Section 5.6 reviews the 
differences between the account of agency offered here and other attempts to provide minimal 
conditions for agency.  
In this chapter I am offering necessary and sufficient conditions for agency. I am writing 
this as a philosopher but it is intended for an interdisciplinary audience. Some usages in some 
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domains (e.g., artificial intelligence and agent-based modelling) will often not meet all of my 
criteria. My intention here is not to legislate about who should get to use the word ‘agent’, and 
in what circumstances (this would, of course, be counterproductive and a fool’s errand). 
Instead, it is to define a standard notion of agency that can most effectively bridge across 
domains, and to offer the tools for understanding how different usages differ from and relate to 
one another, and how agential terminologies can be usefully translated. I am not offering the 
present account as the once and for all correct way to understand agency, but instead as a 
reference against which other notions can be usefully distinguished. More than merely offering 
a definition of agency, the framework presented here builds on the previous chapter to 
elaborate the kinds of features that control systems can have that make them similar to or 
comparable to “agents” in various ways. This can provide a coherent conceptual repertoire for 
qualifying usages of ‘agent’ and other agent-related terminology so that workers in different 
domains can exchange ideas without having to come to an agreement on who gets to own 
unqualified usage of the word ‘agent’. 
 
5.2 Preference-Based Control as Necessary and Sufficient for 
Agency 
 
Agency is a foundational concept in  
• law (List & Pettit, 2011), 
• anthropology (Rapport & Overing, 2000, pp. 1–9), 
• economics (Ross, 2018), 
• linguistics (Palmer, 2007, p. 1048), 
• psychology (Bandura, 2001; Seligman et al., 2013), 
• sociology (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), 
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• neuroscience (Shadlen & Kiani, 2013), 
• ethology (McFarland & Bösser, 1993), 
• artificial intelligence (Russell & Norvig, 2010), 
• robotics (Murphy, 2000, p. 70), and 
• philosophy of action (Taylor, 1966). 
What these fields arguably have in common is that they are focused on entities or systems that 
confront situations in which there are multiple ways they can respond and can choose how they 
will respond. This might sound, especially given the previous chapter, a lot like a description of 
control systems: a control system categorizes its situation and selects a response. But note the 
word select: a selection is not necessarily a choice. Sober’s (1984, p. 99; see Figure 5.1) 
“selection machine” can select which balls will be distributed into the lower compartment, but it 
does not have the power of choice; it is not an agent. What differentiates an agent from other 
types of control systems, then, is the power of choice. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: “Selection machine” from Sober (1984, p. 99). 
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What is the difference between the ability to choose and the ability to select? T. F. 
Daveney (1964) tackled this question directly, and argued that there are two basic differences 
between choosing and selecting: 
• What gets chosen in any instance of choosing is a state of affairs. Other 
kinds of things, like actions or objects, are only picked or selected, not 
chosen. 
• Choice always involves a valuation: the option that is chosen by the agent is 
the one that is considered best by the agent from among the available 
options. 
Neither of these points is obvious or self-evident, and one or both of them might initially strike 
the reader as wrong. However, I think that these points do capture the difference between 
choosing and selecting, and are therefore key to understanding the basic nature of agency. For 
this reason, they are both worth examining closely. 
 
5.2.1 What Are Chosen: States of Affairs 
 
At first glance, this might seem like an obvious point. One might respond that 
grammatically, other categories can be converted into states of affairs. Rather than selecting 
the “on” setting of the furnace, we might say that the thermostat selects the state of affairs in 
which the furnace is turned on. Rather than selecting forward motion at a given moment, we 
might say that the robots selects the state of affairs in which it is moving forward. 
However, this response misses something important. Representation of something as 
an action or as a control parameter or as an affordance for action is very different from 
 
 
131 
representation of something as a state of affairs.72 The difference here corresponds to Grush’s 
way of distinguishing between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’: 
On one common use of these terms, they mark a contrast between things that 
are dependent on being represented, or being experienced, (subjective) on the 
one hand, and things that are truly independent of all representation: something 
that exists, or is true, regardless of the experience or biases of the representer. 
This is a perfectly fine usage, but it is not quite the contrast I am after. The 
contrast I am interested in is between things that are represented as being 
dependent upon the representer (subjective), and things that are represented as 
being independent of the representer (objective). In my sense of objective, then, 
the large toothy spiders crawling up the LSD user’s arm are objective, so long as 
the hallucinator thinks they are real. The hallucinator has the tools that the 
[proverbial ostrich that seeks to deprive the predator of existence by hiding its 
head in the sand] lacks, he is just misapplying them. I am interested in 
understanding the tools, not in the conditions of their correct application. (2000, 
pp. 60–61; cf. Weiss, 1938, p. 29) 
What is meant by “represented as being dependent upon the representer”? Suppose I 
represent something, such as a banana, solely as just an affordance for my own nourishment. 
Its identity qua affordance for nourishment is dependent on whether it can in fact nourish me 
and nothing else. If that is the only way I can register its existence, then I would have no ability 
to take into account the possibility of its being eaten by someone else, or the possibility of 
using it for some other purpose, of doing something with it besides eating it (like placing it 
somewhere to store it for later), or the danger of slipping on it and falling. 
I could form separate representations for these purposes. I could recognize an 
affordance for slipping and falling, an affordance for nourishing someone else, etc. But it 
requires a yet separate feat for me to treat these as representations of the same object: to 
                                                            
72 Gibson, for example, did not consider affordances to be objective features of the environment, writing 
that 
an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you 
like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to 
understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It 
is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer. (1979, p. 129) 
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represent that there is an object that can serve as an affordance for throwing a projectile at an 
enemy or for storing it for later nourishment, or even to remember that there is still the very 
same object in the same location, even though it is not currently an opportunity for throwing or 
nourishment.73 
Daveney argues that when we make choices, we “do not choose objects as such, but 
rather states of affairs in which objects feature” (1964, p. 85). He offers the following example: 
Suppose I pick a certain flower in a meadow, and announce that I have chosen it. 
A friend remarks, “You are going to write a sonnet about it, or take it home to 
decorate a room?” I reply, “No. I haven’t chosen the flower for anything—there is 
nothing I am going to do with it. I have just chosen it, for it is possible to choose 
things, isn’t it?” And I steadfastly refuse to agree that there is any state of affairs 
relating to the flower which I commit myself to in making the choice. My claim to 
have chosen it, in these circumstances, is meaningless… (ibid., pp. 85–86) 
Daveney does not use Grush’s terminology, but his argument essentially is that choosing 
involves making a selection of an objective state of affairs against other objective states of 
affairs. It involves selecting, not between actions or control parameters or affordances or 
sensory or perceptual states (which are all subjective in Grush’s sense), and not between 
objects (considered in isolation), but between states of the world. I don’t think that this requires 
having a single “world model” within which all of one’s representations are coordinated or 
semantically related, but it does require the use of representations or models that are objective 
in a certain sense, that is, that represent their contents as being independent of the 
representer. But independent in what sense, exactly? I tackle this question next. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
73 Treating multiple representations as referring to the same object actually involves two separate feats: 
there is the challenge of treating multiple affordances as a unified object (Cussins, 1992, p. 659), and 
there is the challenge of treating spatiotemporally and qualitatively disjoint representations as referring to 
the same object (or “reidentification”; Strawson, 1959, pp. 31–38).  
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5.2.2 A Perspective on What Might or Might Not Be Under My Control 
 
My contention is that objective representation, i.e., representing states of affairs as 
states of affairs, involves having a perspective on something as being potentially under my 
control sometimes and not under my control at other times. Consider a simple example of how 
something can be represented as under my direct control in some ways but not others. If I 
move my head up, the cylindrical beverage can in front of me appears differently. The top looks 
rounder, less flat. But my mental registration of its three-dimensional shape doesn’t change. I 
have not changed its shape or its position by simply moving my head up. I could alternatively 
reach out my hand and reposition the can to provide a similar sensory profile as if I had moved 
my head in the same way; now I represent the can as having been moved by me. 
The can’s shape and position exist apart from my sensory manifold and apart from my 
motor capabilities, and I represent the can and its shape and position as being separate from 
them. I can represent them as remaining constant even when my sensory input is changing, 
and when I am selecting different control parameter values (i.e., sending different motor 
commands) for my muscles. This is very different from simpler control systems, like the 
thermostat. The thermostat does not need to represent the status of whether the ambient 
temperature or the furnace setting is under its control in a given instance. As a matter of fact, 
the ambient temperature is not under its direct control, whereas the furnace state is under its 
direct control—but the thermostat doesn’t represent these facts. The thermostat does not 
represent these as states of affairs that may or may not be under its control at different times. 
Now suppose I form a preference: at the moment, I would prefer the can to be at a 
higher location (for example, on the shelf in front of me, instead of on the desktop) to reduce 
the risk of spilling its contents. I cannot control the position of the can unless I reach out my 
hand and grasp it first. However, if I move my head downward, my sensory input will change in 
a way that would correspond to the can moving upward if I were not currently representing the 
 
 
134 
status of whether its position is currently under my control (and in particular, whether it can be 
controlled by means of my head movements). My preference is not about the sensory input 
itself, or about the movement to be performed; it is about the position of the can, an objective 
state of affairs. In order to have such a preference about an objective state of affairs, I must 
keep track of whether and in what ways my movements can result in a change of this state of 
affairs.  
Agents, therefore, unlike other control systems, can implicitly regard something as 
being controllable or uncontrollable in different ways at different times. The reason why this is 
key to agency is because it is the point where the semantic content of the system’s internal 
states becomes decoupled from the direction of fit.74 A non-agential control system has 
sensory states that have a certain content, and can make behavioral selections that have a 
certain content. The sensory contents must always be sensory contents, and the behavioral 
contents must always be behavioral contents. The sensory contents always have a world-to-
system direction of fit, and the behavioral contents must always have a system-to-world 
direction of fit.75 It is only when the semantic contents become decouplable from the direction 
of fit that behavioral explanations become intelligible in terms of the system’s own reasons 
(rather than in terms of an external observer’s “intentional stance”), which as Anscombe (1963, 
pp. 7–9) and Dretske (1999, pp. 19–20) have argued is essential to agency. Another way to put 
this is that there is a single semantic repertoire that is common to the control system’s input 
and output states.76 Reasons explanations require a space of reasons (McDowell, 1994, p. 
                                                            
74 The phrase ‘direction of fit’ was coined by Searle (1979) but the distinction between world-to-mind and 
mind-to-world direction of fit was explicated in different terminology much earlier by Montague (1909, pp. 
234–235). 
75 Millikan (1995) argued that simpler systems than agents can also have what she calls “pushmi-pullyu” 
representations, which have both directions of fit at once, or as she puts it, both a “descriptive” and a 
“directive” function. See also Chemero (2009, p. 26). 
76 Though reasons explanations are often thought to require propositional mental attitudes, I instead 
agree with Heck (2000) that a system’s reasons may be nonconceptual. On the other hand, the present 
account would fit well with the situation semantics developed in Devlin (1991). Devlin takes types of 
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125), a repertoire of representational contents that enable control system states to be directed 
at states of affairs in the manner of a belief or a desire.77 
I consider this way of understanding the independence involved in objectivity as 
superior to that of Cussins, who writes that “An objective world is given to a subject if the 
content presents something as being independent of the subject's particular abilities, and 
particular location in space and time,” (1992, p. 659). The content need not be totally 
independent of the subject’s abilities, and I would argue (though I won’t do so here78) that it 
cannot be so independent. Objectivity need be neither a “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986) nor 
a “view from anywhere” (Cussins, 1990, p. 426) nor a “God’s-eye” point of view (Evans, 1982, 
p. 152), and it need not be domain-general (Premack, 2007). It merely must be representable 
by the agent (or “subject”) as both potentially controllable and potentially uncontrollable by that 
agent. This is a much thinner notion of objectivity that need not satisfy Evans’s (1982, p. 104) 
generality constraint and that does not require any kind of robust practical rationality.79 But I 
believe it captures the minimal core essence of what separates agents from other control 
systems. 
One question that needs to be tackled is: how can a control system have a variable 
perspective on whether something is under its control? We will be in a better position to answer 
this question after we consider Daveney’s second difference between selecting and choosing. 
 
                                                            
situations or states of affairs, and the constraints that hold between them, to be the basic semantic 
building blocks, and any system that works with a determinate scheme for sorting situations into types will 
thereby possess a “concept” on his account (1991, p. 19). This is of course a much thinner way of 
understanding ‘concept’ than most participants in debates about “conceptual/nonconceptual” content 
(such as Heck) have in mind. 
77 Here my view is in disagreement with Hurley, who writes that “the space of reasons is the space of 
action” (2003, p. 231); it is instead the space of representations of states of affairs that can be the 
contents of beliefs or preferences. 
78 Such a defense would require a fully spelled-out, thorough-goingly embodied/situated/embedded 
theory of semantic content, which is unfortunately out of scope for the present dissertation. I believe that 
the present dissertation could potentially provide the foundation for such a theory, however. 
79 Though Davidson points out that “there is a limit to how inconsistent a person can be and still be 
credited with clearly defined attitudes” (1999, p. 8). 
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5.2.3 Selecting Based on Which Option is Considered to Be the Best 
 
Daveney argued that when making a choice, the option that is chosen by the agent is 
the one that is considered best by the agent from among the available options. To see this, 
Daveney points out that there are other instances in which agents make selections that we 
would not call choices: “I cannot be said to choose, if I am merely looking for an object 
answering a certain description among a lot of other things” (1964, p. 84). In such a case, it will 
sound strange to call it “choosing” if there is no dimension or criterion of goodness involved in 
the description. Daveney provides the following example: 
To illustrate this distinction, suppose I am about to perform a certain operation in 
carpentry. The job can, I know, be done with any one of a number of tools, 
although not all the tools will do the job equally well. I pick the one that I think will 
do the job better than anything else, and my decision to use this one as the most 
suitable, and my rejection of all the others, is a genuine case of choosing. This is 
a different case from the one in which I merely look for a pair of long-nosed pliers 
among a heap of pliers on the bench. In choice I am guided by an end in view, 
and what is chosen is what I think will best bring about this end. I evaluate the 
alternatives in the light of my aim and select the best. (1964, p. 84) 
Daveney considers another example in which he is asked by someone performing a card trick 
to “pick out a card” from a number of cards that are face down. Assuming that there is no prior 
aim or criterion of goodness that the selection satisfies, Daveney argues that “It cannot be said 
that I chose carefully or carelessly, etc., and I cannot answer the question, ‘What did you 
choose that one for?’” (1964, p. 84). Similarly, McCall writes: “selecting moves in a random way 
could hardly be called choosing” (1987, p. 285). What, then, does it mean for there to be a 
criterion of goodness that guides the selection? My contention here is that there must be an 
antecedent preference: when choosing state of affairs A over state of affairs B, the agent must 
prefer A to B. 
This might seem like a trivial point. In fact, according to the way economists sometimes 
define ‘preference’ (i.e., “revealed preferences”), the existence of a preference is constituted by 
the fact that an agent chose A over B. This will not be my usage, and I will also not consider 
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preference to merely be a disposition to choose one state of affairs over another (Weirich, 2013 
refers to this as a “behaviorist account of preference”). A preference is an occurrent feature of 
a control system; it is what Dretske (1988) called a “structuring cause.” In the card trick case, 
Daveney picked a card but not based on any antecedent preference. 
More specifically, a preference is a certain kind of modification to a control system’s 
input/output mapping. It is like an implicit rule (in the Sellarsian sense of “rule-governed 
behavior”; see Section 3.5.2) that is operative in a control system that says that when 
presented with certain alternatives, one of them should be selected instead of the others 
(where ‘should’ is being used in the same razor-thin sense in which the alpha creatures from 
Chapter 3 operate with an implicit rule that beta creatures “should” be censured under certain 
conditions). But it is an effective rule: while it has the preference, the preference is an operative 
part of the input/output mapping of the control system. Further, the alternatives to be selected 
between are states of affairs. Weirich writes that “Preference is a mental state that compares 
two situations. To prefer one situation to another is to favor the first situation; one would rather 
be in the first situation,” (2013, p. 4041). Possession of this implicit rule requires that the control 
system must be able to recognize the presence of an alternative of states of affairs that can be 
selected between. What exactly does this mean? 
 
5.2.4 Recognizing Alternative Outcomes 
 
Sterelny (2003) distinguishes between what he calls “drive-based” and “preference-
based” motivation. Essentially, drive-based motivation occurs when a response is selected 
based on what kind of situation is detected as being present. What is selected in this case is a 
behavior, not a situation (or state of affairs). This involves the control system’s possession of 
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some kind of functional mapping from detected situations to behaviors.80 In this case, the kind 
of thing that the control system selects is not the same kind of thing that it detects. It does not 
need to register or represent what kind of situation will result from the behavioral selection, and 
it does not select behaviors on the basis of what kind of situation or state of affairs will result. 
Since it is not states of affairs that are selected by the system, it cannot be said to operate on 
the basis of preferences. 
Sterelny, following Anthony Dickinson (e.g., Dickinson and Balleine, 2000), argues that 
we can infer the presence of preference-based motivation when an organism can implicitly take 
into account the causal consequences of their behaviors when selecting those behaviors. They 
do not blindly favor the same behaviors in the same circumstances if it becomes apparent that 
those behaviors will lead to states of affairs that are less desirable. In this case, the state of 
affairs itself is evaluated, and behaviors are selected on that basis. In order for behaviors like 
these to be learned and reinforced, the organism must be capable of detecting the presence of 
some state of affairs S and of anticipating the fact that a certain behavior B1 will causally 
produce some state of affairs R1, and an alternate behavior (or lack of behavior) B2 will result 
in some state of affairs R2 (S might be identical to or represented as identical to R1 or R2, but 
R1 must be represented as distinct from R2 for one to be preferred, of course). It is then R1 
and R2 that are directly compared, not B1 and B2. Either B1 or B2 is selected based on 
whether R1 or R2 is preferred. 
 
                                                            
80 In such contexts, the term ‘motivation’ is sometimes used for relatively complex organisms, robots, or 
artificial agents. It is difficult to discern any kind of rule dictating when a control system is complex enough 
to count as incorporating “motivation”. In this dissertation, I will not take a stand on this issue. One 
definition that is often useful is the following: M is a motivational variable for a control system if it is an 
operational part of the mapping from input states to behaviors, and does not vary in any simple way in 
relation to any input or output states of the system. This definition becomes less useful in contexts that 
rely on a distinction between “conative” and “cognitive” states, aspects, or activities. In the latter cases, 
the definition of what counts as “motivation” usually depends on the kind of agent architecture under 
discussion; see Section 5.5. 
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The organism must be able to: 
• Detect whether R1 obtains or not, and whether R2 obtains or not 
• Determine what behaviors can currently be performed 
• Anticipate what states of affairs will result from performing behaviors given 
the states of affairs that currently obtain81 
• Anticipate whether R1 or R2 will be among the results of actions that can be 
performed given the current states of affairs 
Sterelny’s position is compatible with Irwin’s earlier characterization of choice and 
preference: “A choice, then, expresses a preference for one of a pair of differential outcomes 
over the other, in some common outcome field” (1971, p. 7). One study that Dickinson and 
Balleine performed to determine whether rats possessed these capacities involved what they 
refer to as devaluation: 
hungry rats are trained to press a lever to receive food pellets. These pellets are 
then devalued by conditioning a food aversion to them. This aversion is 
conditioned by allowing the animals to eat some of the pellets immediately before 
they are made to feel sick by an injection of lithium chloride. After a few 
experiences of this association between the pellets and sickness, the animals 
learn to refrain from eating the pellets. As this aversion conditioning takes place 
in the absence of the opportunity to press the lever, the animals cannot associate 
this action directly with the illness. Even so, they are reluctant to press the lever 
when once again given the opportunity to do so. This test is conducted in the 
absence of any food pellets so that the low frequency of pressing shows that the 
performance of this action is based on knowledge of the action-pellet relation 
acquired during initial training. (1995, p. 162) 
The rats must therefore be capable of selecting actions, not due to an antecedent preference 
about the actions themselves, but due to an antecedent preference about their outcomes. The 
rats detected that the sickness state of affairs accompanied the ingestion of food pellets. In 
doing so, the sickness was registered as a perceptual state, not a behavior. But the rats also 
treated this same situation as one that they could control in the future; they could make 
                                                            
81 MacCorquodale and Meehl (1954) discuss the minimal kind of “cognitive map” that would be needed 
for this capability, which (following Tolman) they refer to as “expectancy.” 
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behavioral selections in the future to avoid that same state of affairs. They are able to have 
mental states with either a mind-to-world or world-to-mind direction of fit with the same 
contents. 
 
5.2.5 Selecting Based on Which Option is Considered to Be the Best, Reconsidered 
 
At this point, Daveney might not be satisfied that the rats in Dickinson and Balleine’s 
experiments count as genuine choosing, for reasons that Sterelny articulates. Consider another 
type of experiment. Dickinson and Balleine (2000) trained rats to engage in separate behaviors 
to receive either carbohydrates or proteins. However, the rats are always kept hungry, and 
never allowed to experience being satiated with respect to either carbohydrates or protein. 
They are then prompted with a novel situation: they are allowed to become satiated with 
respect to one of the food sources. After this occurs, the rats will choose only the behavior that 
leads to the other food source. Dickinson and Balleine argue that this shows that the rats are 
driven by preference for outcomes; they cannot have learned such behaviors through 
conditioning because they had never engaged in the behaviors in such circumstances before. 
Sterelny (2003) argues that though this kind of result is consistent with outcome-based 
preferences, it might also be that they possess separate motivational systems that keep track 
of action-outcome contingencies, but at the same time, which motivational system wins out in a 
given case might be a matter of its drive strength, rather than an outcome-based utility 
comparison.82 For this reason, Sterelny argues that the possession of preferences requires that 
competition not just between candidate behaviors but also between disparate motivational 
systems must be outcome-based. If motivational systems compete for behavioral selection 
                                                            
82 The notion of a “motivational system” was introduced in Section 4.6.3.4. For more recent arguments 
based on brain and behavioral research that action-event contingencies are used across different 
motivational systems, see Hommel and Wiers (2017). For a recent review of investigations into outcome-
based motivation in animals, see O’Doherty, Cockburn, and Pauli (2017). 
 
 
141 
based merely on drive intensity or hard-wired hierarchical relationships, such behavioral 
selections would not count as being based on comparison and valuation of outcomes. 
The ability to choose behavioral candidates generated by competing motivational 
systems prompts the question of what is required to make this possible. In the next section, I 
argue that the rudiments of beliefs, desires, and intentions emerge for systems capable of 
making outcome-based behavioral selections across the domains of different motivational 
systems. 
 
5.3 Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions 
 
5.3.1 Likings 
 
The idea of preference-based outcome selection might suggest that an agent must 
possess a database in which every possible outcome pair is represented along with the 
outcome that will be preferred when presented with that pair. Pollock (2006, Chapter 2) 
provides good reasons to think that this would not be computationally feasible. It would be far 
more economical for any preference-based agent to store objective representations of cardinal 
value to types of situations, and then generate binary preferences on the fly when presented 
with a choice by comparing the cardinal values. Pollock argues that biologically such cardinal 
values are probably analog representations, which are measured when a choice must be 
made. Such value representations, on his view, should not be thought of as preferences or 
desires, but instead as “feature likings”; they are not desires because, being likings, they do not 
represent an active motivational energizing of behavior.83,84 A desire, properly speaking, 
                                                            
83 I elaborate on the notion of “energizing” behavior in Section 5.3.3. 
84 Pollock’s distinction between liking and desire should not be confused with Berridge’s (2018) distinction 
between liking and wanting. By ‘liking’, Berridge refers to the hedonic component of reward. Pollock’s 
notion of ‘liking’ is not hedonic, but is instead more closely connected to what Berridge calls ‘wanting’. 
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implies that the agent is in an active state of seeking a certain outcome but has not necessarily 
adopted behaviors (or a “plan”) to acquire the outcome (the latter would imply an intention, not 
merely a desire). 
An agent similarly does not need to store a comprehensive database of feature likings 
to generate preferences about outcomes on the fly. Pollock argues that “The only way to make 
evaluative cognition work is to have a database of ‘computationally primitive values’ from which 
other values not included in the database can be computed” (2006, p. 35). Here it is important 
not to take computational metaphors too literally; Pollack is not advocating a Fodor-style 
computational theory of mind but merely making a point about basic features of the information 
processing that is necessary. However, it is the need to work out derivative feature likings from 
the “computationally primitive values” that makes beliefs necessary. This is because systems 
capable of beliefs can represent causal relationships between states of affairs in a way that 
abstracts away both from particular motivational or evaluative systems, and from what the 
system is currently able to control, as I explain next. 
 
5.3.2 Beliefs 
 
A number of philosophers have debated about what the capacity to believe minimally 
requires. Davidson (1982) argued that belief possession requires possession of language; 
Stich (1978) argued that belief possession requires the possession of concepts. Philosophers 
sometimes argue on either of these bases that organisms other than humans cannot have 
beliefs. Such philosophers may well be right that language or concepts are necessary for 
possession of certain kinds of beliefs. In this discussion, I do not wish to take a stance on what 
counts as a language or what counts as a concept, or which kinds of states should or should 
not be counted as “beliefs”. However, I have been articulating an account of agency that is 
based on analyzing the concept of a choice, and on the assumption that choices are unlike 
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mere selections by being based on preferences. The notions of choice and preference that I 
have been working with are grounded in the account of control I gave in the previous chapter, 
which has so far been noncommittal with respect to linguistic or conceptual capacities. I believe 
that this route to an understanding of agency leads to a corresponding way of understanding 
belief that is similarly neutral with respect to the possession of linguistic or conceptual 
capacities by the agent (i.e., both to whether the agent must possess them and what it means 
to possess them). 
Sterelny’s (2003) distinction between drive-based and preference-based motivation 
comes packaged with another distinction that is important to his account, between detection-
based sensory tracking and what he called “robust” tracking. Detection-based tracking occurs 
when an organism relies solely on a single cue to track any given feature of its environment. 
Organisms that rely on this type of tracking can be easily fooled if there are other features in 
the environment that can cause false positive registrations for the cue. Instead, robust tracking 
capacities are often selected for in lineages that have to cope with greater environmental 
complexity. With robust tracking, an organism is able to integrate information from the detection 
of multiple cues to keep track of a single feature. 
Sterelny argues that robust tracking is not yet sufficient for belief, however. Robust 
tracking can occur in conjunction with drive-based motivation: behaviors may be driven directly 
by the registration of features that are robustly tracked, without the mediation of outcome 
valuations. For Sterelny, belief emerges when such registrations count as “decoupled 
representations,” that is, “internal states that track aspects of our world, but which do not have 
the function of controlling particular behaviors” (2003, p. 29). He therefore defines beliefs as 
“representations that are relevant to many behaviors, but do not have the biological function of 
directing any specific behavior” (ibid.). Sterelny (2003, p. 86) notes that preference-based 
motivation may not be necessary for the possession of beliefs in this sense (since the function 
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of such beliefs in a given organism may simply be to modulate a wide range of drives or 
modulate drive-based behaviors in diverse ways). 
Above, I argued that representing states of affairs as states of affairs, which is 
necessary for choosing and having preferences, involves having a perspective on something 
as being potentially under my control sometimes and not under my control at other times. In 
this way, a content is not merely decoupled from particular behaviors; it is decoupled from 
control as such, for the agent.85 I believe that this makes for a more objective (i.e., external 
observer-independent) criterion for what counts as a belief. To have a belief, then, involves 
more than just the registration of information that is not treated as intrinsically relevant to any 
behavior in particular. It must have a content that could also be the content of a preference for 
that agent. If I do not have the capacity to prefer that the sky be blue, then I cannot have the 
capacity to believe that the sky is blue. This may strike the reader as wrong on first glance: we 
usually only form preferences about things that we consider to be controllable. This is true; but 
it only shows that we do not actually form preferences about things that we don’t consider to be 
controllable. If I were presented with a set of buttons, and I found that pressing different buttons 
changed the color of the sky, I would be capable of forming a preference about which button to 
press, i.e., what color to make the sky. Being able to envision or anticipate a means of 
controlling a situation is not necessary; what is necessary is that if confronted with a means of 
controlling the situation, one could form a preference and make a choice. My contention is that 
this is exactly what it means for something to be an agent, rather than another type of control 
system. 
If beliefs must have content that could also be the content of a preference for the agent, 
then this shows how systems become capable of making outcome-based behavioral selections 
across the domains of different motivational systems. On the sensory side, perceptual contents 
                                                            
85 For an account of how a common repertoire of contents for sensory and action representations may be 
implemented in the brain, see Hommel & Wiers (2017). 
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are unified into a common spatial field in a way that motivational systems often do not unify 
behaviors into a common behavioral space. By learning new correspondences between states-
of-affairs represented as achievable outcomes for particular motivational systems, on the one 
hand, and states-of-affairs represented as perceptually distinct situations, on the other, a 
content framework that spans across motivational system domains that is also neutral with 
respect to direct-of-fit (i.e., decoupled from the status of being-under-control or not) becomes 
possible. This way of understanding belief is another piece of the puzzle that enables us to 
understand agency (and related notions) in a way that distinguishes agents from other control 
systems but also places at center stage the key features that a wide swath of disciplines is 
unified in considering to be important about agency. 
 
5.3.3 Desires and Intentions: Agential Goal-Directedness 
 
Providing a bare sketch86 of what desires and intentions look like on this account 
requires elaborating on my above usage of the phrase “active motivational energizing of 
behavior” when discussing the difference between liking and desiring. States of liking are often 
not considered motivational or conative because merely liking something does not in itself 
involve energization of behavior, as it is often put by psychologists (e.g., Schultheiss et al., 
2012). As one philosopher wrote, 
a reason or motive is a moving or impelling thought, the thought of that for the 
sake, or in view of which, some act is done; and I myself see no intelligible 
alternative to saying that it “moves” or “impels” in the sense that it functions as a 
cause of actions, in the conventional sense of cause as an antecedent implying a 
consequent by a rule of invariable connection. I should therefore, describe a 
motive as a causa rationis, a mental antecedent which, when attended to by a 
person, and in otherwise comparable conditions, will invariably be followed by an 
orientation of his organism towards the action thought of, in a way which, except 
for the intervention of distractions, counter-motives and physical impediments, 
                                                            
86 Both the nature of desire and the nature of intention (and for that matter, belief) are huge topics in 
themselves that have received multiple book-length treatments, so more than a minimal sketch will not be 
possible here, though a little more substance will be added in the next chapter. 
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will terminate in the action itself. Such a thought may be said to constitute simply 
a reason or motive, if, when attended to by itself alone, it thus causally implies 
action... (Falk, 1948, p. 116) 
Merely liking a state of affairs may be said to “causally imply” a preference (or preferences), 
perhaps, but it does not “causally imply” action. A preference only implies an action if one is in 
a situation where one must make a choice. This may make one desire the preferred option (if 
only out of a desire to escape the alternative options), but the desire to avoid the choice 
situation itself may easily prevail (and it may easily lead to an extinguishment of the desire for 
the preferred option) if a means of doing so becomes available. As Schroeder puts it, “the 
ability to get the body moving,” sometimes also called as “oomph” by philosophers (2004b, p. 
22), is essential to desire.  
Another way of making the same point is that desiring, unlike liking, initiates and 
sustains striving for a state of affairs. This way of putting it makes salient the goal-directed 
nature of desiring as opposed to liking. As I discussed in the previous chapter, “goal-
directedness” does not refer to any one phenomenon but instead a range of distinct kinds of 
phenomena. The specific kind of goal-directedness that is key to understanding the difference 
between liking and desiring is what I referred to as “weak goal-directedness” (Section 4.6.3.3). 
Weak goal-directedness at minimum requires a variable control system that can change its 
input/output mapping over time (Section 4.6.3.2). It involves what I referred to as targeting, 
which is the online coordination (Section 4.6.2) of input parameters with behavior parameters. 
Desire requires not merely tracking whether the desired state of affairs (i.e., goal) obtains, but 
also progress toward the obtaining of that goal (the input parameters); behavior is then actively 
coordinated with such progress registrations. This might make it sound like desire-driven 
behavior is limited to simple sensorimotor coordination, but as discussed in Chapter 4, such 
progress tracking may involve higher-order “quasi-spatial” (in the terminology of Grush, 2000) 
manifolds, or “order parameters” (Kelso, 1995). This is true even for the most sophisticated 
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desire-based behaviors such as pursuing long-term career goals or spiritual goals (e.g., 
seeking “enlightenment”).87 
Several things set desire-driven behavior apart from mere weak goal-directedness: 1) 
the fact that the goal is represented as a state of affairs, 2) the use of beliefs in tracking 
progress toward the goal (the inputs for the coordinating control subsystem are parametrized in 
terms of beliefs), and 3) parameterization of the outputs of the coordinating control subsystem 
in terms of intentions. The adoption of a desire is the reconfiguration of the input/output 
mapping of the control system such that beliefs are coordinated in a certain way with 
intentions: intentions are continually updated in accordance with the updating of beliefs. 
What, then, are intentions? Intentions88 are to motor commands what beliefs are to 
sensory detections. Intentions map representations of states of affairs (the contents of 
intentions) ultimately to basic behavioral skills. A basic skill is a control subsystem (a motor 
schema, or a higher order behavioral schema; Arkin, 1998, p. 43) that generates motor 
commands without the mediation of the agent’s beliefs and preferences. We can give 
determinate meaning to this statement in light of what has come before: The details of how 
behavior is directed by basic skills are not, according to the agent’s own perspective, 
controllable (at least, controllable during the behavior) by the agent.89 
For example, suppose I form an intention to lift a beverage can to a higher location. For 
most people, such a movement can be performed without having to reason about means and 
ends, i.e., without having to form the intention to lift my arm, open my hand, grasp the can, etc. 
                                                            
87 Though such long-term goals will often involve committal, rather than inclinational, desires, and 
therefore a more complex type of coordination than has been discussed so far; see Chapter 6. 
88 Here, my focus is on what Searle (1983) calls “intentions in action,” that is, intensions that direct 
occurrent behavior, rather than “prior intentions,” planned actions that are not yet under execution. 
Pacherie (2008) refers to intentions in action as “proximal intentions” or “P-intentions”; importantly, these 
are distinct from what she calls “motor intentions” or “M-intentions.” By ‘intention’, in this chapter, I will 
only mean proximal intentions, not motor intentions, which are internal to basic skill systems and 
generally not directly coordinated with beliefs and desires. What Searle refers to as “prior intentions” and 
Pacherie refers to as “distal intentions” will be discussed in the next chapter. 
89 Polányi (1958, p. 56) distinguished between intentions and the behavioral skills that underlie them in a 
similar way. 
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For a normal adult, lifting the beverage can to a higher location is a task that can be performed 
automatically by relying on motor skills alone, rather than practical reasoning. Similarly, one 
can act on one’s intention to continue riding a bicycle in a particular direction without needing 
mediating intentions or preferences about whether the handle bars should be turned slightly to 
the left or right at a given moment to maintain balance. Objective representations are only 
necessary for forming the initial intention; one’s motor skills then take over. 
 
5.4 What is the Agent? 
 
The agent, then, is a multidimensional and multivariate control system (capable of 
tracking many sensory and behavioral parameters) which is also necessarily composite. 
Agents consist of many different control systems combined into a central control system. The 
central controller has beliefs and intentions in its input and output repertoire, but the contents of 
beliefs and intentions form a common repertoire of contentful states that represent states of 
affairs. If this central control system can change its repertoire of beliefs and intentions over time 
(e.g., by learning and forgetting), then it is a metamorphic control system. Its input/output 
mapping will necessarily incorporate both preferences and desires (and likely, if Pollack is right, 
other states like likings). 
The central controller will have other controllers whose job it is to update beliefs based 
on sensory input (these implement perceptual skills) and controllers whose job it is to translate 
intentions into motor commands (these implement behavioral skills). Grush and Springle 
(forthcoming) characterize these as controllers that implement inverse mappings because in 
the case of perception, they determine what kind of state of affairs would causally produce the 
sensory input, and on the behavior side, they determine the motor commands based on what 
kind of motor commands would causally result in the intended state of affairs. The possession 
of a central belief/desire controller is necessary for agency but the agent itself should be 
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identified with the larger containing control system (Taylor, 1966, pp. 134–138). The central 
control system is the larger agent’s means of having a perspective on what is under its control 
and what is not.90 The junction between the central controller and its skill controllers 
corresponds to what Grush and Springle refer to as an “inverse intersection” (forthcoming, p. 9) 
because it is the intersection of the perceptual inverse mappings and behavioral inverse 
mappings. The interface between these mappings and the central controller determine what 
Grush and Springle refer to as the “subjective accusatives of agency” (or SAAs), which define 
the limit of what the agent implicitly takes itself to be able to directly perceive and directly 
control. In this way, as Grush and Springle write, “Control, from a subject’s point of view, starts 
with an SAA. And SAAs are defined by inverse mappings,” (forthcoming, p. 6). 
 
5.5 Agent Architectures and Terminological Issues 
 
The discussion so far has omitted an enormous amount of detail, on questions such as: 
• How are preferences formed? Does this require use of a “common currency” 
(McFarland & Sibley, 1975) representation of utility/reward? 
• What other kinds of states (likings, goals, emotions, hedonic states, affective 
states, neuromodulatory systems, internal “need” states, etc.) are functionally 
implicated in the formation of preferences, and how does this work? 
• How are beliefs used to update beliefs, preferences, desires, and intentions? 
Are there alternatives to reward-based learning? To what extent are “rational” 
processes of judgment and inference versus heuristics used? To what extent 
are these processes “penetrable” by peripheral control systems? 
                                                            
90 I will discuss reasons in the next chapter why the “central controller” (in the sense I am using here) may 
not straightforwardly map onto the “will,” “consciousness,” or “self” of the agent. 
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• How much behavior is controlled through the central controller (or 
“intentional”) as opposed to peripheral (or “habitual”) control systems? And 
how do the peripheral control systems work? 
• Where does “cognition” begin and end in the complex arrangement of control 
systems? Which processes are “cognitive,” and which are not? Which are 
“conative” or “motivational,” and which are not? 
• How are desires formed? 
• How are intentions/goals formed? Can this occur in the absence of any top-
level goals or intentions (Carbonelle, 1982; this is sometimes referred to as 
“goal autonomy”, e.g., Castelfranchi, 1995)? 
• What is the nature of the coordination process by which desires generate 
intentions? 
• Can there be more than one central controller? Can they be nested within 
each other? Can they be hierarchically/heterarchically arranged? Can an 
agent have multiple central controllers functioning in series or parallel? 
The present account does not attempt to answer these questions. This is not because the 
account is deficient or incomplete, but instead because they are questions, not about the basic 
nature of agency, but about different ways to implement agency. Any given agent will embody 
answers to these questions in the detail of its makeup, which AI researchers refer to as an 
agent architecture (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995).91 
Not all of what AI researchers refer to as agent architectures will yield a literal agent 
according to the present definition (i.e., a control system capable of choosing states of affairs, 
not merely selecting behaviors). For example, Braitenburg vehicles (Braitenburg, 1984) are 
                                                            
91 This is not to say that theoretical questions about agential concepts are autonomous from or 
independent of implementation questions. I see them not as qualitatively discontinuous, but rather as 
occupying different positions on a smooth continuum of levels of grain. 
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sometimes considered to embody a very simple agent architecture, even though they operate 
by extremely simple dynamics (e.g., turning the wheels left instead of right when a blue light is 
detected). The robots of Rodney Brooks are sometimes referred to as embodying a “reactive 
agent architecture” (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995, pp. 132–133), meaning that their behaviors 
are determined based only on their momentary sensory inputs. 
Often, the interest of these “agent architectures” is not necessarily in understanding 
agency as such, but in the attempt to engineer systems that behave in agent-like ways, or 
reverse-engineer systems that behave in agent-like ways. This goal is not only important for 
robotics and artificial intelligence, since an enormous about of behavior and control processes 
within organisms (even humans) are by means of processes that would not count as fully 
“agential” on the present account. This is true to such a great extent that it would probably not, 
in general, be useful, even when adopting the present framework for understanding agency, to 
restrict usage of terms like ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘preference’, etc. to only those states that represent 
things as states of affairs. 
Even when it is best to restrict language like ‘belief’, ‘preference’, and ‘choice’ to those 
systems that are capable of representing something as a state of affairs (for reasons I have 
discussed above, e.g., to have a notion of agency that is not grounded in external 
perspectives), in many contexts it is useful to adopt a way of talking on which even sub-
agential motor commands involve “intentions” (such as in Pacherie’s use of ‘motor intention’) or 
basic sensory registrations count as “beliefs.” In fact, we often refer to behaviors performed by 
agents as “actions” when they are caused by habits or drives, or even when they are not even 
“goal-directed” in these ways (e.g., the action of accidentally knocking over a glass). And in 
other contexts, it may be useful simply to adopt a purely instrumental intentional stance for 
systems that would not be considered agents at all on this view, to say things like that “the 
bacterium kept going straight because it believed it was heading towards a food source.” 
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Such usages will, of course, befuddle social psychologists and economists. The power 
of the present framework is that the conversation does not have to end at this state of 
befuddlement: the present framework offers a means to express the full range of ideas, across 
contexts and even disciplines, while avoiding such ambiguity and confusion. However, a great 
potential source of confusion remains, because even in fully agential contexts, concepts like 
‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘preference’, and ‘intention’ are used in starkly different ways: Sometimes they 
are used in a way that implies a commitment on the part of an agent, and sometimes not. This 
is a large topic that cannot be addressed here and will instead be the subject of the next 
chapter. There, I will demonstrate that whether or not agential states involve commitment 
makes a huge difference to their functional profile. For example, in general, systems capable of 
genuine planning or future-directed intentions will likely require commitment-based states. In 
the rest of this chapter I will compare the present framework to other contemporary attempts at 
understanding agency. 
 
5.6 Comparison to Other Accounts 
 
5.6.1 Sterelny 
 
Sterelny’s account of agency is in agreement with the one presented in this chapter in 
that it takes the capacity for preference-based behavior to be a necessary condition for agency 
(2003, pp. 32–33). On Sterelny’s view, both beliefs and preferences are attitudes directed at 
states of the world, and preferences motivate behavior if and to the extent that that behavior is 
expected to produce the preferred outcome. The difference between Sterelny’s view and the 
present one lies in how Sterelny spells this out. 
As I explained above, what Sterelny calls “drive-based” motivation differs from 
“preference-based” motivation in that drive-based motivation, unlike preference-based 
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motivation, involves a functional mapping from detected situation kinds to kinds of behaviors or 
drive-specific goals, unmediated by expectations about the causal outcomes of those 
behaviors.92 What is key for Sterelny is whether or not the system selects behaviors based on 
anticipating both the effect the behaviors will have on the world and whether such effects will 
be good or bad. Note that what is important is the fact that outcomes of actions (and valuations 
of such outcomes) are represented; this requirement, by itself, does not involve any kind of 
essential link between the contents of preferences and sensory contents. In fact, recall that for 
Sterelny (2003, p. 86), the capacity for preferences may conceivably exist in the absence of a 
capacity for belief. This is because the representational capacities necessary for preferences 
are not essentially tied to the representational capacities necessary for belief. Sterelny requires 
preferences and beliefs to be representational, but he does not require them to operate with a 
common repertoire of representational contents. 
The problem here is that Sterelny’s account does not actually offer a way of 
distinguishing between the anticipation of changes in states of the world, on the one hand, and 
anticipation merely of changes in (potentially complexly related) control parameters, on the 
other. Sterelny’s account does not rule out cases in which the kind of thing that the control 
system selects is not the same kind of thing that it detects. Sterelny considers preferences to 
be representations directed at states of the world, but unless these include the coordination 
and registration of correspondence between sensory and control order parameters amounting 
to what Grush and Springle refer to as an “inverse intersection” (forthcoming, p. 9), such 
contents will not be represented as states of affairs or states of the world, but merely 
affordances for control with an indeterminate relation to the world. 
What I have argued, by contrast, is that objective representation requires the ability to 
couple and decouple one’s sensory contents and one’s control parameter contents. It requires 
                                                            
92 What Sterelny calls drive-based motivation corresponds to a type of what I called “strong goal-
directedness” in the last chapter. 
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the ability to register one’s sensory contents as corresponding to one’s control parameter 
contents (by updating how these are coordinated in the central input/output mapping), and to 
alter these correspondences over time as one’s sensory and behavioral situatedness changes 
with respect to the states of affairs they represent. This is necessary for states of affairs to be 
representable by the agent as both potentially controllable and potentially uncontrollable by that 
agent. To have a belief involves more than just the registration of information that is not treated 
as intrinsically relevant to any behavior in particular. It must have a content that could also be 
the content of a preference for that agent. 
Sterelny seems to rely on the fact that external observers can observe the seemingly 
agential behavior of rats and infer that the rats must be representing behavioral outcomes as 
outcomes, i.e., as states of affairs. What I am offering is an account that relies exclusively on 
what I have called internal perspectivalism: representation that is grounded in the system’s own 
perspective. By registering, maintaining, and updating correspondences between sensory 
contents and control parameters, agents identify states of affairs as things that can correspond 
to different kinds of sensory and control parameters at different times, and therefore things 
whose existence is not dependent on the system’s sensory or control parameters. The main 
difference with Sterelny is that instead of taking for granted the capacity for representing states 
of affairs, my account explains what kinds of control system features this requires. 
 
5.6.2 Burge 
 
Burge (2009, 2010) develops a notion of agency that is much thinner than mine. He 
writes that 
Primitive agency forms a background for understanding both representation and 
representation-as in perceptual systems—hence for understanding perceptual 
kinds. Primitive organismic agency is phylogenetically prior to perception. It 
occurs in animals that demonstrably lack perception in the sense that I will 
elaborate. ... Usually discussion [of agency] begins with cases involving desire, 
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intention, will, and then focuses on subcases of intentional action. There is 
nothing in itself wrong with this focus, of course. But often it is assumed that such 
approaches encompass all action. Animal action begins earlier. Much of it is pre-
intentional, even pre-representational and pre-perceptual. Origins of agency 
precede those of perception and representation. Even representational agency 
precedes intention and belief, not to say meta-evaluation. (2010, p. 327) 
According to Burge, not all biological movement, activity, or change counts as a manifestation 
of agency (i.e., as an “action”). What distinguishes actions from other activities is that actions, 
unlike other internally-produced changes in an organism, either “issue from,” or are “a product 
of coordination with,” at least some of the “central behavioral capacities” of the organism 
(Burge, 2009, pp. 262–264). Burge summarizes his view by writing that 
I think that the relevant notion of action is grounded in functioning, coordinated 
behavior by the whole organism, issuing from the individual’s central behavioral 
capacities, not purely from sub-systems. Coordination is meant to imply that the 
behavior must issue from central capacities, in effect coordinating sub-systems, 
or coordinating central capacities with their peripheral realizations. (2009, p. 260) 
Key to Burge’s view is the distinction between what he calls “central capacities,” on the 
one hand, and “sub-systems” or “peripheral systems,” on the other. Burge never provides an 
explicit criterion for what counts as a “central” versus “peripheral” or “sub-” system, but instead 
provides a number of examples. For example, he writes that 
An animal’s shivering in the cold, or its coughing or sneezing, are perhaps 
instances of behavior. But they are not instances of active behavior. The events 
can be functional. Shivering engenders heat. Coughing and sneezing have 
expectorant functions. They are functional, but they are operations of peripheral 
systems that are not normally products of coordination with central behavioral 
capacities. (Burge, 2009, pp. 261–262) 
Burge does not, however, require that all actions must be exercises of biological proper 
functions: 
There are types of non-pathological primitive agency that do not obviously fulfill 
larger biological functions. Idly, non-intentionally, drumming one’s fingers, or the 
unconscious coordinated swaying to rhythmic sound by an animal, can be active. 
It is not evident what function it performs. Certainly it need not realize any of the 
basic biological functions. (Burge, 2009, p. 262) 
Further, even organisms without nervous systems possess central behavioral capacities: 
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One can make a start at analogous points even for simple organisms like 
paramecia that lack a central nervous system. Eating involves a unitary process 
that involves the whole organism (eating itself, and rotation of the animal body so 
that the side that has the gullet opening faces the food), as well as operations 
that are imputable purely to its subsystems (expansion of the gullet). By contrast, 
protein transfer through the membranes of the paramecium is not a process that 
engages the unified behavior of the whole animal. (Burge, 2009, p. 263) 
While Burge counts paramecium motility as involving action and therefore agency, he does not 
count tropisms or prokaryote motility as manifestations of agency, and so organisms such as 
bacteria and plants do not count as agents. About tropisms, he writes: “In many cases, 
tropisms are nothing more than oriented growth. I lay tropisms aside. They are mostly either 
non-active movement or at best borderline cases of active movement,” (Burge, 2009, p. 257). 
He does not count prokaryotes like E. coli as capable of agency because they are not able to 
directly control the direction in which they propel themselves. By changing the frequency with 
which they “tumble” instead of “run,” E. coli are able to significantly increase the likelihood of 
swimming towards food sources, but they do not actually steer themselves. 
Moreno and Mossio criticize Burge’s account, writing that Burge “seems to rely more on 
intuition than on a rigorous conceptual base” (2015, p. 95). With the present framework, we can 
go further than this and understand the difference between paramecium and prokaryote motility 
in terms of the capacity for targeting (Section 4.6.3.3), which I defined as the minimal 
requirement for weak goal-directedness. The difference between central and peripheral 
capacities that Burge relies on more generally, however, does not seem explainable in these 
terms. 
Above, in Section 5.4, I defined a distinction between the “central” and “peripheral” 
controllers that are part of the larger composite control system which is the agent itself. The 
difference between the central and peripheral controllers is that the input and output repertoire 
of the central system form what Grush and Springle referred to as an “inverse intersection” 
(forthcoming, p. 9), a common repertoire of contentful states that represent states of affairs. 
The peripheral systems maintain these repertoires using information sources internal and 
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external to the organism and translate output repertoire selections into fully articulated 
behaviors or motor commands. While this is a rigorous and “objective” (in the sense of being 
grounded in the system’s own perspective, rather than the perspective on an external 
observer) way of distinguishing between central and peripheral systems, it would of course not 
serve Burge’s purposes since the information processing capabilities of single-celled 
organisms certainly do not have the sophistication necessary for representation of states of 
affairs as states of affairs. 
Burge’s notion of agency, unlike the present one, is not derived from presupposing a 
meaningful distinction between choices and selections, and seems to be more concerned with 
capturing casual usages (of biologists among others) of the word ‘action’. As with the 
distinction between paramecium and prokaryote motility, it is likely that in particular contexts, 
attribution of activities as ‘actions’ will turn on the presence or absence of some control system 
feature or other (such as those described in the previous, present, and following chapters), but 
it is unlikely that usage of ‘action’ or ‘agent’ will be captured across the board by any particular 
set of control system features. This is why the main value of the present framework lies in its 
laying out of the various features that are likely to be important for understanding such usages, 
rather than in legislating about the language itself. 
Before moving on from the discussion of Burge, one further comment he makes 
deserves attention. While Burge’s account of agency is much thinner than the one I’ve offered 
here, his account is also very different from mine in that he also argues that agency does not 
necessarily involve control: 
Primitive whole-organism agency often involves whole-organism control, but 
does not require it. Ducking an approaching missile can be an action even if it is 
against one’s own attempt to inhibit the ducking. I assume that the ducking is not 
a peripheral reflex in the classical sense. It is guided by perception. Such ducking 
seems intuitively not to be under the individual’s control. The individual would 
naturally say that he or she could not help but duck despite trying not to. ... A 
more fundamental reason against taking control to be central to primitive agency 
is that with respect to the simplest organisms, the notion of control has little grip. 
Primitive whole-organism agency also does not require a capacity to shape or 
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guide whole-organism movement past the point where the stimulus is registered. 
Various types of instinctive behavior are inflexible and chain-reflexive, but still 
count as action. The male grouse will copulate with a stuffed grouse, male 
grouse, or dead grouse, if it sees any of these as assuming the relevant female 
mating position. The male grouse’s copulation activity is released by a single 
stimulus or single perception. The instinctive behavior does not derive from an 
inability to distinguish visually between the sexes, or between live and dead 
grouses. It is just that the instinctive behavior overrides these distinctions, once 
the key stimulus is received. … Intuitively the grouse’s action and the ducking are 
guided by the individual’s perception. But the action is not under the control or 
guidance of the individual in the sense that the individual need not endorse the 
behavior and could not monitor or adjust it, given the initial perceptual input. 
(Burge, 2009, pp. 264–265) 
Here, it is apparent that Burge understands control in a different way than the account I offered 
in the previous chapter. The phrase “he or she could not help it” usually refers to a type of 
control that philosophers refer to as intentional control, which involves the ability to prevent 
behaviors that deviate from one’s intentions. As I mentioned in Section 4.7.4, the nature of 
intentional control is a topic that has been highly debated by philosophers who are interested in 
defending causal theories of action from the problem of deviant causal chains.93 As long as 
‘control’ is being understood in the sense of intentional control, Burge is of course right that 
“primitive agency” (as he understands it) would not necessarily require control, since for him, 
primitive agents may not have intentions at all. 
The last sentence of the quotation suggests a weaker understanding of control, 
however. Instincts can give rise to ballistic behaviors that are not guided by feedback once they 
are initiated (Klinger, 1977, pp. 84–85; Lea, 1984, p. 22). Such behaviors are generally aimed 
at a goal at least when or before they are initiated, and still count as what I referred to as “weak 
goal-directedness” in Section 4.6.3.3. There, I also distinguished between guided and unguided 
targeting; unguided targeting corresponds to aimed ballistic behaviors. Both types of behaviors 
ultimately involve control, of course, in the sense I defined in Chapter 4; the difference is in the 
                                                            
93 I do not necessarily consider the account developed in this chapter as a version of the “causal theory of 
action.” As Frankfurt wrote, “Explaining purposive behavior in terms of causal mechanisms is not 
tantamount to propounding a causal theory of action. ... the pertinent activity of these mechanisms is not 
prior to but concurrent with the movements they guide” (1978, p. 160). 
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type of control involved. As long as ‘control’ is being understood in the sense of guided 
targeting, again, Burge is right that “primitive agency” (again, as he understands it) would not 
require control, the copulation activity of the grouse being a case in point. 
 
5.6.3 Steward 
 
Helen Steward (2009, 2012) offers an account of minimal agency designed to 
accommodate the attribution of agency broadly to animals as well as humans, on which: 
(i) an agent can move the whole, or at least some parts, of something we are 
inclined to think of as its body; 
(ii) an agent is a centre of some form of subjectivity; 
(iii) an agent is something to which at least some rudimentary types of intentional 
state (e.g., trying, wanting, perceiving) may be properly attributed; 
(iv) an agent is a settler of matters concerning certain of the movements of its 
own body i.e., the actions by means of which those movements are effected 
are considered to be non-necessitated events, attributed always first and 
foremost to the agent, and only secondarily to environmental impacts or 
triggers of any sort. (2009, p. 226) 
 
About condition (i) she writes: 
[W]e immediately impose, for example, on our conception of an animate entity, at 
least at first, [a] dualistic scheme of animal and body, according to which we 
suppose the animal to be a possessor of its body, in much the way that we are 
possessors of our own. There is the cockerel, and there is the cockerel’s body 
which the cockerel can make move, just as we can make our bodies move. 
(2009, p. 225) 
The idea here seems to be that there is a conceptual distinction made between the agent as 
controller, and the agent (or its body) as controlled. This appears to me to correspond to the 
basic distinction between the controller and the controlled system (or “plant”) in control theory. I 
therefore interpret condition (i) as a corollary of the analytically true fact that, as Rescher 
pointed out (Section 4.4), in any instance of control, there must always be something doing the 
controlling, and something being controlled. (i), then, follows from the fact that an agent is a 
type of control system. 
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On condition (ii), Steward does not provide much in the way of elaboration, except to 
characterize it as “the presupposition that an animal is a centre of some form of subjectivity, 
subjectivity which affects and mediates its interactions with its environment” (2009, p. 225). The 
present view can provide substantiation for this criterion, however, since it holds that agency 
involves having a perspective on the world as being carved into a number of kinds of states of 
affairs, as well as a perspective on what states of affairs currently obtain and which ones are 
under the agent’s control. The agent’s repertoire of types of states of affairs, beliefs, and 
preferences together constitute a categorization scheme and normative standard for how it 
should influence its own environment. 
Condition (iii) is intended to be thinner than it sounds. First, Steward is clear that she 
does not take “intentional states” to necessarily be propositional attitudes. But further, she 
seems to mean by “intentional states” what I have referred to as strong goal-directedness 
(Section 4.6.3.4): the ability to combine representational models of the environment with 
representations of value (what she calls “desire-like states”) that are then used to drive 
behaviors. This would not require the capacity for objective representation of states of affairs 
that I have described in this chapter, and therefore would not require the kind of distinction that 
I have emphasized between choice and selection. It would also not be sufficient to allow for the 
kinds of reasons explanations that I discussed above in Section 5.2.2 (except from the context 
of an external observer’s intentional stance, but Steward, 2012, p. 107 rejects instrumentalism 
about agency). 
On the other hand, Steward claims that she intends condition (iv) to capture the 
capacity for choice, writing that 
Our natural inclination is to think of an animal as a creature that can, within limits, 
direct its own activities and which has certain choices about the details of those 
activities. To invoke a terminology I find helpful in this context, it is natural to think 
of animals as the settlers of various matters which concern the movement 
through time and space of their own bodies, and I submit that it goes deeply 
against the grain to suppose that each exact detail of each movement 
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orchestrated by an animal was settled at any point prior to a period broadly 
coeval with what we think of as the period of the animal’s action. (2009, p. 226) 
Recall from Section 4.3 that Rescher characterized control in general as the capacity to “affect 
decisively” an outcome, and even to “assure” a “desired result.” There are, then, a couple of 
ways to interpret the intuition that animals are the “settlers” of various matters. Any 
autonomous controller has a perspective on when it should have one kind of influence on a 
control parameter rather than another; animals are no exception. I argued in the last chapter 
that this constitutes a rudimentary kind of normative standard, the kind that can be invoked 
whenever literal selection is said to occur. In Pattee’s (1973b, p. 71) terminology, any selector 
or controller must incorporate “decision-making constraints.” 
The other way to interpret the idea of animals as the “settlers” of matters concerning 
them is to consider them to be capable of choosing in Daveney’s sense. I have argued, 
however, that the representational requirements for this go beyond strong goal-directedness 
and require preferences, which in turn require the ability to represent states of affairs as states 
of affairs, decoupled not merely from particular behaviors (Sterelny’s sense of “decoupled 
representations), but further decoupled from control as such (i.e., decoupled from direction of 
fit). In this way, the agent does not merely make a selection (or “pick” an outcome), the agent 
selects based on which outcome the agent itself considers to be the best. Depending on how 
condition (iv) is read (or intuited), then, it may constitute an argument in favor of the view of 
agency I have put forward. 
Ultimately, Steward’s views about agency are designed primarily to facilitate her larger 
(2012) metaphysical position on the freewill debate, in particular, her response to Van 
Inwagen’s (1983) “consequence argument.” She attempts to formulate a libertarian 
metaphysics that incorporates a non-perspectivalist realism about agency and non-
deterministic agential causation. Since my view combines internal perspectivalism about both 
control (Chapter 4) and agency (Section 5.2.2), multi-perspectival realism about mechanistic 
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causation (Chapter 2), and the view that controllers and agents are types of mechanisms, it 
would likely be considered largely incompatible with her larger metaphysical goals.94 
 
5.6.4 Moreno and Mossio 
 
Moreno and Mossio’s (2015; henceforth M&M) account of agency is the most fully 
developed of a larger class of accounts that define agency in terms of self-maintenance (e.g., 
Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Christensen, 1999; Di Paolo, 2005; Lyon, 2006; Thompson, 2007; 
Campbell, 2009; Hooker, 2009; Witherington, 2011; Arnellos, Bruni, El-Hani, & Collier, 2012; 
Walsh, 2015; Jones, 2017). M&M, like many other authors who develop self-maintenance-
based accounts, are primarily concerned with developing their notion of biological autonomy 
and arrive at their notion of agency within the context of this broader project. 
M&M’s account begins with the plausible claim that the concept of agency inherently 
involves a differentiation between a self (the agent) and its environment (2015, p. 91). Such a 
differentiation naturally falls out of their conception of biological autonomy, given that self-
maintenance is essential to the latter (without a self with its own identity distinct from its 
surroundings, self-maintenance could not have meaning). M&M claim that a second feature 
that follows from the very concept of agency is that agents have a “capacity to generate causal 
effects: agents are the source of interactions that are not determined by either the events of the 
immediate or distant past, or by physical laws of nature” (2015, p. 92). They explain that 
“agents are the sources of causal effects because these effects are generated by the 
constraints that belong to their organization” (ibid.). M&M are working with a notion of 
                                                            
94 In a future paper I will combine the present framework with an elaboration of MacKay’s (1962) control-
theoretic approach to the freewill debate. The basic idea is that microphysical determinism and agent 
causation are distinct but equally valid perspectives that can be taken on the non-perspectival reality of 
modal patterns that ground both perspectives. 
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‘constraint’ that has descended from the work of Howard Pattee, similar to that developed in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
Third, M&M write that agency has “teleological and normative dimensions” in that 
“actions are supposed to have goals and comply with norms” (2015, p. 93). The details of their 
account are then derived from these three initial claims, which may be restated as follows: 
(1) Agency inherently involves a differentiation between a self (the agent) and its 
environment. 
(2) Agents initiate and determine at least some of their interactions with their 
environments. 
(3) The interactions that agents initiate are imbued by the agent with normativity. 
From only these basic principles, M&M derive their definition of agents as those systems that 
maintain their own organization partly by initiating and determining their interactions with their 
environments “in a teleological and normative way” (2015, p. 93). How do M&M arrive at this 
definition? 
In an earlier chapter of their (2015), and as discussed in Section 3.3.3 of this 
dissertation, M&M defend a self-maintenance-based account of proper function normativity: 
traits are functioning properly when they are actually contributing to the self-maintenance of the 
larger organized system. M&M then combine this with statement (3) to make an argumentative 
move that one commonly finds among the larger family of self-maintenance-based approaches 
to agency listed above—an appropriate name for it might be the “Standard Argument for 
Agency as Grounded in Self-Maintenance”: 
By contributing to the maintenance of the closed organisation to which they 
belong, agential functions contribute to maintaining the conditions of their own 
existence; hence, the maintenance of the whole organisation can be taken as the 
naturalised goal of agential functions, and its conditions of existence are the 
norms of their activity. (2015, p. 93) 
I noted above that the self-maintenance-based approach provides a natural way to 
accommodate statement (1). To see how it is intended to accommodate statement (2), recall 
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M&M’s claim that “agents are the sources of causal effects because these effects are 
generated by the constraints that belong to their organization” (2015, p. 92). M&M argue that 
their account of self-maintenance as involving a certain kind of organization called “constraint 
closure” results in the emergence of causal powers (2015, p. 51). On their view, it is then these 
very causal powers that allow agents to initiate and determine their interactions with the 
environment. 
Only those systems that realize constraint closure have the kind of causal 
independence that counts as agency. Based on their definition, M&M argue that chemotactic 
bacteria and higher organisms, but not viruses, count as agents (2015, pp. 96–98). This is 
because whereas for bacteria like E. coli, the organization necessary to initiate complex 
interactions with the environment such as chemotaxis lies within their own self-maintained 
boundaries, viruses 
do not possess a constitutive organisation that is complex enough to perform 
agential capacities: they exhibit such capacities only insofar as they are 
integrated into much more complex systems (typically: cells) that are organised, 
in the specific sense that they realise a closure of constraints. (Moreno & Mossio, 
2015, p. 96) 
There are 5 main ways that the framework developed in this dissertation differs from 
that of M&M that are relevant for evaluating M&M’s account. 
First, unlike many authors (including M&M) that adopt self-maintenance-based 
accounts of agency, I do not consider the normativity of agency to be derived from the 
normativity of proper function. I argued in this chapter that agents are control systems, and 
their normativity derives from having a perspective on what states of affairs are under their 
control at what times. In Chapter 3, I considered and rejected the self-maintenance-based 
account of proper function and instead argued that the normativity of proper function is based 
on a system having a perspective on how its components (the “beta creatures”) are supposed 
to perform. In Section 4.5, I argued that control systems do not necessarily have this type of 
perspective; proper function normativity is orthogonal to control normativity. Having said that, 
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some forms of control do incorporate proper function normativity, for example in reinforcement 
learning, certain forms of strong goal-directedness, and the use of Kalman filters with forward 
models (on the latter, see Grush, 2009). In such forms of control, some component of the 
input/output mapping will have a certain role, and the control system then modulates the 
input/output mapping on the basis of whether that component is detected to have played that 
role correctly or not. This type of normativity is not essential to how I have defined agency in 
this chapter, however (though as a contingent matter, it may be present in all existing control 
systems that count as agents on my definition). 
Second, I do not consider the normativity of control to derive from self-maintenance. A 
system need not be self-maintaining to be an autonomous controller in the sense defined in 
Chapter 4. What makes a controller an autonomous controller is the fact that it operates with its 
own categorization scheme for sensory and control parameters, and its own mapping from 
sensory to control parameters. The system’s influencing of the control parameters need not 
result in self-maintenance. In fact, I argued in Section 3.3.3 that the attempt to ground a 
normative standard in self-maintenance fails due to generality problems. The account of control 
and agential normativity I am adopting here is instead internal perspectivalist, and so is not 
vulnerable to generality problems in the way that self-maintenance-based views are. 
Third, on the framework I have developed in this dissertation, the emergence of causal 
powers does not require constraint closure. In Chapter 2, I provided an account of the 
emergence of directional causal powers based on a certain kind of second-order structuring of 
constraints, but this structuring did not require a level of complexity remotely approaching 
autonomous self-maintenance or constraint closure. Similarly, as a fourth point, possession of 
active causal powers does not require agency on my view. I instead defined systems capable 
of realizing proper function, control, and agency in terms of mechanisms and their directional 
causal powers. Further, not all mechanisms are intrinsically normative: as I argued in Chapter 
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4, only those mechanisms that are observer-worker systems realize any kind of normative 
standard by themselves. 
Fifth, I don’t think that a system has to have a particular perspective on where its own 
boundaries begin and end in order to be an agent. Agents will often be capable of sensing both 
internal and external states (called interoception and exteroception), and will respond 
differently to internal states than to external states. Further, agents often respond differently to 
sensory features that are produced by a part its own body (for example, a dog whose vision is 
partly occluded by its snout does not behave as if an object is close to its face or getting in its 
way). But this does not require the agent to identify such internal states and body parts 
producing certain sensory effects as states of the same being, or to in any way identify that 
being as what does the controlling. In fact, most organisms likely have no perspective at all 
about their own “self” as a unified object distinct from its environment; they would not, for 
example, understand that the image they see in the mirror is identical to what is doing the 
seeing (or, the same dog that seems aware of its own snout may start chasing its tail). I do not, 
therefore, think that statement (1) lends support to a self-maintenance-based view, or to any 
view of agency as requiring the agent itself to have a perspective on where its own boundaries 
are. As I argued in Chapter 3, however, living biological systems do, in general, have such 
perspectives that are instead subagential and grounded in proper function normativity.95 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
95 Grush (2000) discusses the role of allocentric representation in model-based control, which may 
require registering the bodily “self” as an individual distinct from other individuals in one’s model. As 
Grush (2009, p. 311) points out, however, this type of representation does not necessarily constitute a 
perspective on where the boundaries of the agent itself lie. Such a perspective would arguably require the 
agent to attribute its own controlling activities to that bodily self, which would in turn involve much more 
sophisticated representational capacities. 
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5.6.5 Dretske 
 
According to Dretske (1999), an agent is a system that is capable of behavior caused 
by the system’s own internal representational states, such that the meaning of the internal 
states explains why they cause the behavior. Dretske argues that a control system like a 
thermostat is capable of behavior that is caused by an internal representational state. An 
internal component—in Dretske’s example, a bimetallic strip—represents whether or not the 
temperature rises above a certain threshold by whether or not it bends enough to complete an 
electric circuit, and the furnace turns on as a result. But Dretske argues that the thermostat is 
not an agent because  
The internal element whose degree of curvature means something is causally 
active, yes, but the fact that its curvature means something about temperature is 
not a fact about the cause that explains the effect. Meaning is there, but it is not 
doing anything. (1999, p. 23) 
In other words, it is the mere fact that the strip has bent enough to complete the circuit that 
causes the furnace to turn on, and this would occur even if the strip did not bear a 
representational relation to the temperature. For example, one could also bend the strip with a 
pair of pliers. Dretske argues, therefore, that the representational property of the strip does not 
explain why it turns the furnace on. 
Dretske acknowledges, however, that the representational capacity of the bimetallic 
strip “indirectly” explains why it was incorporated into the thermostat in the first place: 
Meaning explains – through us – why the cause is having this effect. It thus 
explains, indirectly, why the effect is occurring. We put the metallic strip there, we 
gave it that job to do, because of what its curvature means about the quantity 
(temperature) we want controlled. Given our purposes (to control room 
temperature), had the metallic strip's curvature not been a reliable indicator of 
temperature, it would not have been made into an electrical switch for the 
furnace. This internal element's curvature is causing what it does – and, thus, the 
thermostat is behaving the way it is – because this curvature means what it does. 
In this indirect way, then, meaning becomes explanatorily relevant. It achieves its 
relevance through us, the designers and makers of instruments. (1999, p. 24) 
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The key to focus on in this quotation is the claim that “we gave it that job to do.” In other words, 
it is only in the perspective of external observers that the component has its “job” of serving as 
a temperature-sensitive switch for the furnace. And it is only by virtue of its possession of this 
“job” that it becomes true to say that the meaning of the curvature explains the furnace’s 
turning on. 
By contrast, animals are capable of acquiring representational states in such a way that 
their behavior becomes explainable directly in terms of the meaning of those states. Dretske 
considers a case of devaluation similar to the one in Dickinson and Balleine’s experiment 
discussed earlier: 
A foraging bird tries to eat a Monarch butterfly. This butterfly has been reared on 
a toxic form of milkweed. Such butterflies are poisonous and cause birds to 
vomit. After one nasty encounter, the bird avoids butterflies that look like the one 
that made it sick. A day later our bird sees a tasty Viceroy, a butterfly with an 
appearance remarkably like that of the noxious Monarch. The Viceroy, though, is 
not poisonous. It has developed this coloration as a defense from predatory 
birds. It mimics the appearance of the Monarch so that birds will "think" that it, 
too, tastes nasty and avoid it. Our bird sees the Viceroy and flies away. (Dretske, 
1999, p. 27) 
In this case, Dretske argues, the bird’s representation of the butterfly has acquired a new 
meaning, a nonconceptual representation of something like “nasty tasting bug.” Having 
acquired this new meaning, the representation then causes the bird to avoid the butterfly. 
Dretske argues that unlike with the bimetallic strip, this representation is a case where the 
meaning directly explains the behavior; this explanatory role is not mediated by the 
perspective-taking of an external agent. Like Anscombe (1963, pp. 7–9), Dretske considers 
behavior explainable in terms of the agent’s own reasons to be the essential distinguishing 
characteristic of agency as opposed to other systems capable of behavior (like human-built 
thermostats). After learning from the previous experience of eating the Monarch, the bird now 
has its own reason for avoiding similar butterflies, and its behavior is “governed by” this reason 
(Dretske, 1999, p. 30). 
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Why, exactly, is the bird acting on its own reason, but not the thermostat? There is 
presumably something in the bird’s brain that is analogous to the bending of the bimetallic strip. 
One might argue that though the strip historically acquired its role in a different way from the 
bird’s representational state, it ultimately is playing a similar type of causal role in the moment 
that it is actually causing the behavior. Dretske also considers the possibility of an organism 
having representational states with a meaning acquired not through learning, but through 
natural selection. Dretske’s example here is the Scarlet Gilia, which changes its color from red 
to white at the same time each year, around mid-July. In this case, the plant possesses 
something like the bimetallic strip, a chemical clock that acts as a switch at the appropriate time 
of year. Dretske argues that such a feature may be the result of natural selection, so that the 
chemical clock has acquired the role it plays because of its ability to affect the flower’s behavior 
based on what it represents. But unlike the thermostat, the explanatory role of the clock’s 
representational contents is not mediated through an external observer.96 
Dretske argues that even if this natural selection story is true, and even if the plant’s 
changing colors can be construed as “behavior” caused by the chemical clock, the flower, 
unlike the animal, is not an agent, and the flower’s changing color, unlike the bird’s avoiding the 
Viceroy, is not an action. Dretske explains as follows: 
Unlike the thermostat and the plant, though, the meaning of the bird's internal 
representation (of the butterfly) is directly relevant to its behavior. Like the 
thermostat and the plant, this internal representation (call it R) has both a 
meaning and a causal role, but, unlike the instrument and the plant, its meaning 
explains its causal role. R is causing avoidance behavior, it was given that job to 
do, because it means that a butterfly of type M is present, the sort of object the 
bird, after its unpleasant experience, wants to avoid. So the causal story looks 
like this: an R which means M causes avoidance because it means M. A 
meaningful state is not only causing behavior (this was also true in the 
thermostat and the plant), its meaning explains why it is causing it. Meaning is 
thus explanatorily relevant to why the bird is behaving as it is. (1999, p. 29) 
                                                            
96 Arguably, “natural selection” should not be construed as something that has a determinate perspective; 
see Section 3.3.1. 
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Though Dretske does not emphasize it, the key part to focus on is the phrase “it was given that 
job to do, because… .” Again, what allows representational meaning to have a causal 
explanatory role is not merely that is has been given a job to do so, but who or what gave it that 
job. Ultimately, the point here is that like Moreno and most of the self-maintenance theorists 
about agency, Dretske is grounding the normativity of agency (i.e., the fact that agency 
involves behavior that is explainable in terms of the behaving system’s own reasons) in the 
normativity of proper functions. A representational state can have a meaning that serves as an 
agent’s own reason for acting only if this meaning is grounded in a “job”-possession 
perspective (i.e., a proper function perspective) that is internal to the agent. 
Thus, Dretske’s account of agency is centered around what amounts to an internal 
perspectivalist account of proper functions—not internal perspectivalism about proper functions 
across the board, but only about the kinds of proper functions that allow representational states 
to play the role of agential reasons. This explains why learning history is so important to 
Dretske’s account. The connection between reinforcement learning and internal 
perspectivalism about proper function can been seen by the fact that reinforcement learning is 
often described in terms of an “actor-critic” model, as Sutton and Barto explain: 
Actor–critic methods are TD [temporal-difference] methods that have a separate 
memory structure to explicitly represent the policy independent of the value 
function. The policy structure is known as the actor, because it is used to select 
actions, and the estimated value function is known as the critic, because it 
criticizes the actions made by the actor. Learning is always on-policy: the critic 
must learn about and critique whatever policy is currently being followed by the 
actor. The critique takes the form of a TD error. This scalar signal is the sole 
output of the critic and drives all learning in both actor and critic… (1998, p. 151) 
From this description it can easily be seen that reinforcement learning (at least on the actor-
critic model) involves the generation and enactment of proper function norms in just the way 
described in Section 3.5.3. The “actor” corresponds to what I referred to there as a “beta 
creature,” and the “critic” corresponds to an “alpha creature.” The actor-critic model is a little 
more sophisticated than the picture laid out in Chapter 3, however, because it provides a way 
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for the performance norms to shift over time, since the behavioral policy is independent of the 
“value function” (which itself might involve valuations of behavior outcomes). 
While many control systems will of course incorporate something like the actor-critic 
model as part of how their input/output mapping works, it is important to emphasize again that 
the basic normativity of control is distinct from proper function normativity (Section 4.5). Proper 
function normativity involves a perspective on what it is the job of some part of a larger system 
to do. Control normativity involves a perspective on how something should be influenced over 
time. While it may be reasonable to conclude that “alpha creatures” that do the censoring that 
partly realizes norms of proper function acts as a controller for a given beta creature, the 
resulting control norms are not identical to the proper function norms realized by the larger 
system that potentially includes many alpha creatures and many methods of censoring. 
Censoring can be an instance of control but the two should not be conflated. 
Further, I have argued that agency requires preferences, which involve a perspective 
on which some things can be under my control at some times but not at others. What it means 
for an agent to act on its own reasons is that such preferences are used in making choices, 
which then result in the behavior. This is not necessarily a proper function perspective: there 
doesn’t need to be anything like an “alpha creature” or a “critic” that, itself, has a perspective on 
how the belief and preference states are themselves supposed to function, or on what their 
“job” is. All that is required is that the system is organized such that they in fact play that role. 
While looking for something internal to animals that can realize a form of normativity not 
present in plants and machines, I believe that Dretske has fixed on a real form of normativity 
realized by an internal perspective, but not the form of normativity that is constitutive of animal 
agency.97 
 
                                                            
97 It is arguably also not a form of normativity exclusive to animal agents, since robotic control systems 
can be made to incorporate actor-critic-based reinforcement learning (e.g., Muse & Wermter, 2009). 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have offered an account of agency that is not meant to be the one true 
definition of agency, but instead intended to serve as a fairly demanding reference definition 
that other notions of agency can be defined in relation against. This account is built around the 
central idea that the capacity, not merely to behave in a functional or adaptive way, and not 
merely to make selections, but instead to make choices, is the feature that workers across 
various disciplines are most often interested when talking about agency as a distinct type of 
organization. I have introduced a set of terminology as follows: 
Agent. An agent is a control system whose input/output mapping incorporates 
preferences about objective states of affairs in order to make choices. 
Choosing (5.2.1). Choosing is making a selection of an objective state of affairs 
against other objective states of affairs, on the basis that the selected state of 
affairs is considered best from among the options. This requires representing 
state of affairs as objective states of affairs. 
Representing something as objective (5.2.2). Objective representation, i.e., 
representing states of affairs as states of affairs, involves having a perspective 
on something as being potentially under my control sometimes and not under my 
control at other times. 
Considering a state of affairs to be the best from among the options (5.2.3). 
What determines whether a state of affairs is being chosen based on its being 
considered to be the best is whether or not it is chosen because it is preferred 
over other states of affairs. 
Preference (5.2.3). A preference is a certain kind of modification to a control 
system’s input/output mapping. It is like an implicit rule (in the Sellarsian sense of 
“rule-governed behavior”; see Section 3.5.2) that is operative in a control system 
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that says that when presented with certain alternatives, one of them should be 
selected instead of the others (where ‘should’ is being used in the same razor-
thin sense in which the alpha creatures from Chapter 3 operate with an implicit 
rule that beta creatures “should” be censured under certain conditions). But it is 
an effective rule: while it has the preference, the preference is an operative part 
of the input/output mapping of the control system. Further, the alternatives to be 
selected between are states of affairs. Possession of this implicit rule requires 
that the control system must be able to recognize the presence of an alternative 
of states of affairs that can be selected between. 
Recognizing the presence of an alternative of states of affairs (5.2.4). This 
requires recognizing that several competing states of affairs as the outcomes of 
competing behaviors that could potentially be chosen. This in itself requires a set 
of capabilities that only certain control systems and organisms possess. Namely, 
the organism/control system must be capable of detecting the presence of some 
state of affairs S and of anticipating the fact that a certain behavior B1 will 
causally produce some state of affairs R1, and an alternate behavior (or lack of 
behavior) B2 will result in some state of affairs R2 (S might be identical to or 
represented as identical to R1 or R2, but R1 must be represented as distinct from 
R2 for one to be preferred, of course). It is then R1 and R2 that are directly 
compared, not B1 and B2. Either B1 or B2 is selected based on whether R1 or 
R2 is preferred. 
I have tried to show the place that a capacity for making choices occupies in a larger framework 
of capacities that includes other varieties of control, such as negative feedback, model-based 
control, weak and strong goal-directedness, and the possession of sub-agential motivational 
systems (a.k.a. “drive systems” or “motives”). I have also distinguished agential normativity from 
other types, such as basic selector normativity, proper function normativity, basic control 
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normativity, and the “actor-critic” normativity often involved in reinforcement learning. I have also 
defended the idea that agency, being a form of autonomous control, is grounded in the 
perspective of the system itself; an agent can have a perspective on states of affairs as being 
sometimes under its control and sometimes not. 
I then showed how “folk psychological” states such as preferences, beliefs, and desires 
emerge from such perspective-taking activity. The use of preferences in conjunction with such a 
sophisticated representational system as described in Section 5.2.4 is what makes “agential 
states” like beliefs and desires necessary. As explained in Section 5.3, beliefs and desires 
prevent the agent from having to hold all of its preferences “in memory” all the time, which would 
require brains to be much larger than they are. The function of beliefs and desires is to enable 
the generation of preferences that can support the above representational capabilities on the fly. 
In the next chapter, I build on this account by dividing intentions, beliefs, and desires into two 
classes: inclinational and committal, and show how committal agency builds on the foundations 
laid in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
Inclinational and Committal Agency 
 
That was the moment I made the decision. It was like I had stepped through a 
door and locked it behind me. 
—Capt. Benjamin Sisko, “In the Pale Moonlight,” Star Trek DS9  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Whereas non-human animals are generally limited to doing whatever they feel most 
inclined to do at a given moment, humans are distinguished by their ability to override these 
inclinations and instead act on their commitments (e.g., commitments to goals or to policies). 
An example of this might be a woman who acts on her psychologically internal commitment 
(expressed in ordinary speech as what she has “decided to do”) to going to work rather than 
her inclination (expressed in ordinary speech as what she “felt like doing”) to go to the beach. 
For this reason, Klein, Molloy, and Cooper write that “commitment is a fundamental concept for 
understanding human behavior” (2009, p. 3). Commitment—like the topics of the previous 
chapters: constraint, function, control, and agency—is a highly multidisciplinary concept. The 
notion of commitment has been thought to be indispensable for addressing philosophical topics 
such as 
• Free will (Holton, 2009) 
• The distinctiveness of human action (Bratman, 2000) 
• The self (Shoemaker, 2003) 
• Personhood (Bratman, 2000) 
• Akrasia (Shoemaker, 2003; Dodd, 2009) 
• Self-control (Henden, 2008) 
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• Rational choice theory (McClennan, 1990; Peter & Schmid, 2007) 
• The nature of concepts (Brandom, 2000) 
• Altruistic motivation (Sen, 2005) 
• Moral responsibility (Wolf, 1990) 
• Scientific knowledge (Polányi, 1958, Chapter 10) 
Further, commitment is a well-established construct in experimental psychology (Klein, Cooper, 
& Monahan, 2013; Allen, 2016; Klein & Park, 2016), and has been key to investigations into 
• The self (Lydon, 1996) 
• Well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Cantor & Sanderson, 1999) 
• Effectiveness of psychotherapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012) 
• Cognitive dissonance (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-
Jones, 2008) 
• Work motivation and organizational behavior (Locke & Latham, 1990; Klein, 
Becker, & Meyer, 2009; Meyer, 2016) 
• Decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977; Montgomery, 1998; Baron, 2007) 
• Emotional reactions (Klinger, 1987; Klinger & Cox, 2004) 
• Representation of expected hedonic reaction to stimuli (Sharot, 2012) 
• Perception (Lepora & Pezzulo, 2015) 
• Attention and cognitive priming (Gollwitzer, 1999; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Huang & Bargh, 2014) 
• Thematic content of thoughts and dreams (Klinger, 2013) 
• Human sociality and joint action (Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016). 
• Persuasion and social influence (Cialdini, 2009, Chapter 3) 
• Learning and educational outcomes (Morisano, 2013) 
• The psychology of religious beliefs, experiences, and practices (Hinde, 1999) 
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Commitment is also an important concept in artificial intelligence and robotics, where it has 
been employed in research into 
• Planning (Wooldridge, 2009) 
• Communication (Chopra & Singh, 2013) 
• Reasoning (Yolum & Singh, 2002) 
• Cooperation and coordination between multiple agents (Jennings, 1993; 
Tweedale et al., 2007) 
• Human-robot interactions (Curioni, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2016) 
Commitment is clearly of high importance for understanding many facets of agency across 
various disciplines.98 But the same could be said about other concepts that are connected to 
agency, such as emotion, cognition, and consciousness. Why, then, devote an entire chapter 
to commitment, as opposed to these other topics? The reason is that commitment is the key 
architectural feature that brings with it a crucial new kind of agential perspective: the agent’s 
own agency becomes one of the things that the agent can view as either under its control or 
not under its control in various ways at various times. The kind of perspective introduced in 
Chapter 5 then becomes applied to the agent itself in a recursive manner, as will become clear 
as the chapter proceeds. 
In what follows I will refer to agents that are capable of acting on inclinations but not 
commitments as inclinational agents, and to agents that are capable of forming and acting on 
commitments as committal agents. Both inclinational agents and committal agents have the 
capacity for inclinational agency, but only committal agents have the capacity for committal 
agency. The discussion of agency in the previous chapter did not distinguish between 
inclinational and committal agency. The reference definition of agency I provided was intended 
                                                            
98 Neuroscientists generally don’t talk about ‘commitment’ per se, but they often investigate related 
phenomena under the rubric of “cognitive control” or “executive functions” (see Section 6.5). 
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to be neutral with respect to this distinction; inclinational and committal agents are both kinds of 
agents, but the account in Chapter 5 will be more directly applicable to inclinational agents, 
which generally have a simpler architecture. In this chapter, I will explain why commitment is 
necessary for understanding agency in many contexts and provide an account of what sets 
committal agency apart from inclinational agency. 
In Section 6.2, I explain why an account of agents like humans requires a notion of 
commitment. Here, I rely primarily on Bratman’s (1987) account. Bratman’s discussion of 
commitment is mostly limited to how it figures in intentions; in Section 6.3, I explain why 
agential states in general, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and preferences, actually divide 
into two kinds: committal and inclinational. In Section 6.4, I turn to the question of how 
committal states are related to inclinational states and critically examine how some other 
philosophers answer this question. In Section 6.5, I offer some gestures towards a novel 
mechanistic account of how they might be related, drawing from Grush’s emulator theory. 
Section 6.6 concludes by considering the sense in which the present account can be classified 
as internal perspectivalist. 
 
6.2 The Importance of Commitment for Future-Directed Intentions 
 
6.2.1 Why Future-Directed Intentions Are Not Reducible to Beliefs and Desires 
 
In the previous chapter, I described agency as a kind of control system. Like any control 
system, there are input or sensory parameters, and there are control parameters. There is also 
a functional mapping between the two. With agents, this functional mapping is very 
sophisticated, and involves preferences. To act on preferences, the agent must have beliefs, 
and must be able to form intentions based on its beliefs and preferences. Desires can cause 
preferences, and vice versa. My preference for IPAs over lagers may result in a desire for an 
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IPA when I am presented with a choice between the two. My desire for an IPA may then lead 
me to prefer drinking out of a tulip class instead of a tall and narrow one. As discussed in 
Section 5.3.3, desires also play a coordinating role between beliefs and intentions. As relevant 
beliefs are updated, the desire causes intentions to be updated in real time. What if there are 
multiple desires that would result in a conflict if I tried to act on them simultaneously? Other 
things being equal, the stronger desire will generally “win out.” The agent will act on the 
strongest desire, and not on other conflicting desires. Desires are often generated by 
motivational systems (Section 4.6.3.4) combined with associations formed through reward-
based learning. 
This is a simplified picture of agency that is often useful for characterizing animal 
behavior. Something like this picture of agency as dominated by beliefs and desires has often 
presupposed by philosophers of action. However, Michael Bratman has argued that this picture 
of agency is highly problematic when applied to humans, because it cannot properly 
accommodate the existence of future-directed intentions, something that was not addressed in 
the previous chapter.99 
It is not hard to see that we appeal to future-directed intentions when explaining the 
behavior of agents. On Monday I informed you of my intention to go to Los Angeles on 
Thursday. A week later, after hearing that I did indeed go to Los Angeles on Thursday, you will 
feel satisfied that you can explain why I did so. If you hear that I went to Los Angeles on 
Wednesday instead, you will feel that an explanation is called for. Why would an intention 
formed on Monday explain behavior on Thursday but not the same behavior on Wednesday? 
Philosophers have made a number of attempts to analyze future-directed intentions in 
terms of beliefs, desires, and the resulting present-directed intentions; Bratman includes 
Goldman, Anscombe, and Davidson (in earlier writings) on this list. Perhaps we should say that 
                                                            
99 For a review of literature on the capacities and limits of “future-thinking” in non-human animals, see 
Redshaw and Bulley (2018). 
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my desire on Monday to go to Los Angeles was sustained for the next four days, and resulted 
in a present-directed intention to go on Thursday. But why did this desire only result in behavior 
on Thursday? Why didn’t it cause me to go to L.A. on Monday? In answer to this question, we 
might suppose that the desire that was formed on Monday was for a temporally-indexed state 
of affairs: the situation of my being in L.A. on Thursday. This is tantamount to my having said to 
you on Monday, “What I want most is to go to L.A. on Thursday.” 
But can a desire that I had on Monday really cause me to go to L.A. on Thursday? 
Suppose that on Thursday I said “I don’t feel any desire to go to L.A. today. But on Monday I 
did feel such a desire. So I’m going to L.A.” This would not make any sense. Bratman argues, 
based on considerations like this, that future-directed intentions are a very different kind of 
psychological state than ordinary beliefs and desires. They are different because, unlike 
ordinary beliefs and desires of the kind that have been discussed so far, future-directed 
intentions involve commitment.100 
In ordinary discussion contexts, one might say “On Monday I made a choice to go to 
L.A. today, and that’s why I’m going, even though I don’t feel the desire to go that I felt on 
Monday.” There is a way in which this might seem to make sense, and a way in which it might 
not. Of course, once Thursday came around, one could choose at that point not to go to L.A., 
regardless of the choice that was made on Monday. In this sense, only the choice made on 
Thursday matters. On the other hand, sometimes when making a choice we simultaneously 
commit to that choice, which indicates the voluntary adoption of some kind of self-constraint. 
What is the nature of this self-constraint? 
Before diving into this question, it is important to be clear about a couple of distinctions. 
First, Bratman differentiates between interpersonal and intrapersonal commitment. Sometimes 
these are referred to as social versus psychological commitments, or public versus private 
                                                            
100 Cohen (1992, p. 47) similarly distinguishes between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, which he 
claims do not involve commitment, and “having an intention” on the other, which does. 
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commitments. An interpersonal commitment is a commitment that one person makes to 
another, as in a promise. The second person may then hold the first person accountable for 
carrying out their promise. But this is not the same thing as an intrapersonal commitment. 
Often, one will make both kinds of commitment at the same time: one will internally constrain 
oneself to keeping a promise made to someone else. But an intrapersonal commitment does 
not require that one share one’s commitment with anyone else. 
Another important distinction is between external versus internal constraints on 
behavior. One may make a promise to others about their own behavior in order to add an 
external incentive that will reinforce their own behavior. Bratman provides another example, of 
“making a side bet with someone else that one will not gamble later on” (1987, p. 12). Such 
external constraints (called “precommitments” by Elster, 1979) do not have to involve other 
people: to prevent myself giving in to the temptation of eating too much junk food later, I might 
decide not to buy any while at the store. In discussing the kind of commitment involved in 
future-directed intention, Bratman is concerned with commitment that is both intrapersonal and 
internal in the sense that such constraint is not mediated by changes in one’s external 
environment.101 Similarly, McClennan argues that an account of rational agency must include a 
notion of commitment understood as the capacity for “endogenous preference changes” (1990, 
p. 215). 
 
6.2.2 The Nature of Commitment-Based Self-Constraint 
 
On Bratman’s view, future-directed intention involves intrapersonal, internal self-
constraint in two important senses: he refers to these as the “volitional dimension” and the 
                                                            
101 Frankish refers to such intrapersonal and internal commitments as “effective commitments” (2004, p. 
74n). 
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“reason-centered dimension” of commitment. By the “volitional dimension,” Bratman means 
that intentions are, like desires, capable of initiating and energizing behavior.102 In other words, 
intentions have motivational “oomph” (see Section 5.3.3). Bratman’s way of putting this is to 
say that intentions and desires are both “pro-attitudes” (1987, p. 16). But here, Bratman argues 
that we must distinguish between two kinds of pro-attitudes. Whereas ordinary desires are 
“merely potential influencers” of action, intentions are “conduct-controlling” pro-attitudes. 
Bratman provides the following example: 
suppose I desire a milk shake for lunch, recognize that the occasion is here, and 
am guilty of no irrationality. Still, I might not drink a milk shake; for my desire for a 
milk shake still needs to be weighed against conflicting desires—say, my desire 
to lose weight. My desire for a milk shake potentially influences what I do at 
lunchtime. But in the normal course of events I still might not even try to drink a 
milk shake. In contrast, suppose that this morning I formed the intention to have 
a milk shake at lunch, lunchtime arrives, my intention remains, and nothing 
unexpected happens. In such a case I do not normally need yet again to tote up 
the pros and cons concerning milk-shake drinking. Rather, in the normal course 
of events I will simply proceed to execute (or, anyway, try to execute) my 
intention and order a milk shake. My intention will not merely influence my 
conduct, it will control it. (1987, p. 16) 
The desire, then, will have the power to influence my behavior but may be in competition with 
other desires that may cause hesitation at the moment of action. A committed intention, on the 
other hand, will be much more robust in the face of competing desires. It will drive one’s 
behavior without one needing to again consult one’s desires. 
Commitment also has a “reason-centered” dimension. If on Monday I form an intention 
to go to L.A. on Thursday, I will typically not continue to deliberate about whether to go to L.A. 
As Bratman writes, “my intention resists reconsideration: it has a characteristic stability or 
inertia … Lacking new considerations I will normally simply retain my intention up to the time of 
action” (1987, p. 16). Merely being confronted with competing, desirable options will not, by 
                                                            
102 For an overview of empirical evidence of this aspect of intentional commitment, see Gollwitzer and 
Oettingen (2011). 
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itself, cause me to reconsider my intention; opening up my intention to reconsideration at all 
requires persuasion. 
Further, committed intentions are normally taken for granted in one’s reasoning 
processes. I may treat it as a foregone conclusion that I will go to L.A. on Thursday, so if a 
friend wants to meet with me in L.A. on that day, I feel free to form the intention to do so since I 
feel that the issue of whether I will be in L.A. on that day is resolved. Having a committed 
intention frees my cognitive resources up so that they can be allocated to deliberating about 
the means of executing my intention (e.g., what form of transportation to use, or what route to 
take). It will also constrain the formation of other intentions: I will not make other intentions that 
are inconsistent with going to L.A. on Thursday, like spending the day at the San Diego Zoo.103 
Bratman argues that our ability to deliberate about and coordinate our activities, not 
only with our future selves but with other people, requires that we have the capacity for pro-
attitudes with the above characteristics. Unlike other animals, humans are planning agents that 
need to be able to treat plans as settled without fear of our momentary desires interfering, and 
without having to continually hold all of the considerations that led to the formation of such 
plans in mind. 
There is an additional sense, considered by Pepper (1958, pp. 79–84), in which a form 
of commitment is widespread in (non-human) animal behavior. Pepper discusses the fact that 
the strength of the energization of a given behavior will depend on not only on the strength of 
the underlying desire or drive, but also on the strength of the evidence that such behavior is 
based on: 
An animal typically gives less than his full commitment to an act when there is a 
conflicting alternative. In a dangerous situation an animal may move gingerly 
toward its goal. A dog with a bone moves past another dog with great 
circumspection. The dog is acting on the evidences of the total situation, and 
commits himself to the drive for depositing his bone only so far as he believes 
                                                            
103 For overviews of empirical findings bearing out what Bratman refers to as the “reason-centered 
dimension” of commitment, see Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2008), Cialdini (2009, Chapter 3), 
and Klinger (2013). 
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safe. There is an implicit judgment here with inertial commitment (which I think, 
we should agree in this instance, happens to be also intelligent). This instance 
shows clearly that animals can express doubt in their behavior. The doubt arises 
from conflicting impulses which inhibit the full discharge into the dominant drive. 
(1958, p. 83) 
This is an important sense of “commitment,” but it is different from the sense that Bratman is 
interested in. Commitment in Bratman’s sense is not something that happens automatically as 
a result of momentary appraisal of evidentiary strength or potential for desire/drive satisfaction, 
but is instead the introduction of a pro-attitude that can override or modulate these momentary 
appraisals. An animal’s automatic updating of momentary beliefs and desires104 will of course 
act as a form of self-constraint, but not in the sense of overriding or controlling the animal’s 
future momentary impressions and passions. In the rest of this chapter, I will be focused on 
commitment in Bratman’s sense.105 
 
6.3 Commitment as Not Limited to Intentions 
 
6.3.1 Committal versus Inclinational Desires 
 
Bratman generally describes intentions (especially future-directed intentions) as 
involving commitment, and desires as not involving commitment (in fact, Bratman refers to first-
                                                            
104 As de Sousa poignantly put it, “Bayesian decision theory is applicable to dumb animals” (1971, p. 57). 
105 For Polányi, these types of commitment are positions along a larger continuum: 
 
I have suggested before that in a generalized sense commitment may be acknowledged 
even at the vegetative level, since it is of the essence of a living organism that each part 
relies for its function, and for its very meaning as part of the organism, on the presence 
and proper functioning of a number of other parts. ... Commitment may then be graded 
by steps of increasing consciousness; namely, from primordial, vegetative commitment 
of a centre of being, function and growth, to primitive commitment of the active-
perceptive centre, and hence further again, to responsible commitments of the 
consciously deliberating person. (1958, p. 363) 
 
Examples of what Polányi calls “vegetative commitment” might include the process by which a bacterium 
“decides” to sporulate (Stephens, 1998) or the processes by which embryonic cells become irreversibly 
constrained to a certain developmental fate (Gilbert & Barresi, 2018, pp. 30–32). 
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order desires as “inclinations” at 2000, p. 38). But other authors have argued that in fact, 
desires break down into two kinds: ones that involve commitment, and ones that do not. 
According to Daveney (1961), there are at least three ways in which the word ‘want’ is used. 
He divides these into “intentional” wanting, “contemplative” wanting, and “inclinational” wanting. 
For example, suppose someone asks me why I am buying a train ticket, and I answer “because 
I want to go to L.A. on Thursday.” Daveney argues that in cases like this, ‘want’ is used 
synonymously with ‘intend’. In other cases, however, it is clear that ‘want’ and ‘intend’ can 
come apart. Daveney gives the following example: “Mr. Smith doesn’t intend to go to the 
meeting because his enemy Jones will be there, although he wants to go.” In this case, 
Daveney argues, the speaker is saying that Smith would go to the meeting under certain 
circumstances, in this case if Jones were not going. Daveney argues that ‘want’ here indicates 
a conditional intention, and he refers to these as cases of “contemplative wanting”: 
One may speak therefore of ‘want’ in the sense of an intention in cold storage, 
awaiting the occurrence of suitable circumstances. I call this sense of ‘want’ 
“wanting in contemplation”, simply because one contemplates what is wanted 
and is not engaged in its active pursuit. And the statement “I want …” I call an 
expression of conditional intention, as certain conditions have to be fulfilled 
before the agent is said to have the intention. This is quite different from “I intend 
to do so and so, if such and such occurs”, for here the intention is not conditional; 
it would be true to say the agent had the intention here and now, but the action 
he intends is conditional upon certain circumstances being fulfilled. By stretching 
the language a little it might be said that my conditional intention is what the 
agent would intend if certain conditions were fulfilled. But we don’t say “would 
intend”. We say “want”. (1961, p. 138) 
Note that in Daveney’s example, there is not an existing intention that is overridden by a desire 
to avoid Jones. But Smith yet has an existing psychological state of being committed (in 
Bratman’s sense) to going if Jones isn’t there, and not if Jones is there. 
Daveney distinguishes this from a third sense that he calls “inclinational wanting.” In this 
sense, it is possible to want to go to the dentist (in the contemplative sense) but to not want to 
go (in the inclinational sense). I may not feel any tooth pain, and I may (like many people) 
generally consider dentist appointments to be unpleasant. But I may also reason that it is in my 
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best interest to go to the dentist every so often. I therefore decide that I want to go to the 
dentist sometime. But this decision does not, by itself, yield an intention to go. I have not 
committed myself to going to any particular dentist (suppose I just moved to a new town) or to 
any particular timeframe for when I will go. This seems to correspond to Daveney’s 
“comtemplative wanting,” since I do not yet have an intention to go to the dentist, but I will 
when certain conditions are fulfilled. Perhaps at some point, after meeting some new people 
and asking them about local dentists, I will form such an intention. “Inclinational wanting,” on 
the other hand, is a desire that is not the result of any such contemplation or commitment, but 
is instead the result of my momentary perceptual evidence, unconscious associations, feelings, 
urges, drives, etc. (i.e., my inclinations). 
Something like Daveney’s distinction between two kinds of ‘wanting’ seems to be 
operative in Watson (1975, p. 209) as well (though Watson reserves the term ‘desire’ for what 
Daveney calls “inclinational wanting”). Davis (1984) similarly distinguishes between “volitive” 
desires and “appetitive” desires. Whereas appetitive desires (corresponding roughly to 
“inclinational wanting”) generally are accompanied with a physical urge or are associated with 
feelings of pleasure, volitive desires (corresponding to “contemplative wanting”) are typically 
“based on reasons,” by which Davis means that we typically have reasons consciously in mind 
for why we have the desire in question. Davis points out not only how volitive desires can come 
apart from appetitive desires, but also how they play a similar reason-centered constraining 
role to Bratman’s intentions. Davis gives the example of someone who is asked “whether he 
wants to play tennis or golf at noon today,” and then responds: “I desire to do both.” This 
response makes sense if ‘desire’ is used in the appetitive sense, but not if ‘desire’ is used in 
the volitive sense. A volitive desire will typically constrain other reasoning and planning 
processes as well, even though it may not yet represent an intention (e.g., committing to a 
desire to play tennis instead of golf would not yet be tantamount to an intention to play tennis). 
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In what follows, I will adopt Daveney’s term and refer to psychological states that do not 
involve commitment in Bratman’s sense as “inclinational”; I will refer to states that do involve 
such commitment as “committal.”106 Instead of talking in terms of “ordinary desires” (Bratman’s 
term), “inclinational wanting,” or “appetitive desires,” I will refer to inclinational desires. Instead 
of talking in terms of “contemplative wanting” or “volitive desires,” I will refer to committal 
desires. 
Thomas Nagel also drew a distinction between two kinds of desires, which he called 
“motivated” and “unmotivated” desires. As seen in the following passage, his “motivated” 
desires correspond to committal desires, and his “unmotivated” desires correspond to 
inclinational desires: 
many desires, like many beliefs, are arrived at by decision and after deliberation. 
They need not simply assail us, though there are certain desires that do, like the 
appetites and in certain cases the emotions. The same is true of beliefs, for 
often, as when we simply perceive something, we acquire a belief without 
arriving at it by decision. The desires which simply come to us are unmotivated 
though they can be explained. (1970, p. 29) 
In fact, in Bratman’s later work, he himself appears to make room for a kind of contemplative or 
volitive desire, writing that “to identify with a desire to A one needs actually to decide to treat 
that desire as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning and planning concerning some 
relevant circumstances” (1996, p. 197). Further, “One treats one's desire as reason-giving 
when one treats it as setting an end that can to some extent justify means and/or preliminary 
steps” (1996, p. 198). This would seem difficult to do consistently if one were not able to 
commit to it in a similar way to how one commits to an intention.  
 
6.3.2 Committal versus Inclinational Beliefs 
                                                            
106 Gollwitzer similarly used the word ‘noncommittal’ to refer to inclinational desires: “By forming goal 
intentions. people translate their noncommittal desires into binding goals. The consequence of having 
formed a goal intention is a sense of commitment that obligates the individual to realize the goal” (1999, 
p. 494). 
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As seen in the above quotation, Nagel also seems to allow for a distinction between 
committal beliefs and inclinational beliefs. de Sousa (1971) similarly distinguished between 
Bayesian belief, which does not involve commitment, and “belief proper,” or “acceptance,” 
which does (cf. van Fraassen, 1980, p. 88; Lehrer, 1989, p. 26). Instead of saying that belief 
proper involves commitment, however, de Sousa says that it involves assent. Similarly, 
Dennett (1978) argued that we should distinguish between beliefs and opinions. He uses 
‘belief’ to denote the type of attitude, common among both humans and non-human animals, 
that is basically an impression or seeming that is currently guiding one’s actions. Dennett 
follows de Sousa in appealing to the notion of assent to distinguish between the two kinds of 
attitude: For Dennett, what separates opinions and beliefs is that unlike beliefs, opinions 
involve assent. One makes up one’s mind to have an opinion, but not to have a belief, because 
making up one’s mind results in assent. Dennett points out that it is possible to have a belief p 
that guides one’s actions, without knowing that one has that belief that p. But this is very 
different from having decided that p, believing p on the basis of deliberation. This latter sort of 
belief, Dennett argues, is on the contrary “something rather like commitment, rather like 
ownership” (1978, p. 303). Similarly, Baier (1979) distinguishes between what she calls 
“beliefs” on the one hand—which she says involve commitment—and what she calls mere 
“cognitive states,” “registrations,” or “Bayesian beliefs” on the other hand, which do not involve 
commitment.107 
These authors are not alone in forming a conception of a belief-like attitude that 
involves commitment. Brandom (1994, p. 157; cf. Polányi, 1958, p. 28) in fact defines belief as 
a doxastic commitment, and he argues that it is because belief can involve commitment, that 
beliefs can play the kind of role that they do play in our deliberations and reasoning. In this 
                                                            
107 Baier’s notion of ‘registration’ is drawn from Bennett (1976, p. 56). Dennett (1978) is actually a 
response to an earlier draft of Baier (1979). 
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way, Brandom gives a similar role to commitment to that given by Bratman, although Bratman 
is concerned with commitments involved in intentions, not beliefs. For Dennett, whereas mere 
beliefs can be spontaneously generated through perception or introspection, one must be 
persuaded or convinced to assent to an opinion. 
It is important to note at this point that Dennett’s distinction between belief and opinion, 
which roughly maps onto de Sousa’s distinction between belief and acceptance, is not the 
same distinction that Railton discusses between belief and acceptance. In “Normative 
Guidance,” Railton writes: 
Although acceptance, like belief, can arise spontaneously, acceptance is much 
more amenable to volition and purpose, and hence more directly subject to 
decision. We do sometimes speak of deciding whether to believe p, but this is 
equivalent to making up our mind whether p. That is, the focus is on the question 
whether p—whether p is supported by the balance of evidence, intuitively 
plausible, etc.—while ignoring collateral effects attributable to the state of mind of 
believing that p. In contrast, deciding whether to accept p often is not equivalent 
to making up our mind whether p, and the decision typically focuses not only on 
whether p, but also on the costs and benefits of accepting or failing to accept p in 
the present context, many of which enjoy some independence from p’s truth. 
(2006, p. 17) 
So what we really have are three attitudes on the table: Dennett’s ‘belief’, Dennett’s ‘opinion’ 
(which corresponds to Railton’s ‘belief’ and de Sousa’s ‘acceptance’), and Railton’s 
‘acceptance’ (which also appears to correspond to Stalnaker’s (1984, pp. 79–81), Cohen’s 
(1986, pp. 91–97), and Bratman’s (1992) usage).108 Dennett’s notion of ‘opinion’, like Railton’s 
notion of ‘belief’, involves making up one’s mind whether p, so it is similarly non-amenable to 
volition109 and purpose and represents a reason-centered commitment in Bratman’s sense. We 
do not form opinions for specific purposes in specific contexts, just as Railton points out that we 
do not form beliefs for specific purposes in specific contexts. But we do sometimes accept 
                                                            
108 For other references to similar usages of ‘acceptance’, see Frankish (2004, p. 81). Frankish (2004, p. 
124) refers to ‘acceptance’ in de Sousa’s sense as “doxastic acceptance”, and to acceptance in Railton’s 
sense as “non-doxastic acceptance.” Frankish also refers to doxastic acceptances as “superbeliefs.” 
109 Whether or not committal beliefs, or ‘opinions’ in Dennett’s sense, are under voluntary control (a thesis 
sometimes called doxastic voluntarism) is a matter of debate; see Vitz (2008). 
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propositions for specific purposes in specific contexts (e.g., accepting a statement for sake of 
argument). In what follows, I will use ‘committal belief’ as synonymous with Dennett’s ‘opinion’, 
and ‘inclinational belief’ as synonymous with Dennett’s ‘belief’110 and Baier’s mere 
‘registration’.111 
 
6.3.3 Committal versus Inclinational Intentions 
 
We saw that while Bratman described ordinary (i.e., inclinational) desires as potential 
influencers of behavior, he characterized intentions as “conduct-controlling” states that involve 
commitment. However, whereas Bratman is clearly concerned with committal intentions (as are 
many social psychologists such as Gollwitzer), other authors have argued for what we might 
call inclinational intentions. For example, McFarland writes, 
By intention I mean that there is an explicit (mental) goal-representation which is 
in some way instrumental in controlling the behaviour of the animal, or person. 
Thus if I have an intention to write the following sentence, then I have a mental 
representation of the goal-to-be-achieved, and this representation is instrumental 
in controlling my behaviour, in the sense that my progress in achieving the goal is 
compared with my representation of the goal. This is close to the everyday usage 
of this term, and different from the current usage of some philosophers. (1989, p. 
124) 
McFarland’s usage corresponds more closely to how ‘intention’ was used in the previous 
chapter, and does not involve commitment in Bratman’s sense (although it does involve 
commitment in Pepper’s much thinner sense above). In McFarland’s sense, desires in general 
that result in behavior will do so by means of a mediating intention. The distinction here 
corresponds to Pacherie’s (2008) distinction between proximal intentions (which are present-
directed and do not involve commitment) and distal intentions (which are future-directed and 
                                                            
110 Though my usage of ‘inclinational belief’ will not carry with it Dennett’s instrumentalism about 
psychological states. 
111 Gendler’s (2008) ‘alief’ seems to be a subclassification of what I am calling ‘inclinational belief’. Price 
(1969, pp. 205–206) refers to ‘inclination’ in describing the stages of belief-formation before one has 
made up one’s mind, and uses the word ‘commit’ for when one’s belief becomes settled.  
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involve commitment). Carruthers (2007) similarly draws from dual process theory (Wason & 
Evans, 1974; Evans & Over, 1996) to distinguish between “System 1 intentions” and “System 2 
intentions.” Holton provides an example of what he takes to be a System 1 intention: “Seeing 
the stationary traffic ahead I form the intention to change lane, and start scanning the mirror for 
an opportunity to do so. If you ask me what I am doing I can tell you, but I have given no 
conscious thought to the matter” (2009, p. 53). Shpall distinguishes between “partial 
intentions,” which he characterizes as “mental states of being inclined to act,” on the one hand, 
and “full or outright intentions, which, as traditionally conceived, are mental states of being 
settled on acting” (2016, p. 817). Chang (2013) also distinguishes between non-committed 
intentions and commitments, arguing that the content of intentions often comes apart from the 
content of commitments that lead to such intentions. I will refer to intentions without 
commitment as “inclinational intentions,” and intentions with commitment (i.e., intentions in 
Bratman’s sense) as “committal intentions.” 
 
6.3.4 Committal versus Inclinational Preferences and Choices 
 
According to some authors, both preferences and choices can themselves be divided 
into two categories: some preferences involve commitment while some do not, and some 
choices result in commitment while some do not. First, preferences: Andreou (2007) 
distinguishes between “given preferences” and “chosen preferences.” Whereas given 
preferences are preferences that “an agent can just find herself with,” chosen preferences “can 
be conceived of as a system of ranking that the agent commits to in light of her preferences in 
the first sense and her choice situation” (2007, p. 119). Andreou uses this distinction to address 
a puzzle about how rational people can form intransitive preferences: rationality dictates that 
one form intentions that are consistent with one’s chosen preferences, not one’s given 
preferences. Similarly, Weirich argues that there is a sense in which preferences can arise as a 
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result of deliberation and making up one’s mind, but denies that such preferences can be 
voluntarily chosen: 
The formation of the preferences is a response to deliberation and not an act of 
will, in contrast to a choice resting on the preferences. Forming preferences after 
deliberation resembles believing the conclusion of an argument that one sees is 
valid and that has premises one believes. The belief arises because of the 
cogency of the argument and not because of an act of will. Similarly, preferences 
arise because of the force of deliberations and not because of an act of will. 
(2013, p. 4043) 
Experimental work also suggests a functional differentiation between committed and 
non-committed choices. For example, Polman and Russo (2012) demonstrate that when 
commitment to a preference is strengthened, without in any way altering the content of the 
preference or the subject’s evaluation of the preferred option, this can lead to a difference in 
how the subject later processes information relevant to the preference. 
Acts of choice, themselves, may be differentiated based on whether they result in the 
formation of a commitment. In some contexts, the word ‘decision’ is used to distinguish choices 
that result in a commitment (e.g., Frankfurt, 1988, p. 172; Shadlen & Kiani, 2013). Sen argued 
that economic theory must incorporate a distinction between choices that do not, and choices 
that do, result in commitment, writing that “commitment does involve, in a very real sense, 
counterpreferential choice, destroying the crucial assumption that a chosen alternative must be 
better than (or at least as good as) the others for the person choosing it” (1977, p. 328). Rather 
than following from one’s preferences, Sen wrote, commitment is “closely connected with one’s 
morals” (ibid., p. 329). One way to understand Sen’s point is to assume that by “preferences” 
Sen is referring to one’s inclinational preferences, whereas one’s “morals” may be partly 
constituted by committal preferences.112 
 
                                                            
112 Chang (2017) argues that reasons themselves break down into two kinds: “given reasons” and “will-
based reasons.” For Chang, will-based reasons, but not given reasons, derive from commitments. In the 
present terminology we might then refer to this as a distinction between inclinational reasons and 
committal reasons. 
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6.4 How are Inclination and Commitment Related? 
 
Though different authors use different terminology, there is widespread consensus that 
commitment is crucial for agency at least in humans, and that commitments have motivating 
force, effects on cognition, and normative force (in terms of reasoning, planning, etc.).113 
Different kinds of psychological states (not just commitments) can be characterized in terms of 
the degree to which they have the dispositional nature and normative force of inclinations or of 
commitments. But there has been little consensus about how the relation between inclinations 
and commitments should be characterized. I first consider several prominent positions on how 
they are related, before turning to my own emulator-based account.  
 
6.4.1 Commitment as Robust Inclination 
 
We saw that one usage of ‘commitment’, that of Pepper, might be reflected by the 
strength of the evidence that an animal takes itself to be acting on, or the intensity of the desire 
in question. This might lead to the suggestion that the degree of commitment simply 
corresponds to the degree of inclination. An animal that is more thirsty may have a stronger 
inclination to find water, and might also be said to be more committed to the goal of finding 
water. But this does not reflect Bratman’s understanding of commitment. For Bratman, the 
whole point of a committed intention is that it can persist and control your behavior even after 
the inclination to perform the action has waned, or after competing inclinations have become 
present. For Bratman, commitment can remain stable in spite of what happens to your 
inclinations. This is reflected in others’ accounts of committal desires, committal beliefs, and 
                                                            
113 Though O’Shaughnessy (1980, p. 546) distinguishes between “cognitive commitments,” which result 
from a decision whether a proposition is true, and “practical commitments,” which result from a decision 
whether to do something. 
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committal preferences. Commitment can override the inclinational versions of such states, 
allowing for greater control and coordination of one’s reasoning and activities.114 
But at the same time, commitment and inclination are not completely independent of 
one another. Commitment raises the threshold that must be met for inclinations to interfere, but 
strong enough inclinations can overcome commitments. Further, the fact that one has 
committed to an intention, belief, desire, or preference, may not imply a very high threshold. 
We have all observed cases of a person’s commitment being very brittle; sometimes such 
people are characterized as “gullible,” “influenceable,” “fickle,” or “capricious.” Sometimes the 
degree of commitment may be high, but the person’s effectiveness of self-control may be more 
compromised (i.e., they thoroughly identify with their commitments but are weak-willed). Here 
again we see the distinction, discussed in Section 4.5, between degree of effectiveness of 
control and degree of control. 
 
6.4.2 Commitment as Higher-Order Inclination 
 
Another way that committal psychological states are often characterized is as being 
second-order versions of inclinational states (e.g., Ryle, 1949, p. 97). For example, committal 
desires might be understood as the (inclinational) desire to have a certain (inclinational) desire. 
I may have a committed desire to quit smoking cigarettes but lack the inclinational desire to do 
so (i.e., I am still inclined to smoke cigarettes). A natural way to understand my committal 
desire, on this view, would be that I have an (inclinational) desire to be inclined to quit smoking. 
Something like this thought lies behind Frankfurt’s (1971) earlier “hierarchical” theory of willing 
and commitment. 
                                                            
114 Chang (2013, p. 84) provides another argument against treating commitment as a special kind of 
inclination: whereas you can decide to take on a commitment, you cannot decide to take on an inclination. 
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This approach has been criticized, however, by Watson (1975), Bratman (2000), and 
Frankfurt himself (1988). Frankfurt acknowledges Watson’s point that merely having a second-
order desire does not by itself confer a normative force or stability distinct from first-order 
desires to rise beyond the status of an inclination: 
The mere fact that one desire occupies a higher level than another in the 
hierarchy seems plainly insufficient to endow it with greater authority or with any 
constitutive legitimacy. … Gary Watson has formulated the issue succinctly: 
“Since second-order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add them to the 
context of conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give a 
special place to any of those in contention.” (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 166; Watson, 
1975, p. 218) 
Also, the fact that a desire (or belief, or intention) is second-order would not by itself explain 
other features that Bratman argued are essential to commitments, such as the fact that 
commitments are resistant to reconsideration and tend to have a greater inertia than 
inclinations. 
 
6.4.3 Commitment as Evaluative Judgment with Independent Motivating Force 
 
Watson (1975) instead argues that commitments should be construed, not along the 
lines of desires or intentions, but instead as evaluative judgments. When one commits to 
quitting smoking, for example, this means that the person has decided that it would be best to 
quit smoking. In order to explain what Bratman referred to as the “volitional dimension” of 
commitment, Watson argues that evaluative judgments have a motivational force of their own, 
independent of inclinations.115 However, this theory has the implausible consequence that it 
would not be possible to commit to a plan that one does not believe would be the best thing to 
                                                            
115 This proposal also of course raises the issue of motivational “internalism” versus “externalism” 
(Björnsson, Strandberg, Olinder, Eriksson, & Björklund, 2015; or in Staude’s 1986 terminology, 
“cognitivism” versus “conativism”), a debate that is unfortunately outside the scope of this chapter. 
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do.116 For example, it would not be possible for someone to decide that it would be best if they 
did not drive while under the influence of alcohol, but then act on a plan to go to a bar and drive 
home after drinking. Cases like these provide reason for thinking that one can simultaneously 
commit to a belief about what would be best to do, and also commit to following a plan that is in 
conflict with the belief. Such cases also bolster the case I have been making that different kinds 
of psychological states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, or desires) can involve commitment, and such 
states will not be functionally equivalent. 
 
6.4.4 Commitment as Personal Identification with Inclinations 
 
After abandoning his earlier hierarchical theory of commitment, Frankfurt adopted a 
view of commitment based on the idea of personal identification. Frankfurt’s way of spelling this 
out is in terms of “wholeheartedness,” which refers to the degree to which “the person’s 
preferences concerning what he wants are … fully integrated” (1988, p. 165). An initial prima 
facie objection to this proposal might be that wholeheartedness does not seem necessary for 
commitment. Suppose person A and person B are committed to quitting smoking cigarettes. 
The fact that person B has stronger cravings than person A does not imply that person B is 
less committed than person A. Frankfurt anticipates this objection, writing that: 
When someone identifies himself with one rather than with another of his own 
desires, the result is not necessarily to eliminate the conflict between those 
desires, or even to reduce its severity, but to alter its nature. Suppose that a 
person with two conflicting desires identifies with one rather than with the other. 
This might cause the other – the desire with which the person does not identify – 
to become substantially weaker than it was, or to disappear altogether. But it 
need not. Quite possibly, the conflict between the two desires will remain as 
virulent as before. What the person’s commitment to the one eliminates is not the 
conflict between it and the other. It eliminates the conflict within the person as to 
which of these desires he prefers to be his motive. The conflict between the 
desires is in this way transformed into a conflict between one of them and the 
                                                            
116 Similarly, Klein, Molloy, and Cooper argue that “Being committed to a target is distinct from the 
summary judgment of how favorable (or unfavorable) one views that target. Indeed, one need not have a 
favorable view of a target to be committed to that target” (2009, p. 9). 
 
 
197 
person who has identified himself with its rival. That person is no longer uncertain 
which side he is on, in the conflict between the two desires, and the persistence 
of this conflict need not subvert or diminish the wholeheartedness of his 
commitment to the desire with which he identifies. (1988, p. 172) 
But now a new problem arises. In what sense is it the “person” that has now become 
“identified” with the desire? The agent still has both desires. It cannot simply be that the agent 
has chosen not to have one of the desires. Is the “person” something different from the agent? 
If so, then it would seem that we are just introducing a homunculus to explain the commitment. 
We are then led to ask what is involved in the homunculus identifying with the desire, and an 
infinite regress ensues.117 
Another way of fleshing this out is to say that what one commits to will be what one 
believes to be most consistent with one’s self-conception. But since this conception assimilates 
committal desires or intentions to beliefs, it faces similar objections to the evaluative judgment 
approach discussed above. A still further approach is to argue that one’s commitments will be 
those psychological states that match best with one’s stable character. The main problem with 
such virtue-based approaches is that they are not able to account for cases in which a person 
makes a commitment that is uncharacteristic of them: for example, a violent gang member who 
decides one day to make a lifestyle change. 
Ultimately, I believe that there is an important kernel of truth in the identification theory 
of commitment. But this is because the agent creates a certain kind of representation of itself 
as constrained by the commitment, and this is a special kind of representation (not merely an 
evaluative belief or second-order inclination) that can directly influence the agent’s behavior. I 
                                                            
117 Klein, Molloy, and Cooper also argue against understanding commitment in terms of identification: 
 
Although commitment and identification are both aspects of attachment (Meyer et 
al., 2006) and are often highly related (Riketta, 2005), identification is both 
deficient and contaminated as a construct definition of commitment. That is, there 
are unique aspects of commitment not captured by identification and 
characteristics of identification that are not part of commitment. (2009, p. 13) 
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will elaborate on this in Section 6.5. First, it is important to look at another account that I believe 
is also partially correct. 
 
6.4.5 Frankish on the Relation Between Commitment and Inclination 
 
Frankish (2004, 2016) endorses a distinction between two kinds of beliefs—“basic 
beliefs” and “superbeliefs”—and two corresponding kinds of desires—“basic desires” and 
“superdesires.” The “super” variety (which he refers to, in general, as “supermental states”) 
share the traits of being “conscious, apt to be occurrently activated, active, flat-out, and 
frequently language-involving”; the “basic” variety instead have “the opposite properties” 
(Frankish, 2004, p. 24). In his (2016), he also endorses a distinction between basic and 
supermental intentions. For Frankish, supermental states, unlike basic folk psychological 
states, involve commitment in Bratman’s sense: they can influence our reasoning and our 
motivation without the mediation of other people or changes in the environment. 
However, Frankish does not consider commitments to be capable of exerting these 
influences independently of inclinations (i.e., what he calls “basic” beliefs, desires, and 
intentions). Frankish argues, in fact, that the relation between supermental and basic states is 
one of realization. When one commits to a belief or an intention, one thereby acquires a 
behavioral disposition in virtue of taking on a constellation of basic-level psychological states: 
a behavioural commitment can be thought of as a kind of disposition – a 
disposition with a particular sort of basis. If one is committed to A-ing, then one 
will be disposed to A precisely because one believes oneself to be committed to 
A-ing and desires to honour this commitment – or, if belief and desire are graded, 
because one attaches a high probability to the proposition that one is committed 
to A-ing and a high desirability to honouring the commitment. And, as before, we 
can think of the commitment as realized in those states. (2004, p. 73) 
He understands commitment as a kind of self-imposed cognitive and conative policy and writes 
that “policy-related action is reflexively motivated: having a policy of A-ing involves being 
disposed to A because one believes oneself to have a policy of A-ing and wants to adhere to it” 
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(2004, p. 109), where the latter belief and desire are basic-level, by which he means they are 
themselves not only non-committal but also implicit and unconscious. He also refers to the 
relation as one of implementation: “the supermind is implemented, not in the hardware of the 
brain, but in basic-level intentional states and actions” (2004, p. 7). Frankish also wants to 
retain an important role of commitments in coordination and planning, however, agreeing with 
Dennett that committal states “can outlast the beliefs and desires that originally prompted their 
formation” (Frankish, 2004, p. 73). Thus, while committal states are synchronically “motivated 
by” (Frankish, 2004, p. 80) what I am calling inclinational states, they do not require the 
inclinational states involved in their creation to persist. 
So far, Frankish’s view may seem like a close cousin of Frankfurt’s (1971) view. For 
Frankish, being committed to going to the dentist on Tuesday means wanting to adhere to a 
policy of going to the dentist on Tuesday and believing that one has taken this on as a policy; 
this seems suspiciously close to saying (as the 1971 Frankfurt would) that one wants going to 
the dentist on Tuesday to be one’s “will,” i.e., to be one’s effective inclination. However, 
Frankish denies that his is such a hierarchical or higher-order type of view: 
Suppose I consciously judge that I need to talk to my bank manager and 
consciously decide to go to the bank in the morning. Then, these explicit mental 
states could be cited in explanation of my subsequently going to the bank. 
However, the conscious decision will have become effective in virtue of implicit 
mental states, including a belief that I am committed to going to the bank and a 
desire to execute my commitments, and these implicit states could also be cited 
in explanation of the action. Since these implicit beliefs and desires concern my 
premising commitments I shall refer to them as metacognitive states. (Note that 
‘metacognitive’ here does not mean higher-order. The implicit beliefs and desires 
in question are not about other implicit beliefs and desires but about the 
premising policies that constitute explicit beliefs and desires.) (2016, p. 38) 
Presumably this is because the dispositions that constitute commitment require a complex 
range of basic beliefs and desires that goes beyond those that would be cited in a higher-order 
view like Frankfurt’s: 
[Adopting a superbelief that] p or deciding to pursue goal x involves adopting a 
policy of: (1) bearing in mind that one has adopted p as a premise or x as a goal, 
and looking out for problems and inquiries to which it is relevant; (2) taking p or x 
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as input to conscious intentional inference, in conjunction with other premises 
and goals one has adopted; and (3) acting upon the results of these calculations 
– adopting any derived propositions and goals as further premises and goals, 
and performing, or forming intentions to perform, any dictated actions. (2004, p. 
97) 
If I understand Frankish correctly, then, the basic-level, realizer beliefs and desires will have 
items such as those listed in this last quotation (“premising policies”) as their direct contents 
(and in this sense, will be “metacognitive”), not “other implicit beliefs and desires” as on a 
Frankfurt-style view (which would result in Frankish’s commitments as being not merely 
metacognitive, but identical to “second-order” inclinations). This is why the relation between 
committal and inclinational states is one of realization, not identity: 
Talk of realization is, I think, appropriate here. A high-level behavioural 
disposition (say, the disposition to save money) exists in virtue of a set of 
underlying partial beliefs and desires which are, given a normal cognitive 
background, logically sufficient for it. (Frankish, 2004, p. 65) 
In response to Frankish’s proposals, it’s not clear to me why the “realizers” of committal 
states should themselves be considered as a form of what he calls “intentional states” (2016, p. 
38), i.e., beliefs, desires, or intentions. The kinds of dispositions listed in the above quotation 
from (2004), p. 97, might occur simply in virtue of internal control system states and processes 
of the kind I discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which may have sensory states, control 
parameters, behaviors, goals, etc. as contents, but without those contents satisfying the criteria 
I discussed in Chapter 4 (i.e., the kinds of contents beliefs and desires have). Frankish 
additionally writes that “I do not mean to deny the existence of a level of sub-personal 
psychology underlying the folk-psychological levels (we might call it a ‘sub-mind’)” (2004, p. 9); 
he does not seem to have provided sufficient reason for thinking that states and processes at 
the “sub-mind” level should not be considered the direct realizers of committal states. 
Part of the attractiveness of the idea that there ultimately must be desires or inclinations 
at the root of all “higher-level” processes like committal intentions, decision-making, etc. may 
 
 
201 
stem from a further ambiguity of terms like ‘desire’ and ‘inclination’. As a characteristic example 
exhibiting this ambiguity, consider the following two quotations: 
A brief word on desire. When action occurs, it is in the final analysis this 
phenomenon that underlies all of the workings of the act-generative mental 
machinery. For deciding, intending, striving, willing, and choosing, all require a 
foundation in desire. (O’Shaughnessy, 1980, p. 541) 
Twelve pages later in the same volume, O’Shaughnessy writes: 
… is it, after all, credible that a resolve should be something as uncommitted as a 
mere desire? No matter in what relations we suppose such a desire to stand, 
those same relations cannot manage to inject into its heart that element of 
commitment that is so central to the intention. Desire precisely is no form of 
commitment to its own expression. (1980, p. 553) 
Sometimes the word ‘desire’ is used (as in the first passage) to stand in for conative or 
motivational states of any kind; this corresponds to Davidson’s (1963) broad use of the phrase 
‘pro attitude’. In this sense, even Bratman would agree that an intention involves “desire”; this 
is exactly what he referred to as the “volitional dimension” of intention. Similarly, Ryle (1949) 
used ‘inclination’ in this broad sense to include any kind of motive. 
However, such usages of ‘desire’ and ‘inclination’ cannot be operative in passages such 
as the second one from O’Shaughnessy. In passages like these, ‘desire’ and ‘inclination’ are 
limited to those motivations that do not result from deliberation or decision but instead “stem 
from a source external to reason or will” (Schapiro, 2009, p. 233). No philosopher has achieved 
more mileage from this ambiguity than David Hume, and I believe that to this day, many 
philosophers like Frankish are tempted by it to analyze even committal states into desires of 
the non-committal kind. 
A second problem with Frankish’s position is that there seems to be a tension between 
his view that committal states are realized by inclinational states, on the one hand, and his 
agreement with Dennett (and Bratman) that committal states “can outlast the beliefs and 
desires that originally prompted their formation” (Frankish, 2004, p. 73). What sort of 
inclinations might be the ones that realize the outlasting committal states, if not the very same 
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ones that originally prompted their formation? I believe that Frankish’s account may correctly 
describe the kind of constellation of inclinations that typically accompanies the formation of a 
commitment, but once the commitment has been formed, considerations such as those raised 
by Bratman make it clear that such underlying inclinations do not need to be sustained for the 
commitment to persist over time; this would undermine the crucial role of commitment in 
planning and coordination.  
Finally, Frankish’s theory is designed to map the committal/non-committal distinction 
onto other distinctions that are subsumed by “dual-process” theories of reasoning (e.g., Evans 
& Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). Here, recall that Frankish characterizes supermental, but not 
basic, states as “conscious, apt to be occurrently activated, active, flat-out, and frequently 
language-involving” (2004, p. 24). However, many of the dimensions along which Frankish 
divides types of mental states are increasingly coming under criticism in psychology and 
neuroscience literature (Mugg, 2016, 2018). In his review of Frankish’s book, Toribio writes: 
Are all conscious beliefs binary? Are all non-conscious beliefs partial? Is a 
Bayesian model only applicable to non-conscious reasoning? The division here 
seems to be too sharp, easily leading to counter-examples, and although 
Frankish acknowledges that counter-examples would be unavoidable, the 
alignment of conscious and flat-out beliefs under a classical model of reasoning 
seems to be just wrong. (2007, p. 140) 
Mugg (2018) argues that instead of positing two distinct “minds” or two “reasoning systems,” as 
Frankish does, we need an account of how states with different characteristics interact in a 
single reasoning system to produce the kind of motivational and cognitive phenomena that 
correspond to the continuously variable degrees of cognitive control, working memory usage, 
and adherence to norms of reasoning and planning. In the following section, I provide some 
suggestions toward a novel account of commitment that meets such criteria. 
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6.5 An Emulator-Based Hypothesis about the Nature of 
Commitment 
 
In order to account for self-control through internal commitments, we must go beyond 
inclinational agency. Something further needs to be built into the agent architecture beyond 
what inclinational agency includes. First, consider what goes on in the human mind while 
deliberating about possible courses of action. As described in the previous chapter, an 
inclinational agent chooses between candidate actions by considering consequences, states of 
its environmental models that are predicted to result from candidate actions, and compares 
them based on its preferences about these environmental states. Humans are capable of more 
than this, however. When deliberating about courses of action, we consider not only the 
predicted consequences of possible actions, but also existing plans that may conflict. Now a 
question may be raised here: wouldn’t the agent’s plans be included in the predictive model? 
After all, the agent itself is part of its own world, part of its environment; its predicted behaviors 
would also be taken into account by a “rational” inclinational agent.  
This question misses something important: a plan that an agent has is not a prediction 
of what it will do in the future: forming a plan is not merely a process of self-prediction. But 
while a plan is not a prediction, it is yet something to be taken into account when deciding what 
to do. The total set of plans that an agent has constitute a set of constraints to be taken into 
account in further deliberation; specifically, a set of constraints about the agent’s future 
behavior. In order to properly deliberate in the manner of a human, then, what the agent needs 
to use is a non-predictive representation of itself, of its own future behavior, that can be 
updated as its plans continue to be formed. In other words, what the agent needs is a non-
predictive prospective model of its own inclinational self. I will say that it is a prescriptive model 
 
 
204 
rather than a predictive model,118 although the normativity involved in such prescription is not of 
the moral variety; it is the minimal normativity of practical rationality: the set of constraints that 
the agent prescribes to itself in order not to violate its own practical commitments. There is a 
very simple way to think about the set of constraints constituted by the model: they simply are 
the agent’s practical commitments. They constitute the commitments. 
Now the constraints of the agent’s model of its own inclinational self can only function in 
the role of internal commitments if this model actually has some causal influence over the 
agent’s behavior. Here Bratman would say that we need to account, not only for the reason-
centered dimension of commitment, but the volitional dimension as well. To capture the 
volitional dimension of commitment and thereby enable it to function in the role of an internal 
commitment, the prescriptive model, which could also be called a committal model, must be 
dynamically coupled to the agent’s capacity to generate motor impulses. 
We already know that the brain makes use of internal models that are causally coupled 
to one’s motor capacities, including at least internal models of the bodily self. Drawing from the 
work of Mitsuo Kawato and Daniel Wolpert among others, Grush (2004) develops a theory of 
mental representation based on evidence of the use of neural sensorimotor emulators in motor 
control. In order for motor control to be as smooth as possible, an emulator in the brain models 
how one’s proprioceptive sensory inputs will change in response to movement. Feedback from 
the emulator about how movements will affect one’s body and the environment can be 
generated much more rapidly than from sensory signals, so this helps to explain why we are 
able to engage in such smoothly controlled, precise movements. Grush explains as follows: 
                                                            
118 Szpunar, Shrikanth, and Schacter differentiate between four types of mental prospection: “simulation 
(construction of a detailed mental representation of the future), prediction (estimation of the likelihood of, 
and/or one’s reaction to, a particular future outcome), intention (the mental act of setting a goal), and 
planning (the identification and organization of steps toward achieving a goal state)” (2018, p. 52). What 
they call ‘intention’ comes closest to what I mean by commitment, but their focus is on the remembering 
of intentions, rather than what Bratman called the volitional dimension of intentions; the latter (which I 
have referred to as prescriptive prospection) does not figure in their taxonomy per se. 
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The idea is that in addition to simply engaging with the body and environment, 
the brain constructs neural circuits that act as models of the body and 
environment. During overt sensorimotor engagement, these models are driven by 
efference copies in parallel with the body and environment, in order to provide 
expectations of the sensory feedback, and to enhance and process sensory 
information. These models can also be run off-line in order to produce imagery, 
estimate outcomes of different actions, and evaluate and develop motor plans. 
(2004, p. 377) 
See Figure 6.1. In the case of motor control, the “Plant” represents the musculoskeletal 
system. The brain generates efferent signals (motor commands) that are sent to the body, but 
copies of these signals are also sent to circuits in the brain that emulate the musculoskeletal 
system, generating the ‘mock’ proprioceptive feedback that would result from the movements. 
The main advantage of using emulated proprioceptive feedback is that it can be generated 
more quickly than real proprioceptive feedback. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Control that relies on feedback received from a forward model 
(emulator) of the plant (adapted from Grush, 2004, p. 379). 
 
By running “off-line”, Grush means that the control signal is sent only to the emulator, 
but not to the plant, in Figure 6.1. This allows the motor centers to anticipate how, for example, 
the position of my arm will hypothetically change if a certain motor signal is produced. As 
Grush explains, these skills actually require two models: a model of the object itself, or perhaps 
of myself situated in an environment, and a model of what the resulting sensory inputs would 
Sensory Input
Controller Plant
Emulator
Control Signal
Duplicate of
control signal
(efference copy)
Behavior
Feedback from Emulator
(‘mock’ sensor information about plant’s behavior)
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be given the state of the object or environment (2004, p. 388; both of these would be contained 
within the “Emulator” box of Figure 6.1). 
Grush’s theory is mostly concerned with motor imagery, but he also argues that it can 
explain how we are able to generate visual imagery, for example, in our imagination. My ability 
to mentally rotate a cube, for example, may involve an articulated mental model that models a 
number of parameters of the cube, such as its degree of rotation on three axes, its color, etc. In 
addition, it would involve a model of how the cube would look from a given perspective and 
under certain environmental conditions (lighting, etc.), which would take the former model’s 
parameters (as well as its location and orientation relative to my sensory organs, etc.) as inputs 
and generate sensory content as output. 
The literature on mental and neural models generally treats them as predictive in 
nature. But what would a prescriptive model look like in the brain? The functional roles 
postulated by Bratman and others for committal states generally fall under what neuroscientists 
refer to as “executive functions” (e.g., Fuster, 2015, pp. 389–401) or “cognitive control” (e.g., 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). According to Fuster, the adoption of a plan or distal goal of action 
involves the updating of a special memory, which he refers to as executive memory: 
the prefrontal cortex is the depository of executive memory networks, that is, 
networks that represent past actions, future actions, or both. It is impossible to 
construe an executive function without postulating a subjacent executive memory 
network constituting the neural substrate on which the function will take place. 
That same network, orderly and timely activated, will be used in attention, in 
working memory, in planning, and so on. In a word, at a given time, the network 
will cease to be only representational and will also become operational to serve 
any or all of those executive functions. (2015, p. 197) 
When future actions are stored in executive memory, one is not simply remembering that it is 
possible or probable that one will take a certain action in the future; by residing in executive 
memory the future action is scheduled to happen, and will be executed (i.e., “operational”) 
when the time arrives. Based on a wide range of findings that are reviewed in Fuster’s book 
(2015), Fuster further concludes that 
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The abstract schema of the plan would be represented in higher prefrontal 
(perhaps frontopolar) regions and its more concrete elements of action in lower, 
premotor, and motor levels. Some of these concrete elements of action may not 
be represented in the cortex at all but, instead, in the lower levels of the 
executive hierarchy, such as the cerebellum and the basal ganglia. All in all, the 
plan is for the organism a way of imagining or creating the future by means of a 
new or reconstituted neural network. That network, like those that serve the other 
executive functions, can be appropriately considered a “memory of the future.” 
(2015, p. 391; see also Fuster, 2013, Chapter 5) 
Fuster claims that it is difficult to speculate based on current research what kinds of 
representations are involved in these functions: 
New plans are thoroughly anchored in established executive memory. A new 
plan is a rearrangement of that memory with a new set of objectives, a new 
order, a new timetable, and possibly a new ultimate goal. In any case, that plan is 
essentially based on old experience of prior actions. In a way similar to the way a 
new perceptual memory is formed in posterior cortex on a base of old memory 
(phyletic, episodic, semantic, or other), so is the prospective memory of a new 
plan formed in frontal cortex on a base of established executive memory. By 
current means, we have no way of knowing how that plan is represented in 
frontal cortex, least of all how its attributes of time and order are represented. 
(2015, p. 390) 
Pezzulo (2012) suggests that such long-term executive plans may be represented and 
updated by means of emulators, in a similar way to how emulators enable sensorimotor 
imagination and coordination. Pezzulo argues that such emulators could represent distal 
(committal) goals as long-term expectations about future events, and that this can support a 
view of executive function as an extension of Friston’s (2010) “Active Inference” hierarchical 
theory of brain function.119 Friston describes action as driven by the minimization of average 
surprise. Here, surprise is being conceived of as a measure of unexpectedness. An input may 
be unexpected if the agent had not correctly modeled that input as a probabilistic consequence 
of its causes. If the agent’s sensory systems model the environment perfectly, then the agent’s 
average surprise becomes zero, and the recognition density is maximized. The recognition 
density of the agent is the degree to which it has modeled the causes of its sensory states in a 
Bayes-optimal fashion. In information theory, a lower average surprise and a greater 
                                                            
119 Metzinger (2017) makes a similar proposal. See also Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston (2018). 
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recognition density means that there is less free energy in the system; this is also expressed by 
saying that the entropy of the system is lower. According to Friston’s free energy formulation of 
action, then, we can understand perception and action in terms of active inference, which 
can be formulated as a minimization of free-energy; where free-energy bounds 
the surprise inherent in sensory data, under a model of how those data were 
caused. This leads to the free-energy principle, which says that everything in the 
brain should change to minimize free-energy. (Friston et al., 2009, p. 2) 
The free energy formulation of action attempts to explain the action of organisms as 
driven by the reduction of entropy (and thereby the maintenance of self-organization) as well as 
the minimization of surprise (2010, p. 1). Pezzulo’s extension to this framework then proposes 
that 
cognitive control consists in a nesting of optimizations (i.e., free energy 
minimization loops) over time; in addition to the usual overt loop of active 
inference, one (or more) covert loop(s) help optimizing distal goals. (2012) 
However, since Friston’s approach treats all such processes as predictive; it’s not clear how it 
could distinguish between predictive and prescriptive mental prospection, and therefore 
distinguish between commitments and mere anticipated events (that are anticipated merely by 
induction or causal reasoning from earlier events). As Bratman (1987, pp. 19–20) argues, we 
are often able to form intentions that deviate from expectations about what we are most likely 
to actually do. I can act on my intention to win the lottery by buying a lottery ticket even though 
I expect to lose. If my commitments really were a matter of minimizing surprise, I could not form 
such an intention in the first place (unless I were somehow deluded into believing that my 
winning the lottery is the most likely outcome, which is likely rare among those who play the 
lottery).120 
                                                            
120 Gershman and Daw (2012) use similar considerations to criticize Friston’s framework more broadly, 
arguing that it does not account for the fact that brain processes must often represent the utility of an 
event separately from its likelihood: 
 
Although the free-energy principle appears at the least to be a very useful formulation for 
exposing the computational parallelism between perceptual and decision problems, the 
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I believe that we can adopt Pezzulo’s idea of executive function representations as 
implemented by emulators, but we have to combine this with Fuster’s concept of executive 
memory. What I am proposing is the notion of an executive emulator: an emulator that 
emulates, not causal environmental or bodily events, but the generation of the effects of 
inclinational states (such as actions) by other parts of the brain. Emulation could be the means 
by which executive memory keeps track of past instances of action generation and execution 
and can recreate the effects of such processes at a later time in the absence of the perceptual 
stimuli and motivational drive activation that produced the original actions. Suppose I am 
executing my plan to go to the beach. Emulator circuits are producing similar effects in my 
brain (generating motor commands, engaging my navigation skills, making me feel frustrated if 
an obstruction requires me to take a much longer route, etc.) as if I suddenly felt and was 
acting on an (inclinational) urge to go to the beach. This can occur even if am not currently 
inclined to go to the beach, i.e., I may be going there to work (e.g., as a lifeguard or surfing 
instructor), whereas I may feel like doing something somewhere else instead (e.g., go hiking in 
the mountains). Instead of calling it an “executive emulator,” we might call it a committal 
emulator, since it is able to subserve commitments. 
How would such an emulator be incorporated into a control scheme? To see this, go 
back to Figure 6.1 and imagine that the “Plant” is instead the inclinational self, i.e., some set of 
inclinational circuits (the circuits that underwrite inclinational beliefs, desires, preferences, etc.). 
The “Controller” will be represented by circuits that are upstream from the inclinational circuits 
                                                            
more radical maneuver of treating them both as literally optimizing a single objective 
function is harder to swallow. A state’s equilibrium likelihood and its utility are, on the 
classical view, not the same thing; rare events might be either unusually bad (being out of 
water, for a fish), good (being elected president, for an African American), or indeed 
neither. (2012, p. 306) 
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in question.121 The “Emulator” box will then become a committal model of the inclinational self. 
The emulator will be able to generate anticipated causal consequences of actions, which can 
be used for on-line cognitive control or off-line deliberation. But a key difference from the 
scheme in Figure 6.1 is that the emulator will also generate similar output signals to the 
inclinational circuits and project to similar areas (e.g., the basal ganglia), so that it can compete 
with the inclinational circuits. The resulting scheme is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
This committal emulator theory can explain how committal and inclinational states can 
compete with each other both cognitively and motivationally within a single reasoning system. 
Since committal emulators are emulating the inclinational circuits, their outputs will be encoded 
in the same way, and can be used directly as inputs to other inclinational circuits or to the same  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Commitment as the emulation of inclination. Note that the committal model does not 
merely produce anticipated feedback (both present and future), but also directly competes with 
inclinational circuits to produce motor output. This does not represent a fixed set of components 
and connections in the brain, but a control scheme that can exist at and spontaneously organize 
on the fly at many levels of organization. Different committal emulators may become active 
depending on what the subject is deliberating about or what their current tasks and goals are. 
 
                                                            
121 As described by Berntson and Cacioppo (2008), motivational circuits are organized heterarchically, not 
hierarchically, in the brain, so which circuits are “upstream” from which ones will depend on the functional 
context. 
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outputs as inclinational circuits. This could explain the extensive connectivity running directly 
from the PFC to late motor areas, basal ganglia, and cerebellum. 
Similarly, inclinational circuits can input directly to the committal emulators. A committal 
emulator might be used for more deliberately controlled performance of an action that is 
stimulated inclinationally, as when I feel a sudden inclination to shoot while playing basketball, 
but then effortfully try to control the motion in a certain way that I earlier consciously planned 
(i.e., I shoot because I am inclined to, but then I make sure to shoot in the way that I 
committally desired to, e.g., following a coach’s advice of keeping my shoulders square to the 
basket). In this way, I can smoothly transition between executive and automatic control.  
The use of committal emulators can also help to explain why mentally simulating future 
actions (Taylor & Pham, 1996) and forming implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) 
increases commitment: these actions stimulate off-line emulation of the circuits involved in the 
action, causing reinforcement of and articulation of the circuits subserving the emulation in 
executive memory. Further, the fact that humans are able to anticipate future motivational 
states provides support for the idea that commitment may rely on the emulation of inclinational 
circuits. As Sharot writes: 
humans are able to take into account future motivational states when making 
decisions. We go grocery shopping, even if we had recently eaten a large meal, 
because we can anticipate being hungry in a few hours and are aware that the 
fridge is empty (although we might purchase less than we eventually need). This 
ability may be absent in our less sophisticated evolutionary ancestors. (2012, pp. 
67–68) 
In cases like this, a committal emulator may be running off-line to facilitate a decision of whether 
to go shopping, and if so, what to buy. 
As noted by Mugg (2018), the human brain is not limited to discretely switching in an 
all-or-nothing way between using automatic and controlled (or “Type 1” and “Type 2”) 
processes for a given task; humans can smoothly vary the amount of working memory and 
attention being used, and the extent to which the task is performed “consciously” or 
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“deliberately.” Again, the emulator theory can provide insight. Grush (2004) discusses the fact 
that sensorimotor neural emulators likely use something that works like a Kalman filter (Kálmán 
& Bucy, 1961) to continuously compare the actual proprioceptive feedback with the 
proprioceptive feedback that is modeled by the emulator circuits. The difference is used to 
make corrections in the operation of the emulator. But the system will also keep track of the 
reliability of the proprioceptive feedback signal; when it is too noisy or unreliable, the system 
will weight the modeled proprioceptive feedback from the emulator more heavily so that it has 
greater influence in regulating motor output (this weighting is called the “Kalman gain”). The 
Kalman gain therefore determines the extent to which the dynamics of the internal model are 
relied upon for motor control at a given time rather than the dynamics of the body itself. The 
Kalman filter then allows motor control to be much smoother and more robust than it would be 
if only proprioceptive feedback or only emulator feedback were used (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & 
Jordan, 1995). 
Something like Kalman filters could be in operation to bias the amount of influence the 
executive emulators will have versus subcortical motivational circuits over action selection and 
motor control (in Figure 6.2, their point of modulation is designated with the symbol ⨂). The 
neuromodulatory systems could play a key role here, which would make sense given the 
widespread connectivity of such systems to both cortical and subcortical areas of the brain 
(Briand et al., 2007). For example, suppose someone is hiking in the wilderness, following a 
route that they have deliberate decided on days earlier. But the person suddenly sees a 
dangerous animal charging and “instinctively” starts running away from it, deviating from the 
planned route. Of course, it is likely that no reconsideration of one’s intention was necessary in 
this case; the brain’s noradrenergic system likely causes the equivalent of a large shift in the 
“Kalman gain,” resulting in one’s fight-or-flight inclinational states to take almost total control. 
Similarly, by stimulating the GABA system, drugs like Ritalin can have an opposite effect on the 
“Kalman gain,” causing the executive emulator circuits to have more control, and controlling 
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inclinational impulses. Continuing this analogy, the process that is analogous to monitoring the 
reliability or noise-level of the proprioceptive feedback is likely far more complex, and the 
emotions and reward system likely also play key roles.122 There are likely many different 
“Kalman gains” corresponding to different kinds of inclinational circuits (and corresponding 
emulators) that may operate in a more or less “automatic” manner. 
Committal emulators could also be used to represent the commitments of other people 
for use in social interaction and coordination. As Ybarra and Winkielman write, humans engage 
in 
a diverse range of … intense social interactions, spanning the gamut from 
forming impressions on dates and performance in job interviews, to discussions 
of policies with colleagues, consultations of clothing choices with a sensitive 
spouse, bargaining with a sneaky salesperson, to performing a complex dance, 
playing a bridge game, or having a diplomatic negotiation. Often, to be effective 
in the latter, complex and often more consequential type of social interaction a 
perceiver is required to develop an on-line representation of a dynamic and 
changing mental-model of another person’s beliefs, expectations, emotions, and 
desires. The perceiver also must be able to problem-solve, inhibit inappropriate 
behaviors, take-turns, and pursue goals in a distraction-rich environment. (2012, 
p. 1) 
It is possible that executive functions and the ability for these kinds of social interactions 
evolved together, as the ability to construct and use committal emulators evolved. This would 
also explain findings that suggest that complex social interactions can facilitate more effective 
executive functioning (Ybarra and Winkielman, 2012; Ding et al., 2018); such activities might 
do so by training the brain’s ability to generate and use committal emulators. 
It would certainly not be possible in the limited space of this chapter to evaluate the 
committal emulator hypothesis in light of the large body of empirical findings on executive 
                                                            
122 The hypothesis being developed here is admittedly very sketchy and it is too early for empirical 
confirmation or disconfirmation. However, Avery and Krichmar claim that empirical findings support the 
view that neuromodulatory systems “provide a foundation for cognitive function in higher organisms; 
attention, emotion, goal-directed behavior, and decision-making derive from the interaction between the 
neuromodulatory systems and brain areas, such as the amygdala, frontal cortex, hippocampus, and 
sensory cortices” (2017, p. 1). Such findings would mesh well with the view that neuromodulatory systems 
facilitate the development and updating of executive emulator circuits and modulation of competition 
between executive emulators and inclinational circuits.  
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functioning and neuromodulatory systems to date, nor to speculate about specific empirical 
predictions that would follow from it; these are tasks to be pursued in future work. Instead I will 
conclude this section by considering some differences between the position here being 
explored and Frankish’s position that was discussed in the previous section. Recall that on 
Frankish’s view, committal states are not identical to inclinational states but are implemented 
by them. For Frankish this is a synchronic relation: a committal state exists at a given moment 
in virtue of the inclinational states that implement it at that moment. This is not the case on the 
committal emulator hypothesis: committal states are implemented by emulator circuits, which 
model inclinational circuits. But the inclinational circuits they model do not need to be actively 
engaged for a commitment to influence one’s behavior or cognition (just as I act on my 
commitment to go to the dentist even though I don’t really feel like going), and may no longer 
even exist in the same form as when the emulator circuit was first formed. Emulator circuits 
could also be modulated without the corresponding inclinational circuit being modulated in that 
way; they may be subserved by different parts of the brain. This better accommodates 
Dennett’s and Bratman’s point that, as Frankish puts it, committal states “can outlast the beliefs 
and desires that originally prompted their formation” (2004, p. 73). 
Like Frankish’s view, I believe that the committal emulator picture can support both 
committal and inclinational versions of desires, intentions, and beliefs. Executive emulators 
could emulate not only inclinational desire or inclinational intention circuits, but also 
inclinational circuits that register perceptual information or the presence/absence of states of 
affairs (to yield committal beliefs). Since it is the functional (input and output) characteristics 
that are emulated rather than the internal workings, the corresponding imagery or perceptual 
data would not need to be emulated. This is likely the reason why executive emulators lend 
themselves more naturally to articulation of their contents in linguistic form. Unlike on 
Frankish’s view, however, I don’t think that conceptual or linguistic articulation is essential to 
committal states or the executive emulators that underlie them. 
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Similarly, I don’t think that committal states are necessarily more “conscious” than 
inclinational states. What does seem to be true about committal emulators is that their use 
requires working memory and attentional resources and can result in “ego depletion” 
(Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007). But the work of Bargh (e.g., Huang & Bargh, 2014), 
among others, seems to demonstrate that goal commitments can be formed, sustained, 
modified, and can control behavior without conscious awareness, conscious effort, or the 
“feeling of agency.” Finally, though committal states often seem to work in an all-or-nothing 
manner (e.g., flat-out as opposed to Bayesian belief), this likely does not reflect the nature of 
committal states in general but instead the way they often interact with other states. 
Inclinational states work in a partial way because they are frequently in competition with other 
conflicting inclinational states—an unlimited number of inclinational circuits can be activated at 
a given time. But due to the fact that committal states generally require scarce working memory 
and attentional resources, far fewer of them can be actively engaged at the same time. 
Additionally, nothing stops a person from committing to a partial belief. After thinking it over for 
a while, one might make up one’s mind that there is a pretty good chance that the person they 
saw earlier that day was someone they went to elementary school with. Having committed to 
this (partial) belief, one may stick to it even after one’s memory of the experience that first 
triggered the inclinational belief has faded (and with it, the inclinational belief). 
 
6.6 Conclusion: Internal Perspectivalism about Committal Agency 
 
All committal agents are agents. All agents are control systems (not mere regulators; 
see Section 4.4.1). All control systems are observer-worker systems. Because committal 
agents are observer-worker systems, they (at any moment) have a perspective on how to 
behave given the current detected situation. Because they are control systems, they have a 
perspective on what kind of influence to have on control parameters given the current sensory 
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(input) parameters. Because they are agents (i.e., at least have the capacity for inclinational 
agency), they have preferences, which requires a perspective on whether things that are 
potentially either under their control or not under their control are in fact under their control at a 
given time. Continuing this trend, we might ask if committal agency is associated with a distinct 
type of perspective. Here, I believe that the following quotation from Bratman is especially 
relevant: 
Of course, there is a sense in which when I act, I act at a particular time; but in 
acting I do not see myself, the agent of the act, as simply a time-slice agent. I 
see my action at that time as the action of the same agent as he who has acted 
in the past and (it is to be hoped) will act in the future. In this respect I differ 
importantly from those nonhuman agents who do not have the resources to 
understand their own agency as temporally extended. (2000, p. 43) 
I believe that Bratman’s insight here, that what is distinctive about committal agency (which he 
calls “planning agency”) is that from the agent’s perspective, the agent’s own agency is 
temporally extended, is fundamentally correct. The agent’s own self, as agent, becomes not 
just the subject but the object of its own agency: it becomes one of the things that has been, 
and will be, either under its control or not under its control in various ways at various times. It 
doesn’t just see its own body or its cognitive capacities as tools for its own use: it sees its own 
agency as a tool for its own use. And it can subject itself to its own past commands, as well as 
subordinate its future self to its current self, by means of internal operations. The emulator 
theory of commitment provides a way of fleshing this out mechanistically.  
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